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Abstract 
 
Developments in the investment securities markets have played an important role in the 
growth and globalization of the world’s financial markets. Securities market participants, 
investment banks and hedges funds in particular, were also in the epicentre of the global 
financial crisis 2007~2010 (GFC). The globalization-to-crisis process has highlighted 
the problems of regulating the globalizing transnational securities markets on the basis 
of national laws alone. More precisely, the three global-level problems in securities 
regulation are: regulatory divergence and conflicts, gaps in cross-border supervision, 
and, spill-over of systemic risks. 
 This thesis contributes to the post-GFC regulatory reforms debate by 
establishing the concept of a Global Regulatory Framework (GRF). The GRF consists 
of a flexible governance structure within which national regulators and policy makers 
may interact with counterparts, either directly or through regional and global bodies, in 
seeking to address cross-border or substantive issues of securities regulation. The GRF 
also comprises a framework of tools for regulatory and supervisory cooperation, using 
which solutions could be reached for the global-level problems.  
 The GRF is essentially soft law by nature. As a result, while the structure and 
mechanisms provided by the GRF contribute to securities market efficiency and 
stability, national sovereignty is also duly upheld. The problems of implementation and 
legitimacy pertaining to soft law processes are addressed, with recommendations for an 
implementation structure and principles of ex ante participation and transparency 
developed.  
The thesis comprises three Parts, with two Chapters in each, followed by a 
seventh Chapter of overall Conclusions. Starting from the analysis of the three global-
level regulatory problems in the fast globalizing securities markets, the thesis builds on 
the experience from the EU and US, and other global actors, including the IMF, FSB 
and IOSCO, to produce a multi-layered structure for the governance of the securities 
markets. The GRF is designed to accommodate and engender different functions and 
forms of collective actions, because flexibility is crucial for addressing new cross-
border issues arising from the often turbulent transnational securities markets. 
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Introduction 
 
My journey to find a regulatory framework for the globalizing securities markets began 
in March 2007. That now appears to be a different era from the present time of writing. 
Yet I can still recall being on board a bus in the City of London during the last days of 
winter in early 2007, when a piece of financial news caught my eye. The news, which 
concerned the then latest mortgage offers to the City workers allowing them to borrow 
multiple times their salary, was in fact nothing very particular at the time. I remember 
myself smiling as I read the piece of news, and thinking of Harold Macmillan’s phrase 
‘people have never had it so good’.1 
 Five years on, the financial market landscape in the City of London and across 
other financial centres on the globe has been very significantly altered. The saga of the 
global financial crisis started to unfold less than six months after my reading of the 
mortgage news on board the London bus. 2  The root of the crisis was a different 
mortgage market in a different continent. But because of the exuberance at the time, 
involving the collective recklessness of market participants across many countries, the 
default in the United States subprime mortgage sector led to the collapse of a local bank 
(Northern Rock) in the north of the United Kingdom, and, then, parallel collapses of 
financial institutions in a number of other countries, thereby resulting in the evaporation 
of investor confidence, panic, and a totally dysfunctional financial system worldwide. 
Calling the financial markets events between 2007~2010 the global financial crisis 
(GFC) was indeed justified both by the geographical scope of the crisis and its profound 
impact on the economy and wider society. 
 The crisis had also impacted on the focus of my research. In the era before the 
GFC, securities markets were becoming increasingly globalized, with market 
 
1
 The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan speaking at a Tory rally in 1957, painted a rosy picture of 
the British economy, while urging wage restraints and warning of inflation. 
2
 An outline of the events in the GFC is given in Chapter 1, Section 2.2. 
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participants operating on a transnational basis.3 The presence of legal pluralism and 
regulatory divergence in cross-border securities markets transactions had caused 
difficulties for transnational market participants and national regulators.4 The focus of 
my research was initially on how to facilitate market access for foreign issuers and 
financial services providers, and, to ensure their efficient regulation and supervision. 
However, it had come to light during the crisis that activities in the capital markets, such 
as structured finance, hedge funds, and securities instruments issued and traded on these 
markets, including collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps, had led to 
exacerbation of the liquidity problems in different types of financial institutions, 
through the creation of a highly leveraged opaque debt chain. In other words, systemic 
risks in securities markets had come to the fore. Therefore, the question of how to 
provide for systemic risks regulation in globalizing securities markets became an 
additional aspect of my research.  
 The thesis reflects the state of the law on 1
st
 September 2012. 
Aim and scope 
The scope of my thesis is defined by the ‘global-level problems in securities regulation’. 
The concepts of ‘securities’ and ‘regulation’ are defined in Chapter 1. Three global-
level problems are identified and analyzed in Chapter 2. They are: 
1) Regulatory divergence and conflict of laws; 
2) Risks of cross-border supervision for national regulators; 
3) Propagation of systemic risk across territorial boundaries.  
Thus I will not be considering specific substantive issues of securities regulation, and 
will instead examine, from the global-level perspective, how to enhance the current 
system of national-law based regulation and supervision, so that the needs of 
 
3
 One of the indicators of the level of internationalization of securities markets is the US cross-border 
securities data collected by staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. For 
example, since 1974, when surveys began on foreign ownership of US long-term securities, the share 
of the total value of US long-term securities held by foreigners has more than tripled, from less than 5% 
to 16% as of June 2005. In terms of market value, the level of foreign holdings of U.S. long-term 
securities increased from $67 billion as of year-end 1974 to $6.3 trillion as of June 2005. 
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/crossbordersecurities/default.htm. Accessed on 
01/09/2012. 
4
 See Chapter 2, Sections 1.1 and 1.2. 
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transnational securities markets and global financial stability could be met. The aim of 
my research is to establish a framework for addressing these global-level regulatory 
problems so as to promote financial market stability and efficiency. 
 Furthermore, although the global-level regulatory problems are also relevant to 
the banking and insurance sectors, my examination of these problems is conducted 
solely through the lens of securities and securities markets. Although a silos-based 
approach to financial regulation has been criticized for not giving due regards to the 
cross-sectoral nature of financial markets, thereby resulting in regulatory risks, 5  a 
sectoral study of the global-level problems could not be said to give rise to the same 
degree of risks. This is because notwithstanding any global-level initiatives concerning 
financial regulation, the functions of regulation and supervision would remain within 
the competence of national regulatory authorities.6 Moreover, cross-sectoral cooperation 
could be employed at the global-level to address overlapping and underlapping of 
issues.7 My focus selection is necessary from a methodological stand point, due to the 
prospect of a more in-depth analysis from studying one sector of the financial industry 
and limitation of space. Selecting the securities sector for investigation is also arguably 
sound from a theoretical stand point. Firstly, the Joint Forum of the international 
standard-setters has recently identified that there are many unique aspects in securities 
regulation, in particular, securities regulators’ remit encompasses both firms and 
markets, whereas banking and insurance regulators mainly supervise financial 
institutions.8 Secondly, since securities markets and market participants have a natural 
propensity for establishing cross-border linkages, global-level regulatory problems 
occur frequently in this part of the financial industry. Thus a case study of the global-
 
5
 For a discussion of the risks of silo-based approach in regulation, e.g. see Niamh Moloney, ‘The 
European Securities and Markets Authority and institutional design for the EU financial market - a 
tale of two competences: Part 1: rule-making’, 2011 (12) E.B.O.R. 41, 83-85. 
6
 My thesis will not directly address the issues of institutional structures of financial regulation under 
national laws. However, it is worth noting that the GFC has shown that no single institutional 
structure (consolidated, twin-peak or sectoral-based) was the most sufficient. See e.g., FSA, ‘The 
Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis’ (2009), 89-90. 
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. For excellent overview of 
the debates, see Charles Goodhart et al, Financial regulation: why, how and where now? (London: 
Routledge) 1998, Chapter 8. More recently, see Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Structure of Financial 
Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial 
Supervisors’, (2007) 8 E.B.O.R. 237.  
7
 For example the Joint Forum, discussed in Chapter 4, Section 1.3.3. 
8
 Joint Forum, ‘Review of the Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial Regulation’, 5. 
(IOSCOPD315) 
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level regulatory problems from a securities regulation perspective would be 
representative of the issues in other sectors of the financial markets. Findings of the case 
study could therefore be applicable to other financial sectors.  
Methodology 
In the absence of an international legal system, my investigation into the three global-
level problems in securities regulation is based on comparative studies between national, 
regional and global-level initiatives. Three distinct research methods have been 
employed for this purpose. 
 The doctrinal research method is used for investigating securities regulation in 
the European Union (EU) and United States (US). In Chapter 3, an analysis of EU and 
US laws is provided in order to make comparisons and draw lessons for global-level 
governance.  
 An interview is used to investigate the work and operation of the International 
Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO), which is a key part of my research in 
Chapter 4 into the existing approaches of global-level cooperation. The purpose of the 
interview was to fulfil the gaps in my examination of IOSCO’s public documents, since 
information on the culture of the soft law body and operations of its standard-setting 
committees could not be found from the documents. The interview was conducted with 
David Cliffe, the former head of communications at IOSCO, through a recorded phone 
conversation, with the interview transcript approved by Calta Vitzthum, David’s 
successor. A questionnaire, designed according to quantitative social research methods,9 
was used in the interview. It comprises two sections. Section 1 concerns IOSCO’s 
activities to date in the three areas of 1) standards-setting, 2) cross-border market 
surveillance, and 3) mutual assistance and sharing regulatory experience. Section 2 
concerns the future orientation of IOSCO’s work and Section 3 the organizational issues 
of the Organization. I have drawn on the interview in my analyses throughout the thesis. 
 Moreover, in seeking to establish a global regulatory framework (GRF), I have 
drawn on the literature from political sciences, in particular, those relating to 
 
9
 For designing the questionnaire, I used techniques set out in Alan Bryman, Business Research Methods, 
(3
rd
 edn) (Oxford: OUP) 2011. 
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international relations. This trans-disciplinary approach is however not new and has 
been adapted by prominent international law scholars. According to Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, the author of A New World Order, ‘international lawyers can ill afford to 
ignore the growing wealth of political science data on the world they seek to regulate’.10 
In my view, in the area of international finance, political science theories can serve as a 
useful analytical tool, in the absence of legal rules, to expound the context and the 
emerging social orders into which, as a legal scholar, I attempt to export legal concepts 
such as legitimacy. Moreover, the part on Mechanisms of cross-border cooperations in 
Chapter 5 also drew from the literature on law and economics. 
Contributions 
The perspective of my investigation – the global-level regulatory problems – is itself an 
original contribution. Firstly, these problems are distinct from substantive regulatory 
issues, since they are a species of regulatory, rather than market, failure.11 With the 
global-level problems present in all cross-border securities transactions, they need to be 
theorized and addressed specifically. Secondly, by examining the three global-level 
regulatory problems in aggregate, it provides one with the opportunity to bring together 
discourse in regulation which hitherto has been developed independently. Most 
importantly, the literature emanating from the US on opening up national securities 
markets for capital raising, and, literature relating to the concept of International 
Financial Architecture which emerged after the Asian financial crisis, have been 
brought together in establishing the GRF. This approach would enable regulators in 
pursuit of market integration to be aware of the needs of supervisory cooperation and 
the risks of market interconnectedness, which, as will be seen in Chapter 3, is a lesson 
from the EU. Moreover, regulators seeking to cooperate to address externalities and 
supervisory and enforcement gaps could borrow from barrier removal tools, such as 
mutual recognition, which facilitate market access and cross-border supervision at the 
 
10
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual'Agenda', 87 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 205 (1993) 
11
 For a distinction of the two types of failures, see Robert Baldwin, Michael Cave, and Martin Lodge, 
Understanding Regulation, Theory, Strategy, and Practice (2
nd
 ed.) (Oxford: OUP) 2012, Chapter 1. 
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same time.12 The upshot of analyzing securities regulation from a global perspective is 
that national regulation would become equipped to serve the needs of transnational 
markets which have become globalized. 
 The GRF is the central contribution made in my thesis, established on the basis 
of multi-level governance literature. The GRF provides both a structure for organizing 
global actors in securities markets governance, and mechanisms for their cooperation in 
addressing the cross-border problems, as well as substantive regulatory issues. The main 
features of the GRF are as follows. Firstly, the GRF builds on the existing soft law 
structure in the governance of the global financial markets. In this way, the diverging 
needs for upholding state sovereignty, facilitating global market development and 
ensuring adequate regulation become resolved. However, the GRF also expands the 
existing infrastructures in at least two ways. It expounds global-level initiatives and 
national regulation as integral components and interlinked levels of transnational 
securities markets governance. The GRF also facilitates the identification of 
mechanisms of regulatory and supervisory cooperation and allocation of tasks according 
to the expertise of the global actors within different governance levels. Moreover, the 
benefits of my comparative study of the EU and the international standard-setting 
bodies, and, study of the theories of Global Administrative Law and Global 
Constitutionalism are demonstrated by the combination of theoretical analyses and 
practical recommendations in my research outcome. 
 The thesis is divided into three Parts, each consisting of two Chapters, together 
with a seventh Chapter of overall Conclusions. Part 1 argues for the need to establish a 
governance framework for the globalizing securities markets. Part 2 draws lessons for 
global-level governance from EU and US laws, and cross-border initiatives. Part 3 lays 
down the various elements of the GRF with quasi-legal issues relating to its operation 
discussed. The six substantive Chapters are outlined as follows. 
 In Chapter 1, Securities Regulation at Crossroads, the operations of the securities 
markets and developments in their regulation are discussed. 
 
12
 Pierre-HuguesVerdier, ‘Mutual Recognition in International Finance’ Harvard International Law 
Journal 52 (2011) 56. 
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 In Chapter 2, A Case for a Global-level Regulatory Framework, the global-level 
regulatory problems are identified and analyzed, and, a literature review is provided 
with limitations discussed. 
 In Chapter 3, Cross-border Securities Regulation in the EU and a Comparison 
with US Securities Law, the course of developments of EU securities regulation is 
charted and comparisons are made with cross-border securities regulation under federal 
US law. 
 In Chapter 4, Global-level Cooperation in Securities Market Regulation, the 
strengths and limitations of the existing approaches of global-level regulatory 
cooperation are discussed with recommendations set out. 
 In Chapter 5, Towards a Global Regulatory Framework for Transnational 
Securities Markets, the concept of governance and two Pillars of the GRF are 
propounded. 
 In Chapter 6, Quasi-legal Issues in the GRF, the legitimacy issue and 
implementation of international financial standards are examined in relation to IOSCO 
and the Financial Stability Board. 
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PART 1 
 
 
‘The first day or so we all pointed to our countries. The third or fourth day 
we were pointing to our continents. By the fifth day we were aware of only 
one Earth.’ 
 
Sultan bin Salman Al-Saud 
Opening remarks at the First Congress of the Association of Space Explorers 
held in Cernay, France, 2 October 1985. 
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Chapter 1:  Securities Regulation at Crossroads 
 
In today’s society, so important have the financial markets become that it is axiomatic 
to state that their stability 1  is crucial to the health and strength of an economy. 
Unfortunately, the corollary of this axiom has recently been demonstrated by the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC),2 during which malfunctioning financial markets have been seen 
to result in adverse effects on the real economy.3 As a result, it is a key policy objective 
of any modern government to ensure that financial markets are stable and efficient. For 
attaining this goal, national laws and regulations have been promulgated to govern these 
markets. 
 In order to pave the way for discussions in subsequent chapters on global-level 
governance of securities markets, this Chapter discusses the operations of the securities 
markets and developments in their regulation. The aim of this Chapter is to demonstrate 
the evolutionary nature of securities regulation. In particular, it will be shown that the 
GFC has catapulted the securities markets issues into the realm of systemic risk 
regulation, as well as other frontiers of financial regulation with global concern. During 
the discussions, key concepts such as ‘securities’ and ‘systemic risk’ will be examined, 
with a view to finding working definitions for my thesis.  
 The structure of Chapter is as follows. The functions and operations of securities 
markets in the 21
st
 century are firstly introduced in Section 1. The rise of the globalizing 
 
1
 There is no one clear and authoritative definition of ‘financial stability’. One definition I like to use was 
provided by the late Tommasso Padoa-Schioppa in Regulating Finance (Oxford: OUP 2004), Chapter 
4. Padoa-Schioppa defined ‘financial stability’  as ‘a condition in which the financial system would be 
able to withstand shocks, without giving way to cumulative processes, which impair the allocation of 
savings to investment opportunities and the processing of payments in the economy’. (Cited in Rosa 
Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford: OUP) 2006, 93.) 
2
 The GFC started in the summer of 2007 as a result of losses suffered on the US subprime mortgage 
market is further discussed later in the Chapter. 
3
 According to the World Economic Outlook magazine published by the IMF in April 2008, there is a ‘25 
percent chance that global growth will drop to 3 percent or less in 2008 and 2009 — equivalent to a 
global recession. The greatest risk comes from the still-unfolding events in financial markets, 
particularly the potential for deep losses on structured credits …(to) cause the current credit squeeze 
to mutate into a full-blown credit crunch.’ www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/index.htm.  
(07/05/08) 
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securities markets and momentous events during the GFC are then discussed in Section 
2, with a view to highlighting the critical role of securities markets activities in the crisis. 
Some key terms used throughout my thesis are defined in Section 3. The different 
rationales and tools of securities regulation will be discussed in Section 4, with the 
developments in systemic risk and macro-prudential regulation as the novel aspects of 
regulatory evolution. 
1 Functions and Operations of Securities Markets in the 21
st
 
Century 
There is a constant demand for financing from commercial entities, governments, as 
well as private individuals in order to carry out their daily operations and achieve their 
long-term objectives. This demand for funds is met by a desire to invest from entities 
and individuals with excess capital. Financial markets 4  provide mechanisms for 
matching those in need of capital with those with surpluses, thereby facilitating efficient 
transfer of funds in the economy. As an important constituent of the financial markets, 
securities markets perform three specific functions, which are the raising of capital, the 
making of investments, and the management of risks.5 This Section explains how these 
functions are being performed in the securities markets through the use of financial 
instruments, collectively designated as ‘securities’,6 and through the creation of various 
institutional and commercial arrangements. Discussions in this Section proceeds from 
the legal and commercial perspectives.  
 
4
 Financial markets in developed economies comprise different sectors and sub-markets. Although 
classifications and sub-classifications vary from place to place, the main financial market sectors 
include banking, insurance, capital markets, money markets, financial derivatives market, 
commodities markets and foreign exchange markets. See e.g., Stephen Valdez, An Introduction to 
Global Financial Markets (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) Chapter 1, Thomas McInish, Capital Markets – 
A Global Perspective (Blackwell) 2000 Chapter 1, also, Michael Blair and George Walker (ed.), 
Financial Markets and Exchanges Law (Oxford: OUP 2006) Chapter 1. 
5
 McInish, n. 4, Chapter 1. 
6
 The word ‘securities’ is used in many contexts with different meanings. Its meaning for the purposes of 
my thesis will be examined Section 3. 
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1.1 The securities kaleidoscope 
There are three broad categories of securities: equities, debt and derivatives.7 While 
equities and debt are instruments for raising finance,8 derivatives are primarily a means 
of risk management. In the financial markets, there is an ever-growing host of 
instruments/products, created by using the basic features of debt and equity instruments 
in combination with additional contractual and personal property rights, in order to 
provide for the varying investment requirements of individuals, companies, financial 
intermediaries and institutional investors. 9  I have termed the outcome of financial 
innovation as the ‘securities kaleidoscope’.10 While it would not be possible to give an 
account of all the existing instruments, some key types of securities are described below 
with a view to explain how they contribute to fulfilling the above-mentioned securities 
market functions. 
1.1.1 Debt securities 
Debt securities are issued by both corporate and non-corporate entities. A debt security 
represents a debt obligation owed by an issuer to a holder of the security.11 Under the 
terms of issue of the security, an issuer promises to pay a holder of security interest and 
principal at specified dates. The terms may also entitle the holder to other personal 
rights, particularly the right to vote when the need for debt restructuring arises.12  
 
7
 J.M. Samuels, F.M. Wilkes and R.E. Brayshaw Managemnet of Company Finance (6
th
 edn) (London: 
Thompson) 1995.  
8
 The choice between equities or debt securities depends on the nature, business structure and financing 
requirements of the issuer, and is topic within the field of corporate finance studies. 
9
 Robert Litan, ‘In Defense of Much, But Not All, Financial Innovation’. (Examining the phenomenon of 
financial innovation and appropriate regulatory responses.) 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/10/10-06.pdf Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
10
 Kaleidoscope is an optical toy for producing infinite symmetry patterns through a device of inclined 
mirrors enclosed in a tube. The numerous security instruments devised by financial instituions using 
the basic features of debt and equity instruments may be likened to the patterns of simple pieces of 
paper produced by a kaleidoscope. 
11
 McInish, n. 4 above, Chapter 7 and Valdez, n. 4 above, Chapter 6. 
12
 Ravi Tennekoon, The Law and Regulation of International Finance (London: Butterworths) 1991, 
Chapter 11. 
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 Debt securities may be classified as money market instruments and capital 
market instruments. The money markets are to fund short-term cash flows. 13 Prior to the 
Credit Crunch in the money markets in 2007, asset-based commercial papers (ABCPs) 
linked to the US subprime mortgage market were widely issued in the money markets 
by financial institutions and commercial corporations. Due to increased subprime 
mortgage delinquencies, there was a loss of confidence in the value of ABCPs, resulting 
in freeze of interbank lending and liquidity problems in financial institutions.14  
 The capital markets are to provide medium to long-term funding. 15  Since 
government bonds (US treasury bonds in particular) are traditionally seen as a very 
secure form of investment, they have been widely used as collateral, in derivative 
transactions or under repurchase programmes operated by central banks.16 However, the 
presumption of ‘risk-free’ sovereign debts of developed economies has been refuted 
during the recent recession.17 
1.1.2 Equities 
Whereas debt securities can be issued by both companies and non-companies, only 
companies can issue equities. The most common type of equity is an ordinary share in a 
company.  
 An investor makes capital contributions to the company through purchasing 
shares. Unlike the position of a creditor, an investor of equities is not entitled to have 
the amount of its original investment repaid. A share denotes a shareholder’s18 financial 
 
13
 The London’s interbank market is an example of an international money market in which banks borrow 
and lend in different currencies for periods ranging from several weeks to 1 year. Interest rates in the 
unsecured interbank lending market (e.g. the London Internbank lending rate LIBOR) serve as 
reference rates in the pricing of numerous financial instruments. See Tennekoon, n 12 above, Chapter 
5. 
14
 Markus Brunnermeier, ‘Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007-08’ www.nber.org/papers 
/w14612. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012 
15
 Valdez, n. 4 above, 133. 
16
 For an account of central banks ‘lender of last resort’ role, see, Rosa Lastra, Central Banking and 
Banking Regulation, (London: Financial Markets Group) 1996, 126-130. 
17
 Gillian Tett, ‘Subprime moment of “risk-free” sovereign debt’, Financial Times, 3 November 2011. 
18
 The term ‘shareholder’ is used loosely to refer to equity investors in all types of corporate entities, 
whether or not its liabilities are limited. 
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stake in a company, association interests and ownership rights of a species of financial 
asset. 19  
 The precise nature and scope of a shareholder’s rights and obligations are 
governed by the law of the country of incorporation. For example, under English law,20 
the rights of shareholders include the rights to receive dividends and corporate 
information, to vote in general meetings of the company and to share in surplus asset on 
its winding up. The obligation of a shareholder to contribute to the liabilities of a 
limited liability company is limited by the face value of the share.21 Investors of hybrid 
securities may benefit from a steady income of debt securities together with the prospect 
of capital growth of equities.22 
1.1.3 Derivatives 
Derivatives are essentially contracts the value of which is based on that of other 
‘underlying’ securities.23 The function of derivatives in finance is to spread or allocate 
risk to those most willing and able to bear it, without however eliminating it.24 The two 
key products are options and futures, with others (swaps, caps) being variations. 
 An option is a contract giving the holder a right (i.e. the option) to buy (‘call’) or 
sell (‘put’) a product or financial instrument at a fixed price (the ‘strike price’) at a 
specified point in time or within a time period.25 Under futures contracts, there is a 
 
19
 For general discussion on the nature of a share, see Len Sealy and Sarah Worthington, Seal’s Cases and 
Materials in Company Law, (9
th
 edn) (Oxford: OUP 2010), 518. 
20
 See Byles and Sykes, Gore-Browne on Companies (44
th
 edn) (Jordans) 1986, supplement 27, para. 14.3. 
21
 However, in the case of unlimited companies, the exposure of the shareholder is unlimited. Thus 
unlimited companies’ shares are not normally found in the secondary markets. 
22
 The common types of hybrids are convertibles (a bond which confers an option on the holder to 
exchange the debt instrument for another security, usually shares of the issuer), and, preference shares 
(shareholder is paid fixed percentage rate dividends, but is entitled to receive dividends and a return of 
capital with priority to ordinary shareholders). See Benjamin, n 39 below, Introduction. 
23
 Valdez, n. 4 above, 331; Alastair Hudson, The Law of Finance, (London: Thomson Reuters 2009), 
Chapter 43. 
24
 Litan, n 9 above, 38. 
25
 Valdez, n. 4 above, Chapter 12. Derivatives market in financial instruments had developed from the 
commodities market. In some countries the same authority is in charge of both sectors, e.g. the US 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Moreover, commodity market activities are also part of the 
work stream of the International Organization of Securities Commission. See IOSCO TC, ‘Task Force 
on Commodity Futures Markets’, March 2009. (IOSCOPD285) 
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requirement on the holder to buy or sell the product or financial instrument at a pre-
fixed price at maturity.26 
 One type of derivative which has been held to have aggravated the GFC is the 
credit default swap (CDS). Under the swap arrangement, the protection buyer pays a 
premium in receipt of a promise of payment from protection seller upon some defined 
event of default on a loan or a bond. Thus CDS is functionally equivalent to financial 
insurance.27 Not only could CDS reduce risk of the parties who purchase the protection, 
it also functions as a market signal of perceived credit risk of the borrower in the 
underlying lending contract. However, due to concentration in the CDS market and 
proliferation in the use of CDS in structured finance in the period leading up to the GFC, 
counterparty risk was aggravated by interconnectedness between financial institutions 
resulting systemic failure, as illustrated by the near-collapse of AIG.28  
1.2 Securities market mechanisms 
Equities, debts and derivatives have become transferable through evolving commercial 
practices. It is possible to identify three stages in the transactions relating to securities, 
namely, issuance, trading and settlement.29  
 Issuance encompasses the creation of securities by issuers who are either the 
end-users of funds or SPVs, and the distribution of these securities to first time buyers. 
Transactions relating to securities issuance take place in the primary securities markets. 
Services of underwriting banks are attained for the purposes of valuation, finding 
investors, giving advice, managing the distribution process and, above all, underwriting 
the issue.30 Through secondary market trading, securities are bought or sold by 
 
26
 Valdez, n. 4 above, Chapter 13. 
27
 Litan, n 9 above, 41-42. 
28
 AIG was the largest insurer in the United States (US), which through a subsidiary issuing large 
volumes of CDSs before the GFC, had faced great losses ($61.7bn fourth-quarter loss in 2008) and 
had to be rescued by the US government. Francesco Guerrera, ‘AIG gets fresh $30bn bail-out’ 
Financial Times, 1 March 2009. 
29
 See Appendix 1, for more background information on the processes of issuance, trading and settlement 
in the US and UK. 
30
 The predominant two style of underwriting in the markets are: US-style under which an ‘underwriting 
group’ purchases the entire issue outright, and then distributes the securities to a ‘selling group’ of 
dealers, or directly to the public; and UK-style under which a group of sub-underwriters is formed to 
offer securities for sale to investors, and, only to the extent that the securities are not wholly 
subscribed and paid for, then has to subscribe and pay for all the un-subscribed and unpaid securities. 
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dealers and investors so as to make profits on the rise and fall in prices. Moreover, 
securities may also be dealt in stock lending31 and collateral taking32 transactions. As a 
result of technological advancement, trading now occurs on various venues. For 
example, the European Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments regulates 
exchanges, multiple trading facilities and internalised arrangements.33 Over-the-counter 
(OTC) trading occurs outside regulated venues. The CDS market before the crisis is an 
example of OTC market. The GFC has revealed shortcomings in price discovery 
mechanisms in OTC derivatives markets, which led to the current reforms for secondary 
market trade reporting systems.34 
 Settlement takes place on both the primary and secondary markets. It is a 
process of delivering securities and payment under a sales and purchase agreement or 
pursuant to collateral arrangement. Counterparty risk was highlighted during the GFC 
bringing to the fore the need for central-counterparty (CCP) clearing. 35  A CCP is 
interposed between two parties in a securities transaction – to become the seller to the 
original purchaser and purchase to the original seller – so that the two parties are only 
exposed to the risk of default of the CCP, which is required by regulation to be well-
capitalised. Under English law, this process happens through novation.36 
1.3 Savings and investment products 
In the above discussion, an overview has been given of the different types of securities 
and mechanisms used by governments and companies for raising funds in the primary 
markets, and also of the trading and settlement arrangement in the secondary markets 
 
See Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, Fundmentals of Securities Regulation (Aspen Publishers 2004), 
Chapter 2. Also, Tennekoon, n 12 above, Chapter 8. 
31
 This is a method by which market participants borrow securities from others to cope with the problems 
of liquidity, or to carry out speculative trading. 
32
 This is a method of using securities as pledge. 
33
 Directive 93/22/EEC OJ [2004] L145/1. For further discussions on the Directive see Chapter 3, Section 
3.1.3. 
34
 See Subprime report, 10. 
35
 G20 leaders’ statement, ‘Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System’ (London Declaration), 3, 
2 April 2009. www.g20.org/images/stories/canalfinan/docs/uk/08deps.pdf. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
Adam Glass, ‘The regulatory drive towards central counterparty clearing of OTC credit derivatives 
and the necessary limits on this’, (2009) 4 CML Rev. S79. (Discussing why CCP could be a solution 
for addressing problems in the GFC.) 
36
 Novation is a form of transfer of contractual obligations by replacing one party with a new one through 
consent of all concerned. See Bamford, n 42 below, 132-133. 
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for supporting funding and investment. It still remains to examine financial innovations 
that have facilitated savings and investment.37 In this part, legal structures of managed 
funds, which have provided a convenient way of saving, are first discussed. Then 
structured finance mechanisms used before the GFC are outlined. 
1.3.1 Savings products 
Managed funds38 are arrangements whereby the assets of different investors are pooled 
and invested on a collective basis by a professional manager.39  
 Collective investment provides investors with a number of advantages. Firstly, a 
professional manager is likely to have greater specialised market expertise, as well as 
more time than an investor to make successful investments. Secondly, as an institutional 
investor, managed funds can access foreign markets previously inaccessible to 
individual investors due to reasons of law, operation, or cost. As a result, higher degrees 
of investment diversification will be achieved. 
 The three main legal structures of managed funds used in the UK are unit trusts, 
registered companies and limited partnerships.40 A unit trust is a type of fund developed 
in Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction.41 It is constituted by a trust deed, under which a trustee 
(who is either the fund manager or a professional custodian) holds the investment assets 
for the equitable owners (the investors).42 Investors’ assets under a unit trust are ring-
fenced in an event of the trustee’s insolvency. In a corporate fund structure, investors 
are holders of shares in a registered company, which is the owner of investment assets.  
 
37
 I here use the classification of savings and investment products mentioned by Litan, n 9 above. 
38
 In US, they are ‘investment companies’ under Investment Companies Act 1940; in the EU they are 
‘undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities’, or ‘UCITS’ under the EU UCITS 
Directives. 
39
 This definition comes from Joanna Benjamin, Interests in Securities (Oxford: OUP) 2000, Chapter 11. 
While there is some debate about the correct definition of a managed fund in the industry, this 
definition is the most widely accepted in practice. 
40
 For an introduction to fund management see Joanna Benjamin, ‘An Introduction to managed funds, Part 
2’ (2005) 1 JIBFL 10; also, Ian MacNeil, (2nd edn) An Introduction to the Law on Financial 
Investment (Oxford: Hart 2012), Chapter 5.  
41
 The Foreign and Colonial Government Trust formed in 1868 has been identified by Sin as the first unit 
trust. See Kam Fan Sin, The Legal Nature of the Unit Trust (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1997, 19. 
42
 Colin Bamford, Principles of International Financial Law (Oxford: OUP) 2011, 103-104. 
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 Limited partnership is the third type of fund structure.43 Under this structure, the 
fund manager is the general partner, and the investors are limited partners who are 
protected by law from liability of the general partner. Hedge funds use this structure. 
Hedge funds are highly leveraged risk takers who actively invested in subprime 
mortgage-backed securities before the GFC.44 When a run on hedge funds took place, 
the funds sold large volumes of securities, thereby driving down market prices and 
creating volatility.45 
1.3.2 Transferring savings into investment 
Until the eruption of the GFC, securitization was the widely used by banks to finance 
their loans to individuals and businesses.46 The traditional securitization mechanisms are 
capable of providing risk diversification. Assets of originating banks is sold to a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV), which is a separate legal entity created solely for holding 
underlying assets, e.g. mortgages, credit card loans.47 The SPV issues debt securities 
against itself, which are backed by assets in the pool, which are called collateral. These 
asset-backed securities (ABS) are bought by investors, who provide the ultimate 
financing in the originate-to-distribute process. It is crucial that the transfer of assets by 
the originator to the SVP is recognized as a legal sale in law, so as to prevent the 
former’s creditors from reaching into SVP’s asset pool.48  
 Complex features had been added to the traditional mechanisms of 
securitization, so as to enable loans to less credit-worthy borrowers to be sold onto the 
capital markets with the appearance of top credit-worthiness. Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs) were such means for attaining what seemed like financial alchemy 
before the GFC.49 Firstly, CDOs created diversification of risk by combining different 
 
43
 See Litan, n 9 above, 20-22. 
44
 See discussion on structured finance below. 
45
 See discussions in Section 2.2. 
46
 According to data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), in US by 
the end of 2008, there were c. $5 trillion in agency MBS (mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie 
Mae/Freddie Mac) outstanding; $2.5 trillion in non-agency MBS; and roughly $4 trillion in other 
asset-backed securities (ABS). www.sifma.org/research/statistics/market-sector-statistics.html. 
Accessed on 01/09/ 2012 
47
 For a general introduction into securitization see Valdez, n 4 above, 133-136. 
48
 See discussions by Roger McCormick, Legal Risks in Financial Markets (Oxford: OUP) 2006, 215-217. 
49
 Gillian Tett, Fool’s Gold (New York: Free Press) 2009. (Providing an insightful account of the CDO 
process.) 
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ABSs, including residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) from the US subprime 
mortgage markets. Secondly, CDOs were divided into ‘tranches’, so that principal and 
interest payments would first flow to those who were most risk-averse (top tranch 
investors), and then in stages, to investors with higher risk appetites, as a result 
receiving higher interest rates payments. Moreover, credit enhancement techniques, 
such as CDSs and guarantees, were used to obtain top credit ratings. However, the GFC 
has shown that complex and opacity of the legal structure of CDOs has led to the panic 
in the ABCP and money markets.50  
2 From Globalization to Crisis 
The financial markets have been globalizing at a fast speed since the 1980s.51 However, 
as a consequence of the increasing markets interconnectedness, risks have become 
capable of propagating more rapidly and amplifying more easily in the financial system, 
which was exhibited vividly during the recent GFC. Developments in the investment 
securities markets have played an important role in the globalization-to-crisis process. 
This Section outlines the globalization of the securities markets and their part in the 
GFC. 
2.1 Globalizing securities markets 
While securities markets had operated on a transnational basis during the 19
th
 Century, 
their globalization only emerged after the Second World War. 52  The globalization 
 
50
 IOSCO, ‘Report on subprime crisis’, (Subprime report) May 2008. (IOSCOPD273) 
51
 As of end-2006, the estimated value of the world’s outstanding bonds, equities, and banking assets was 
$190.4 trillion, roughly four times the size of global GDP. In the three years from 2003 to 2006, total 
global financial assets increased in value by 53 percent, or $65 trillion. Over the same period, global 
GDP increased by $12 trillion. Moreover, the value of assets under professional management by 
institutional investors in major industrial countries has grown more that five-fold since the early 1990s, 
from an estimated $11 trillion in 1990 to over $60 trillion in 2006. IMF’s Global Financial Stability 
Report, October 2007. 
52
 In this thesis, the term ‘globalizatoin’ describes a process of economic liberalisation, which is marked 
by free movement of goods, services, labour and capital across national borders, and has an end-effect 
of creating of a single market in inputs and output. See, Apostolos Gkoutzinis, Internet Banking and 
the Law in Europe: Regulation, Financial Integration and Electronic Commerce (Cambridge: CUP 
2006), Chapter 1. For a globalization debate, see, Frank Lechner and John Boli (eds.), The 
Globalizatoin Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 2004). 
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process gathered pace after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971,53 and 
following abolishing of exchange controls during the 1980s and 1990s. Securities 
markets started to expand in response to demands for foreign capital from both the 
developing countries after the collapse of Communism,54 and, the developed countries 
as a result of privatization policies.55 Moreover, the rise of institutional investors and the 
need for risk diversification 56  motivated the suppliers of funds to seek investment 
opportunities globally. With deregulation of stock exchanges in the 1980s and 1990s by 
governments around the world (fearful of losing out in international competition), 
access to foreign capital was increasingly being opened up.57 Another significant factor 
driving securities markets globalization was technological and financial innovations 
which led to global investment mechanisms, international clearing and settlement, 
cross-border exchanges, and provision of international financial services. These four 
features are symbols of interconnected securities markets nesting within the global 
financial system. 
 Global investment is facilitated by new products, e.g. global depository 
receipts,58 and distributional arrangements, e.g. global offerings. First used in the bond 
markets, global offerings engenders simultaneous placement of fully fungible securities 
in the US and Eurobond markets, with the same offering prices.59 In the period before 
the GFC, there had been numerous mergers between stock exchange and derivative 
 
53
 For discussions on the Bretton Woods Regime, see Rosa Lastra, Legal Foundations of International 
Monetary Stability (Oxford: OUP 2006), chapter 12. 
54
 See Jay Hansen, ‘London Calling? A Comparison of London and US Stock Exchange Listing 
Requirements for Foreign Equity Securities’, (1995) 6 Duke Journal of Comparative & International 
Law 197, 1 (describing he flow of fund into developing countries).  
55
 Partly explaining the growth of the Eurobond market, from $24 billion in value in 1970 to $8,833 
billion by 1990. Ranald Michie, The Global Securities Market: A History (Oxford: OUP 2006). 
56
 Based on the portfolio theory developed by Henry Markowitz. See Henry Markowitz, ‘Portfolio 
Selection’, (1952) 7 Journal of Finance 77 (expounding that risk is measurable and can be reduced by 
diversification). However reliance upon this theory has been subject to criticism in the light of the 
recent crisis, see John Plender ‘Investment and the crisis: an error-laden machine’ Financial Times, 3 
March 2009.  
57
 Michie, n 55 above, Chapter 8.  
58
 These are sui generis capital market instruments which entitle holders to enjoy, in economic terms, the 
benefits of owning equities that have been issued by a foreign issuer in a foreign domestic market. See 
Joanna Benjamin, Interests in Securities (Oxford: OUP) 2000, Chapter 11. 
59
 The first global bond was issued by the World Bank in 1989 and the first corporate bond was issued by 
Matsdushita Electric in 1992. In Wal-Mart’s global issue to acquire Asda, a UK retail chain in August 
1999, the bonds were place in the US, Europe, Asia and the Middle-East. From Appendix A in Miller 
and Puthenpurackal, ‘Security Fungibility and the Cost of Capital – Evidence from Global Bonds’, 
European Central Bank Working Paper Series, Working Paper Series no. 426. 
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exchanges in response to competition.60 International securities settlement systems, e.g. 
Euroclear located in Belgium and Clearstream in Luxembourg, have provided 
settlement and custody for internationally and domestically traded bonds and equities 
across the world’s major markets.61 Moreover, another driving force of securities market 
globalization has been the growth of multinational financial intermediaries and services 
providers, which have been operating globally through affiliates, subsidiaries and 
branches. 
2.2 Overview of the global financial crisis 
The above-discussed innovations in the securities market are directly linked to the 
global financial crisis (GFC) 2007~2010. The crisis has led to a fundamental re-think of 
financial regulation, in terms of its rationale, structure and tools. This Section outlines 
some of the major events during the crisis in order to pave way for discussions on 
securities regulation below.62 
 The tremors of GFC began in April 2007, with New Century Financial, which 
specialised in originating sub-prime mortgages, filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection.63 As the losses associated with the US sub-prime mortgages market started to 
come to light, implications of these losses were being felt across the globe.64 On 9 
August 2007, the French bank BNP Paribas, as well as reporting losses, published a 
statement saying that investors in two of its funds would not be able take any money out 
because of the inability to value fund assets, owing to a ‘complete evaporation of 
liquidity’ in the market.65 In the autumn of 2007, national governments began to rescue 
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troubled financial institutions. 66  However, after a miscalculated failure to rescue 
Lehman Brothers, the crisis spread to the high street banks.67 As the global economic 
was dragged into recession, troubles in government finances emerged.68 Sovereign debt 
crises in the Eurozone have become the latest chapter in the financial market melodrama. 
 While relaxed monetary policies and global trade imbalances had presented a 
macroeconomic environment for asset bubbles and irrational exuberance, 69  liquidity 
problems encountered by individual financial institutions during the Credit Crunch had 
materialized into insolvency risk because of regulatory arbitrage which went badly 
wrong. Financial innovations in the structured finance sector led to risks of default in 
the subprime mortgages sector to be transferred from the books of banks to highly-
leveraged hedge funds and other institutional investors. When hedge fund investors 
withdrew their investment in 2007 as the losses in the subprime market came to light, 
hedge funds could not find investors to purchase the down-graded subprime RMBSs 
and CDOs, even when these were being sold at fire-sale prices. Consequently, in order 
to repay their investors and lenders, many hedge funds and institutional investors began 
to sell off their holdings in more liquid publicly-traded securities. The large volumes of 
simultaneous sales had the effect of lowering share prices on several of the world’s 
larger stock markets.70 Investment banks had lent large amounts to hedge funds through 
their prime brokerage services. Counterparty risk as well as inability to secure short-
term funding on the money markets, where subprime-linked ABCPs had been used as 
collateral, were the immediate causes of collapse of institutions like Bear Sterns and 
Lehman. Due to market interconnectedness, the fall of Lehman led to the collapsing of 
investor confidence.71 
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3 Definitions  
This Section provides definitions to key terms which are used throughout my thesis. 
3.1 A definition for ‘securities’ 
3.1.1 The purpose of defining ‘securities’ 
The word ‘securities’ is an example of an ‘etymological chameleon’. 72  It has been 
acknowledged as having a range of possible meanings under different contexts. 73 
However, it requires a definition in my thesis for two reasons. Since it is the aim of my 
research to seek to establish ‘A Global-level Regulatory Framework in a Transnational 
Securities Market’, defining the terms ‘securities’ and ‘securities market’ is necessary 
for specifying the scope my investigation and also the area of application of the Global-
level Regulatory Framework. More fundamentally, to date, there has not been any 
published discussion on how ‘securities’ should be defined in the regulatory context at 
the global-level.74 Given that the Joint Forum has acknowledged there to be differences 
between financial sectors,75 and, Principle 7 in IOSCO’s ‘Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation’ has provided for member authorities to regularly review the 
perimeter of regulation, therefore a debate on how ‘securities’ should be defined would 
contribute to clarifying the remit of the international standard setters examined below in 
Chapter 4. Through my discussions on a working definition on ‘securities’, the first 
foundation stone for constructing the GRF is laid.  
 
overnight rates, rose 20 basis points to 220bp, an increase of 140bp since 1 September. See David 
Oakley, ‘Europe bank failures trigger equities collapse’, Financial Times, 30 September 2008, 32. 
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Times, 30 Sept 2008, 34. 
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 To define a word is to state precisely its meaning.76 Where a word relates to an 
object or a concept, its definition provides a precise description or explanation of its 
nature, properties, scope, or essential qualities. However, as the world is always 
changing, a definition must necessarily be understood within a specific context and in 
relation to a particular point in time. The historical evolution of the usages of the word 
‘security’ in the English language may serve as an example.  
 The term ‘security’ was originally used in English law to denote a thing that was 
given to secure the fulfilment of a promise or obligation, such as a payment of debt.77 As 
the practice of issuing transferable debt obligations secured on the issuer’s assets 
became a common way of raising capital by companies and governments, these secured 
debt obligations then also became to be known as securities. 78  Moreover, as the 
transferability of shares became recognized by the English courts during the Victorian 
era, their functional likeness to debt securities became clearer, resulting in both forms of 
financial instruments to be known as ‘securities’.79 
 From this brief historical account of the evolution of the usage of ‘security’, I 
derive two guiding principles for my investigation. Firstly, a definition of ‘securities’ 
needs to be flexible enough to accommodate new commercial practices that may 
develop in the future. Secondly, before searching for a definition, the purpose and 
context for defining ‘securities’ need to be made clear. 
 The need for flexibility renders the task of definition a difficult one. Discussions 
in Section 1 of this Chapter have shown that unaccountable numbers of instruments are 
continuously being created and forfeited. Some notable difficulties are: 1) some 
instruments/arrangements, e.g., CDS and hedge funds, have evolved cross-sectoral 
features; 2) dematerialised and intermediated securities have become more like claims, 
as their proprietary nature becomes blurred; and, 3) commercial usage has put (financial 
and commodity) derivative contracts into ‘securities’ category, although they have little 
in common with the traditional securities. 
 The word ‘securities’ has hitherto been defined for two purposes. First, in the 
regulatory context, a definition of securities is used as a means of establishing the scope 
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 Michael Bridge, Personal Property Law (Oxford: OUP 2002, 169. 
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Securities Regulation at Crossroads 
37 
of a regulator’s functions. In the legal context, a definition serves to trigger the 
application of certain rights and obligations in private law. Since the focus of my thesis 
is on the regulatory, instead of legal, context, the purpose of my defining ‘securities’ is 
to enable regulators to progressively delineate the coverage of the range schemes and 
transactions of concern to their regulatory objectives. 
3.1.2 Approaches to definition 
There are two possible approaches to defining ‘securities’.80 The first approach seeks to 
provide an exhaustive description of the term ‘securities’. While this approach could 
induce coherence and some degree of certainty, it might not provide the necessary 
flexibility for accommodating new types of securities. The second approach simply 
gives an illustrative list of instruments, such as shares, bonds, depository receipts etc., 
each giving rise to specific regulatory concerns. In relation to the global-level, the 
second approach has been questioned as to its potential to achieve evenness in the 
implementation.81 A combination of the two approaches is found in the US securities 
regulation, and, in international conventions for harmonizing the legal aspects of 
securities transactions. 
a. Definition of a ‘security’ under federal securities law in the US 
Securities markets are regulated in the US at both the federal and state levels. Each state 
has enacted securities statutes, known as ‘blue sky’ laws, 82  to regulate securities 
activities within its borders. At the federal level, a regulatory system comprising seven 
statutes83 was created in the aftermath of the Wall Street crash in October 1929 in order 
to establish fully informed and honest markets. 
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 Christophe Bernasconi, ‘Law applicable to dispositions of securities held through indirect holding 
systems’, ('Bernasconi report) (2002)1 Hague Conference on Private International Law, 43-45. The 
report was made in preparation for the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Dispositions of 
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Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 
1940, the Investment Adviser Act of 1940, the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. 
Securities Regulation at Crossroads 
38 
 The term ‘security’ is defined in section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 
(Securities Act) and section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
Act).84 Since the two definitions of security are virtually identical,85 the Supreme Court 
has stated that it would treat the definitions as identical when deciding on the scope of 
security.86  
 In the two statutory provisions, ‘security’ is defined using a list of specific 
instruments, such as ‘any note, stock, security future, bond’, as well as a number of 
general descriptive formulae, namely, ‘investment contract,’ ‘interest or instrument 
commonly known as a “security”’. The combination of a list and general descriptions 
has made the scope of ‘security’ sufficiently broad, thereby conforming to the original 
intention of the US Congress that ‘many types of instruments that in our commercial 
world [are to] fall within the ordinary concept of a security’. 87 However, the broad 
definition has given rise to much litigation resulting in a substantial body of 
jurisprudence. 
 From an examination of the statutes and case law, three broad groups of 
securities may be identified. The first group of securities contains instruments which 
confer ownership interests in companies or other assets. They include ‘stock’, 
‘transferable share’, ‘investment contract’, ‘fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or 
other mineral rights’. The Supreme Court in Landreth Timber held that ‘a stock’, and 
any instrument possessing the characteristics of a stock, namely, right to receive 
dividend, voting rights and possibility of an appreciation capital, are securities.88 
 The second group is debt securities which are specified in the statutory 
definitions to be: ‘any note’, ‘treasury’, ‘bond’, ‘debenture’, ‘evidence of indebtedness’. 
As debt is a vast asset family, debt securities would need to be differentiated from non-
securities such as a bank loan. The ‘family resemblance’ test in Reves was established 
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for this purpose.89 The test is briefly summarised as follows. First, there will be an 
assumption, on the basis of Securities Act, that any note is a ‘security’. The assumption 
is only rebutted where an instrument has strong resemblance to instruments contained in 
a non-securities list.90 Second, where there is no resemblance, one needs to consider 
whether the instrument should be added to the list. Four factors were given by the court 
for considering whether an instrument should be added: 1) motivation of seller and 
purchaser of securities is for investment or commercial purposes; 2) existence of trading 
system in securities; 3) public expectation; 4) existence of other regulatory regimes 
applicable to the instrument. 
 The third group consists of securities that confer on an investor rights under 
contracts that derive from underlying securities, including, ‘security future’, ‘put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege on any security’, ‘warrants’. These are generally 
derivatives contracts. 
 Moreover, under the catchall term ‘investment contracts’, an asset/instrument 
will be found to be a security if the test enunciated by the US Supreme Court in Howey 
is satisfied.91 The Court defined an investment contract ‘as a contract, transaction or 
scheme whereby a person (1) invests his money (2) in a common enterprise and (3) is 
led to expect profits (4) solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.’ The 
fourth enumerated element of the Howey test indicates that the fortunes of a securities 
holder are part of a common enterprise that is dependent upon the expertise of the 
promoter, and activities of investors belonging to the same pool of funds.92 
 The above analysis of the Securities Act and Exchange Act reveals a number of 
common elements in the instruments caught by the legislations. These are: non-tangible 
assets, risk of financial loss resulting from the assets being under the control of others, 
and transferability in case of debts. 
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b. Defining ‘securities’ in international conventions 
Two international conventions are used as examples for how securities are defined in 
the context of legal rights and duties of parties to securities transactions. The Hague 
Convention on the ‘Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held 
(Hague Convention) within an Intermediary’ defines securities as ‘any shares, bonds or 
other financial instruments or financial assets (other than cash), or any interest 
therein’.93 The Hague Convention adopts a functional approach to resolving conflict of 
laws issues in cross-border securities transaction. 94  The definition first provides the 
paradigm cases of security and then evokes the concept of financial asset. While there is 
no definition of financial asset in the Hague convention, it may be understood as any 
intangible assets created in financial market transactions. Authors of the Bernasconi 
report (produced to advise draftsmen of the Convention) had opined that securities 
governed by the Hague Convention were to be ‘fungible’ in character, i.e. securities 
issued in a series indistinguishable from each other, thereby excluding derivatives 
contracts and bank loans.95 Although such stipulation has not appeared in the Hague 
Convention itself, the Bernasconi report may be held to be an authoritative text in 
guiding the consistent interpretation of the Convention. 
 UNIDROIT’s draft convention on substantive rules on intermediated securities 
provides ‘securities’ to mean ‘any shares, bonds or other financial instruments or 
financial assets (other than cash) or any interest therein, which are capable of being 
credited to a securities account and of being acquired and disposed of in accordance 
with the provisions of this Convention’.96 The general definition of securities in the draft 
convention is essentially the same as that in the Hague Convention, except that the draft 
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convention is being restricted to apply to dematerialised securities which are transferred 
through credits and debits of securities accounts.  
 The approach being used in these two definitions is to highlight the features of 
securities, namely, intangible transferables, that are directly associated with the legal 
issues being addressed in the two conventions. 
3.1.3 Working definition 
For the purpose of my thesis on examining securities regulation from a global-level 
perspective, I adopt the following definition of securities: 
Any financial assets, or certificates thereof, issued for investment-related activities and 
capable of being regularly traded in the markets. 
This definition highlights the elements of intangible assets, risk of financial loss, and 
potential transferability, all of which are associated with the rationales of regulation to 
be discussed in Section 4.  
3.2 Other definitions in my thesis 
3.2.1 Regulation  
In the field of social sciences, the term ‘regulation’ is a conceptual accordion 
comprising different types of behavioural-influencing activities.97 A useful definition is 
as follows: 
‘regulation refers to the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
in order to address a collective issue or attain an identified end’.98 
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This definition comprises all types of collective activities that are being used 
systematically to influence behaviour, whether the activities originate from public or 
private bodies. 
 In the area of Financial Law, ‘regulation’ has been given a narrower meaning, 
referring to the establishment of rules, and the processes and instruments of rule-
making. 99  Moreover, ‘regulation’ is distinguished from the notion of ‘supervision’, 
which refers to activities of licensing, supervision stricto sensu (i.e. monitoring), 
sanctioning and crisis management.100 
 In my thesis, ‘regulation’ is used both in the wide and narrow sense. When 
mentioned on its own, ‘regulation’ will be used in the wider social sciences sense; when 
both ‘regulation’ and ‘supervision’ are mentioned together, ‘regulation’ is used in its 
narrower sense. 
 Moreover, in my thesis, ‘regulatory authority’ is used to refer to agencies 
conferred with regulatory and supervisory powers by national legislations. The word 
‘regulator’ is used specifically in relation to the staff in the regulatory authorities who 
carry out the regulatory and supervisory functions. 
3.2.2 Transnational 
In my thesis, the word ‘international’ is avoided. It is understood in political sciences 
literature as referring to acts of sovereign states. Due to the transdisciplinary approach 
of my research, I have chosen ‘transnational’ to refer to cross-border securities 
transactions and cross-border activities of non-state entities. 
4 Re-examining the Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
This Section examines the rationales and tools of securities regulation in light of the 
lessons from the GFC. There are broadly three policy objectives of securities regulation, 
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namely investor protection, markets integrity and efficiency, and reduction of systemic 
risk.101 
4.1 Investor protection and market efficiency 
In a securities market where investors’ proprietary and personal rights are protected and 
their interests are guarded against misconducts of entrepreneurs or other market 
participants, investor confidence could be achieved, leading to market efficiency. 102 
Since common rationales and tools are often used for investor protection and market 
efficiency, it would appear expedient to examine these two objectives together. 
 As discussed under ‘Definitions’, securities are essentially investment in a 
common enterprise, that engages the management and expertise of another. Therefore, 
agency problem is the primary concern of securities investors.
103
 Justice Louis Brandeis’ 
words that ‘Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. 
Sunlight is…the best disinfectant’ still ring true today. 104  However, information 
asymmetry is likely to exist between investors on one hand and managers and financial 
advisors on the other, due to costs of producing information, free-rider problem relating 
to information, absence of incentives to disclose and lack of knowledge and skills by 
investors to analyse and use market information.105 Mandatory issuer disclosure, in the 
form of prospectus requirements and periodic and ad hoc disclosure rules, is a tool 
adopted in securities regulation in many jurisdictions. 106  Mandatory disclosure is 
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thought to be necessary to prevent all issuers becoming penalized by lack of 
information, 107  and, to support price formation mechanism of the market through 
increasing transparency. 108  To achieve the same investor protection and market 
efficiency goals, financial services providers, advisors and credit rating agencies (CRAs) 
in particular, are required to disclose conflicts of interests and certain information 
relating to the services and products they provide.109 
 However, the mandatory disclosure has been subject to criticism in the last four 
decades.110 It has been argued that the level of disclosure will be taken into account by 
investors through their purchasing prices for securities, and so investor welfare is 
largely unaffected by the level of disclosure.111 The assumption of investor activism is 
challenged on the basis that investors would not know what information is missing and 
would also need a baseline of adequate information in order for meaningful discounting 
to be made.112 This argument is particularly relevant for the CDO and CDS markets 
during the Credit Crunch in 2007. Due to a lack of information on which financial 
institutions were exposed to the US subprime mortgages market via CDOs and CDSs, 
financial institutions concurrently refused to lend. Arguably, the Credit Crunch was a 
lemon problem with extreme consequences. Therefore the GFC had reinforced the need 
for transparency and disclosure rules, as demonstrated by the regulation of the OTC 
derivative market and short-selling.113 
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 The distortion of market efficiency also takes the form of insider trading and 
market manipulation. These activities have generally been prohibited under the law.114 
 Regulation of insider trading is not uncontroversial, as trading by insiders may 
be seen as a means by which markets receive information.115 However, insider trading 
has been viewed as detrimental to market efficiency for a number of reasons. First, on 
the basis of ‘public confidence’ theory, investors will more likely to invest in a market 
knowing that insider trading is prohibited.116 Second, insider trading will increase stock 
prices volatility. 117  Third, information about corporate matters may be viewed as 
corporate property and therefore insiders, who are usually regarded as fiduciaries to a 
company, should not be allowed to exploit corporate property for their own benefit.118  
 To ensure the efficient functioning of securities markets, market manipulation 
requires regulation. The policing of market transactions and imposition of enforcement 
against manipulation need to have a deterrent effect on individuals, particularly those in 
a dominant position.119 The main difficulty in regulating market manipulation is how to 
define such activities in the rulebooks, and, how to then identify manipulation in 
practice. In the view of Avgouleas, there are generally four types of activities 
amounting to market manipulation.120 First is the creation of artificial prices, or false or 
misleading impressions. Second is the alleged manipulator inducing other market 
participants to trade (or intending to do so). Third is a combination of the last two 
activities. Lastly, there is the ability to exercise market power to influence market prices. 
The difficulties in policing market manipulation may be illustrated by the recent 
investigations into manipulating of LIBOR. Although concerns about the accuracy of 
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LIBOR had been raised in 2007, it was not until the end of 2011 that regulators around 
the world examined manipulation allegations against large financial institutions.121 
4.2 Systemic risk in securities regulation 
Although the reduction of systemic risk has always been one of IOSCO’s objectives of 
securities regulation, systemic risk only became widely associated with securities 
regulation after the GFC.122 
a. Definition of systemic risk 
The definition of systemic risk in financial regulation remains unsettled.123 An overview 
of the various definitions is presented here in order to identify the common thread 
running through them.124  
 Systemic risk has been defined from ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ perspectives.125 The 
‘micro’ concept of systemic risk focuses on the domino or chain-reaction effect of an 
initial financial loss, incurred by one institution or in one market sector, spreading to 
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 Gillian Tett, ‘Bank lending probe lights up dark financial corners’, Financial Times, 10 February 2012, 
30. 
122
 The main focus of systemic risk in securities market used to be in the area of settlement systems. 
123
 See Alan Greenspan, ‘Remarks at a Conference on Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk’ (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Nov. 16, 1995)) (calling for a clear definition of systemic 
risk). However, this need has still to be met, as a recent FSB/IMF/Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) Report (FSB-IMF-BIS Report) shows, most G20 countries do not have a legal or formal 
definition of what constitutes systemic importance. International Monetary Fund, Financial Stability 
Board & Bank for International Settlements. ‘Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of 
Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations- Background Paper: Report to 
the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’, October 2009. 
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 I have very much benefited from the analysis on systemic risk given by Professor Lastra in ‘Systemic 
risk, SIFIs and financial stability’, (2011) 6 C.M.L.R. 197. The following literature found in this 
article was also found to be useful. Adriano Lucatelli, Finance and World Order – Financial Fragility, 
Systemic Risk and Transnational Regimes (Greenwood Press, Westport Connecticut 1997) 70–4; 
European Central Bank, ‘The Concept of Systemic Risk’ (2009) Financial Stability Review of the 
European Central Bank, December 2009 at 134; Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European 
Central Bank, Systemic Risk, Clare Distinguished Lecture in Economics and Public Policy at the 
Clare College, University of Cambridge (10 December 2009); Anna Gelpern, ‘Financial Crisis 
Containment’ (2009) 41 Connecticut L Rev 1051; Erik Gerding, ‘Code, Crash, and Open Source: The 
Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis’ (2009) 84 
Washington L Rev 127; Amir Khandani, Andrew Lo and Robert Merton, ‘Systemic Risk and the 
Refinancing Ratchet Effect’ (2009) Harvard Business School, Working Paper 10–023; Philip Davis, 
Debt, Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992) 117.  
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 These two concepts of systemic risk was identified in George Kaufman and Kenneth Scott, ‘What is 
Systemic Risk and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?’ (2003) 7 The Independent Review 
371, 376. 
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many other institutions and markets. For example, Kaufman defines systemic risk as 
‘the probability that cumulative losses will occur from an event that ignites a series of 
successive losses along a chain of [financial] institutions or markets comprising . . . a 
system’. 126  A similar definition which was devised by the Bank for International 
Settlement (BIS) defines systemic risk as ‘the risk that the failure of a participant to 
meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other participants to default with a 
chain reaction leading to broader financial difficulties’. 127  The ‘macro’ concept of 
systemic risk, on the other hand, relates to the risk of a single event producing adverse 
impact on the whole financial system. Thus it is ‘the risk of a sudden, unanticipated 
event that would damage the financial system to such an extent that economic activity 
in the wider economy would suffer’.128 Some writers have defined systemic risk as one 
producing negative impact at both macro and micro levels. 129  While others view 
systemic risk as a spectrum of risks, ranging from the risk of only one 
institutional/market failure being caused by an initial loss, to the risk of a systemic crisis 
affecting most (or even the whole) of the financial system.130  
 Events from the recent GFC belonged to the upper extreme of the spectrum. In 
particular, the collapse of Lehman Brothers International (Europe), a systemically 
important counterparty, on 15 September 2008, resulted in the collapse of many other 
financial and non-financial institutions. As an anecdotal example, four investment firms, 
who were the former clients of Lehman, applied to the High Court in London to seek to 
obtain access to information on their assets allegedly held by Lehman, on the grounds 
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that without such information they would collapse, and so would a number of 
companies in which they held shares.131  
 On a macro level, the collapse of financial institutions, as already mentioned, 
was followed by the collapse of confidence in the markets and global recession. 
b. Systemic risk in securities regulation 
Systemic risk is a form of negative externality, where the market price of a product does 
not reflect the true cost to society of producing that good.132 Regulation is therefore used 
to internalized the cost of spill-overs.  
 The role of system risk in securities regulation has been unclear prior to the GFC. 
In the past, the principal concern of securities regulation has been the protection of 
investors through rules of disclosure and conduct of business, rather than the health of 
financial institutions or stability of the financial system. This is because the business of 
securities firms has been perceived to be very different from banking.133 Whereas bank 
loans are illiquid and uncertain in value, securities firms generally hold tradable liquid 
assets; whereas banks rely on potentially volatile and unsecured short-term deposits, a 
high proportion of securities firms’ liabilities are secured funding; and whereas bank 
failures may potentially cause contagion and disruption to the payments system, 
securities firms are believed to be less prone to systemic risk. However, using events 
from the GFC, it can be shown that systemic risk is relevant for securities regulation in 
at least three ways. 
 Firstly, firms engaged in securities business could pose systemic risks. This 
results from changes to the business models of non-banking firms. One significant 
change is that securities market participants have become increasingly involved in 
aggregate maturity transformation – one of the key functions of the banking system. For 
example, before the GFC, investment banks held illiquid assets while they incurred 
shorter-term liabilities under Repurchase Agreements (repo). Similarly, mutual funds in 
the US held long-term credit assets against liabilities which are in the form of promises 
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to investors of immediate redemption and retention of their initial investment values.134 
The ‘shadow banking’ sector was a lacuna in regulation before the GFC.  
 Secondly, securities market crashes and abusive market conducts could also be a 
source of systemic risk. During the GFC, many national regulators banned naked short-
selling of financial shares on the grounds of a possible threat to financial stability.135 The 
first concern is that short-selling may give rise to artificial and unnecessary prices 
declines well below the price level that would have resulted from the normal price 
discovery process. Between 2008~2009, short-selling led to fire-sales and the precipitous 
drop in financial share prices, which contributed to a loss of depositors confidence and 
panic among other lenders and investors. It was the combination of low market 
confidence and funding illiquidity that precipitated the insolvency of many banks.136 The 
second concern about short-selling is that it may be used to assist market abuse. For 
example, the sale of the Bear Stearns Companies Inc. in March 2008 was preceded by 
rumours about its liquidity problems, which led to the fall of the bank’s stock price.137 
Thirdly, short-selling also causes particular settlement concerns.138  
 Thirdly, sound market infrastructure is a key factor for financial stability. In the 
synthetic structured finance market, due to the complexity of financial products and lack 
of adequate information, many investors failed to accurately assess and price their 
investments. Also, since most of the instruments were not traded in real markets, the 
pricing of CDOs relied on using theoretical calculations from models. Therefore, when 
CRAs downgraded structured finance instruments, prices of these instruments collapsed 
as investors lost confidence in the price mechanism and withdrew from the market. 
Moreover, due to opacity in the securitization market, it was difficult for market 
participants to assess which institutions were exposed to losses. This uncertainty was a 
key contributory factor of the Credit Crunch in 2007. Furthermore, when Lehman 
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collapsed, regulators and market participants were not able to properly assess CDS 
exposures with Lehman, and thus exacerbated the effect of Lehman’s insolvency.139  
 Systemic risks in securities markets were explicitly accepted by the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions into its Objectives and Principles. 140  Some 
preliminary discussions on identifying and managing systemic risks were published in a 
Technical Committee report.141 
4.3 Macro-prudential regulation 
In financial regulation, the dominating philosophy of how to make the system safe used 
to be by making the individual financial institutions within the system safe.142 This 
approach has led regulators to impose capital adequacy and risk management 
requirements in relation to the risks which firms undertake individually.  
 However, the experiences of past financial crises have confirmed that crises are 
often rooted in a combination of micro-regulatory failures and adverse macro-economic 
shocks. 143  While inadequate supervision of individual institutions can allow the 
accumulation of large balance sheet exposure to be unchecked, these positions are often 
exposed by adverse macroeconomic events. The Asian crisis was a case in point. 
Inadequate supervision of banks in Asia led to the accumulation of large unhedged 
foreign currency exposures. Then the devaluation of the Asian countries’ exchange rates 
exposed the fragility of banks’ open foreign currency positions, so crisis ensued. 
Moreover, the financial market turmoil that began in August 2007 was also caused by a 
combination of the building-up of excessive exposures in complex financial instruments, 
and the decline of the US economy.144 
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 Therefore, the lessons from the recent crises tell us that by focusing solely on the 
soundness of the individual institutions would not necessarily ensure systemic stability. 
In fact, the individual institutional risk between 2004 and 2006 was found to be low, 
and falling, but the macro-prudential risk in the system had increased.145 As a result, 
macro-prudential supervision and regulation is identified as a missing piece in the 
regulatory jigsaw.146 
 Two guiding principles have emerged from the GFC. Firstly, financial regulation 
needs to have regard of macroeconomic trends, such as, the availability of credit to the 
economy, the pricing of credit, and levels of borrower leverage.147 Secondly, there needs 
to be a shift in the regulatory focus from concerns about the viability of individual 
financial institutions to ensuring the proper functioning of the connecting links in the 
financial system.148 The tools of macro-prudential supervision and regulation are in the 
process of being developed. The emerging consensus is to reform the supervising 
structure to confer powers on a ‘macro-prudential supervisor’ for the purposes of (1) 
identifying the trends in the economy and the financial system that have implications for 
financial and macroeconomic stability whether nationally or more widely; (2) issuing 
warnings for establishing ex ante measures to prevent risks from materializing; and (3) 
efficient coordination as a safeguard to limit possible negative externalities.149  
 For securities regulators, information on macro-economic risks will shed light on 
exogenous factors which are capable of affecting market stability or capability of 
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market participants to fulfil their obligations. For example, at a time of volatility, fraud 
and market abuse is more likely. The information on macro-economic risks could also 
facilitate better decisions-making by regulators regarding allocation of resources and 
choice of tools. 
5 Summary of Findings 
The discussions on the operation of securities markets and their globalization have 
shown how interconnected securities markets have become. Although capital markets 
were apparently becoming a cost-saving strategy for raising capital, the mirage of 
efficiency had vanished during the GFC exposing the social costs resulting from the 
recklessness of financial institutions. From the regulatory perspective, one of the lessons 
of the GFC is that market mechanisms are capable of exacerbating systemic risks. 
Therefore, to achieve the objectives of securities regulation, national authorities 
responsible for securities regulation would need to expand the regulatory perimeter, and 
establish links with other sectoral regulators as well as those in different jurisdictions. 
 This Chapter has presented but a partial picture of the nature of regulatory issues 
in the securities markets of today. In a globalizing world, where interlinkages have 
formed between national securities markets, cross-border regulatory issues are present 
in all transnational activities. The problems resulted by the operation of national laws 
and regulations in globalizing securities markets are to be discussed in the next Chapter, 
with a view to establishing a case for a governance framework for attaining the 
fundamentals of securities regulation that have been analyzed in this Chapter.  
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Chapter 2:  A Case for a Global-level Regulatory 
Framework 
 
It is within the sovereignty1 of states to enact laws to govern the commercial affairs of 
individuals in their territory, 2  including the activities in the securities markets. The 
supreme power of states is subject to no other authority than that of public international 
law.3 In the absence of legally binding international instruments in the area of securities 
market regulation,4 laws emanating from states are therefore the only sources of law for 
governing the globalizing securities markets. Although it might be obvious that 
globalizing markets have moved beyond the territorial reach of national laws, the 
problems caused by this phenomenon and their solutions are less easy to identify. 
 The alternative to national laws is international and/or transnational solutions. 
Since collective action initiatives might require the deployment of national resources, 
entail the fettering of state autonomy, and, carry the risks of collective-action failures, 
before a governance framework is to be developed at the global-level, a case would 
need to be established. This chapter seeks to establish such a case by first analyzing in 
 
1
 One definition of ‘sovereignty’ is ‘the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any 
independent state is governed’; and also as ‘the international independence of a state, combined with 
the right and the power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation’. Black’s Law 
Dictionary. However, the monolithic view of state is challenged in recent years. See Chapter 5, 
Section 2. 
2
 See for example, Alexis de Tocqueville’s definition of sovereignty as the right of law making. 
Democracy in America (New York: Vintage Classics 1990), 123. 
3
 This is the position under public international law. See for example, the opinion of Judge Anzilotti in the 
Austro-German Customs Union Case P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 41 (1931). Also, Helmut Steinberger, 
‘Sovereignty’ in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1987) vol 
10, 408. 
4
 Within the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations, an attempt to harmonise securities regulations have 
failed. In the Annex of Financial Services to GATS, member states have reserved their national 
measures ‘for prudential reasons, including for protection of investors’. It should be noted that there 
have been fresh negotiations in the area of domestic authorisation requirements for facilitating market 
access for foreign companies. The proposal is contained in a model schedule of WTO commitments 
for investment banking, trading and asset management. See e.g., Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, ‘GATS' 
prudential carve out in financial services and its relation with prudential regulation’, I.C.L.Q. 2008, 
57(3), 613. In contrast with the international scene, at the regional level, the European Union has 
enacted regulations and directives with direct effect so as to harmonise national laws on securities 
market regulation. The exceptional case of the EU securities regulation is examined in Chapter 3. 
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Section 1 the problems arising from the operation of national laws and regulations 
within an interdependent global community.5 Then the literature relating the problems is 
examined in Section 2, with their limitations highlighted. 
1 The Global-level Problems in Securities Regulation 
Since different individuals and groups have different preferences, experiences and 
objectives, legal systems and rules differ between various jurisdictions. This is the 
phenomenon of ‘legal diversity’.6 Market participants operating in globalizing securities 
markets have therefore found themselves and their transactions to be governed by a 
mosaic of different regimes and rules. The coexistence of legal systems, networks, or 
orders in the same geographical space is defined as legal pluralism. 7  This section 
explores the problems resulted by legal diversity and legal pluralism.  
 My analysis of the problems arising from national laws regulating globalizing 
securities markets proceeds from two perspectives: the transactional perspective and the 
regulatory perspective. From the transactional perspective, operation of national laws in 
globalizing securities markets is analysed from the viewpoint of a legal counsel, in 
order to bring to light the problems he/she would encounter when advising on 
transnational securities transactions. From the regulatory perspective, the analysis takes 
the national regulators’ viewpoint, seeking to understand the risks for achieving national 
regulatory objectives in the context of market globalization.8 In addition, it will be 
shown that systemic risk is a common problem for market participants and regulators. 
 
5
 According to Professor Zürn, the notions of globalization and interdependence differ in that 
interdependence refers to ‘a growing sensitivity and vulnerability between separate units’, 
globalization to the ‘merging of units’. He also pointed out that the causal mechanisms mentioned in 
connection with the driving forces and the ongoing change in world politics are quite similar in both 
fields. Michael Zürn, ‘From Interdependence to Globalization’, in The Handbook of International 
Relations 235 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002). 
6
 The classic exposition of legal diversity was given by the political philosopher Charles de Montesquieu 
in The Spirit of Laws, Book I of Laws in General (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002). 
7
 See William Twining, Globalizatoin and Legal Theory (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 
2000), 83. 
8
 Objectives of securities regulation are discussed in Chatper 1, Section 4. 
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1.1 Problem analysis: From a transactional perspective 
When advising on securities transactions and drafting legal documents, the aim of a 
legal counsel is to achieve an appropriate level of legal certainty for clients. In a 
securities transaction, the different aspects of legal certainty include: certainty as to all 
relevant securities laws being complied with, certainty as to the enforceability of 
contractual terms and the protection these terms afford to clients in law, and also 
certainty as to when a legal obligation is triggered. It will be shown below that the 
interaction of different national laws and regulatory regimes in cross-border transactions 
results in complexity and conflict. It is submitted that all these problems can hinder the 
attainment of legal certainty, thereby increase legal risk and transactional costs.9 
1.1.1 The rise of regulatory complexity and conflict of laws  
How legal pluralism arises in securities markets? 
 In securities transactions with cross-border elements,10 market participants are 
subjected to laws from different jurisdictions. Two explanations may be offered for this.  
11 First, a cross-border transaction may be found to fall within the territorial scope of 
application of different national laws. The territorial scope of a legal rule may either be 
expressly defined by legislation, or, where there is no express provision, be determined 
by a national court according to its interpretation of the rule. It will be further discussed 
below that states have extended the territorial scope of their laws beyond their natural 
territorial boundaries. Second, where a transaction does not fall within the territorial 
scope of a national law, the law may still be applied in civil litigations or criminal 
 
9
 Since it is not a term of art, ‘legal risk’ has been given different definitions in contexts. The basic 
concept of legal risk has been formulated by McCormick as a Type 1 risk of ‘being sued or being the 
subject of a claim or proceedings due to some infringement of laws or regulations, or the commission 
of …act giving rise to civil liability’, and a Type 2 risk of ‘technical defects in the manner in which 
transaction is carried out’. Roger McCormick, Legal Risks in Financial Markets (Oxford: OUP 2006), 
10. See also, Benjamin, Joanna. 'The sources of legal risk.' Journal of International Banking and 
Financial Law (2004). 
10
 Cross-border elements are the characteristics of a transaction that associate it with different 
jurisdictions. A securities transaction may be said to possess cross-border elements whenever the 
parties to the transaction reside in different jurisdictions, the securities are issued by a foreign issuer, 
various currencies are used, and places where a contract is negotiated, entered and carried out are 
different. 
11
 The explanations are drawn by the author from customary practices of states. For detail discussions on 
customary practice in this area, see Akehurst (1972-73) 46 B.Y.I.L. 145. 
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proceedings if it is the lex fori of the court that has claimed jurisdiction.12 Moreover, 
since a breach of securities laws could give rise to criminal sanctions and civil liabilities, 
due to the different bases for claiming jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters,13 the 
number of applicable laws which a legal counsel would need to consider is again 
increased.  
 Under public international law, there is little limitation on the territorial scope of 
a state’s legislation.14 Therefore, a state has the power to enact laws to govern persons 
and things outside the limits of its territory, unless the state has ceded this power 
pursuant to an international agreement. The extra-territorial application of a legal rule 
may be expressly provided by state legislation. For example, under the UK 
constitutional law, Parliament is competent to make any law whatsoever for any part of 
the world whatsoever, and the UK courts are under an obligation to give effect to any 
such law. 15  However, it is submitted that for reasons of international comity and 
common sense, legislators will not normally extend the scope of application of its laws 
beyond its territory. Under the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), 
the scope of application of the statute has been expressly provided to be ‘in the United 
Kingdom’. According to section 19 of FSMA, the general prohibition on carrying on 
regulated activities relates to ‘a regulated activity in the United Kingdom’. Moreover, in 
relation to the financial promotion restriction under section 21(1), where a 
communication used in financial promotion originated from outside the UK, the 
restriction will only apply if the communication is ‘capable of having effect the UK’. It 
 
12
 For example under English law conflict of law rules, English courts will not enforce a right, capacity, 
disability or legal relationship arising under the law of a foreign country, if an enforcement would be 
inconsistent with the fundamental public policy of English law. Dicey, Morris & Collins: The Conflict 
of Laws (14
th
 ed) (Sweet & Maxwell 2010), Chapter 5.  
13
 In criminal cases, a national court can claim judicial jurisdiction under public international law over 
crimes committed outside its territory on the basis of the territorial principle, nationality principle, 
protective principle and the universality principle. See the Harvard Research Draft Convention on 
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime 1935. The Draft Convention was the product of the unofficial work 
of a number of American international lawyers based on national codes, jurisprudence of national 
courts, conclusions of reliable writers and the resolutions of international conferences. Although not 
binding upon any state as a treaty, the thoroughness of the study preceding it makes the Draft 
Convention an authoritative statement of customary international law. Also see Introductory 
Comment to the Draft Convention, (1935) 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 443. In civil cases, a court may claim 
jurisdiction based on temporary presence of the defendant, place of domicile of the defendant, place 
where the defendant’s asset is located, subject matter of the case. See Akehurst, n. 11 above, 170-177. 
14
 Ibid., 179-188. 
15
 Stanley de Smith & Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8
th
 Edn) (Penguin Books 
1998), Chapter 4.  
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is submitted that in cross-border transactions, the extra-territorial application of a 
national law may cause the greatest degree of uncertainty for the legal counsel where, 
although there is no express provision on its scope of application, the law is applied 
extraterritorially by national courts on the basis of legal interpretation. In this context, 
the jurisprudence of US courts in federal securities laws is a paradigm example. 
 The principal extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws is in the 
area of transactional fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchanges Act 
1934.16 The federal courts have consistently recognised in its cases on section 10(b) that 
Congress has powers to make laws which are of extraterritorial application. 17  The 
jurisprudence of the federal courts may briefly be summarised as follows. The federal 
court will determine whether it has subjective matter jurisdiction under section 27 of the 
1934 Act by adopting the ‘conduct’ test and the ‘effects’ test. Under the ‘conduct’ test, 
when fraudulent conduct of material importance (e.g., a misstatement causing a 
purchase of securities), or conduct integrally associated with fraud (e.g., drafting of an 
inaccurate offering document) that directly caused the plaintiff’s alleged damages is 
found to have taken place within the US, section 10(b) has been held to applied even 
where the foreign transactions have occurred abroad.18 This is to protect the US market 
from being used as a fraud base. According to the ‘effect’ test, even where the whole of 
 
16
 In other areas, such as tender offer regulation and section 5 of the Securities Act 1933 concerning 
registration of securities issues, the extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws has been 
limited either via SEC practice (e.g. Regulation S), and judgement of the US federal courts. E.g. The 
Plessey Company plc v The General Electric Company plc, 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986) declined 
to invoke extraterritorial jurisdiction to tender offer and gave assessment to the considerations of 
comity and policy. But where fraud is alleged in tender offer, the same standards used in fraud cases 
(‘conduct’ and ‘effect’ tests) can apply. See Consolidated Gold Fields plc v Minorco, S.A., 871 F2d 
252 (2d Cir. 1989). 
17
 See US v Aluminium Co of America 148 F 2d 416 (2
nd
 Cir 1945), p. 443, also Leasco Data Processing 
Equipment Corpn v Maxwell 468 F 2d 1326 (2
nd
 Cir 1972), p. 1334.  In these cases federal courts have 
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provision, must be decided by reference to the ‘intention of Congress’ and that if that intention can be 
determined, it will be upheld by the court even if it violate public international law. It is submitted that 
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territorial limitations on the federal securities law which were applicable whenever required to 
protection US investors and markets. See the SEC amicus curiae brief in Schoenbaum v Firstbrook 
405 F 2d 200 (2
nd
 Cir 1986).  
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 See. e.g., Kautbar SDN BHD v Steinberg, 149 F.3d 659 (7
th
 Cir. 1998), Robinson v TCI/US West Cable 
Communications, 117 F. 3d 900 (5
th
 Cir. 1997). A foreigner may also seek protection under the 
federal law in respect of a foreign transaction. See e.g., ITT v Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(The drafting of a prospectus directly caused the foreign investor’s loss). 
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a securities transaction has occurred outside US, section 10(b) has been found to apply 
when a transaction has had substantial and foreseeable injurious effects in the country.19  
 There are a number of reasons why national regulators impose national 
regulation on foreign firms.20 First, to protect domestic investors, as the standard of 
regulation in a foreign firm’s ‘home’ country may be viewed as inadequate. Second, to 
facilitate monitoring and enforcement of regulation by enabling national regulators to 
gather information about a firm’s activities abroad. Third, to ensure that private actions 
may be brought in local courts against foreign firms.  
 The need to comply with different sets of rules entails significantly higher costs 
in cross-border transactions than domestic transactions. The issue of transactional costs 
is explained first from the perspective of issuers and financial service providers, and 
then from that of investors.  
1.1.2 Costs for issuers and financial services providers 
In the area of public offerings, national regulations differ in their procedural, disclosure 
and marketing requirements. Legal counsels would therefore need to adopt specific 
issuance procedures and documentations for each market. For example, a Eurobond 
issue is usually divided into a US and European tranch.21 Duplicated compliance by 
issuers in cross-border offerings and listings results in greater costs without achieving a 
justified regulatory goal. Moreover, conflicts of rules could mean that compliance with 
one set of rules might result in violation of another set of rules. For example, listing 
agreements entered into by an issuer with stock exchanges in different countries for the 
trading of the issuer’s securities may contain contrasting corporate governance 
provisions.22 Therefore, an issuer may find it impossible to adapt its governance model 
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 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v Firstbrook; also Itoba Ltd v Lep Group plc, 54 F3d 118 (2d. Cir. 1975). 
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 See ‘EU-US financial market integration – a work in progress’, 7, report by Deutsche Bank Research, 
Available at  www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD000000000 
0225963.pdf. Accessed on 01/09/2012 
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 Ravi Tennekoon, The Law and Regulation of International Finance (London: Butterworths 1991), 
Chapter 10. 
22
 Resulting from a high levels of diversity between corporate laws and corporate governance structures in 
different jurisdictions. See, Amir Licht, ‘Stock Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and the 
Privatization of Securities Regulation’, (2001) 41 Va J Intl L 583; John Coffee, ‘The future as history: 
the prospects of global convergence in cooperate governance and its implications’, (1999) 93 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 641. 
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to simultaneously fulfil all the different stock markets’ requirements.23 Thus, conflicts of 
rules not only render a transaction legally uncertain, but may also frustrate financing 
opportunities. 
 The dangers of conflicts of rules for financial services providers may be 
illustrated by a recent enforcement decision by the UK’s Financial Services Authority 
against David Einhorn and his US based hedge fund Greenlight for engaging in market 
abuse.24 Einhorn was found guilty of insider trading under section 118(1)(a) FSMA on 
the basis of receiving inside information on a company in which Greenlight held shares, 
and selling Greenlight’s entire shareholding in the company because of the information 
received.25 Einhorn was found guilty of an offence despite the fact that he had at first 
refused to receive the information, which related to the company’s planned equity 
issuance. The decision was controversial because of the broad scope of the ‘insider 
trading’ offence in the UK, which is based on trading knowingly using price sensitive 
information, compared with a narrower US law. A trade would only be found illegal in 
the US if it is based on market-moving information that is obtained by breach of 
confidence.26 This case highlights the legal risks for traders operating in transnational 
markets due to divergent and conflicting laws. 
1.1.3 Costs for investors 
Financial statements prepared under different accounting standards are difficult to 
compare, resulting in extra costs being incurred by investors due to a need to obtain 
expert advice. The need to comply with different national rules may deter some service 
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 Corporate governance is outside the scope of my thesis, for a detailed discussion on difficulties from a 
US law perspective, see Coffee, n 22 above.  
24
 The decision of a £7.2m fine was the second big market abuse decision by the FSA against an overseas 
trader. It caused an outrage in the US. See Brooke Masters and Dan McCrum ‘Split over definition of 
market abuse’, Financial Times, 19, 27/01/2012. For discussions on problems of regulatory 
divergence for stock exchanges, see, Shammo, P, ‘Regulating transatlantic stock exchanges’ (2008) 57 
I.C.L.Q. 827,842-844. 
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 FSA’s decision notice, available on www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/decisions/dn-einhorn-greenlight.pdf. 
Accessed on 01/09/2012 
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 E.g., see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980). Marc Steinberg, Understanding 
Securities Law, 4th edition. (LexisNexis) 2007, Chapter 12. 
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providers from entering a foreign market, thus depriving investors in that market of 
investment and direct access opportunities.27  
 Legal lacunae resulting from the practice of holding and transferring securities in 
electronic settlement systems are a source of legal risk for investors. Traditionally, the 
laws governing the nature of investors’ rights in securities were founded on the 
traditional practices of investors either holding physical instruments in the case of bonds, 
or, being registered on issuers’ registers for shares. These laws have become obsolete as 
securities were dematerialised and investors held securities through intermediaries, with 
only credit entries in intermediary accounts as evidence of their investments.28 This 
legal gap has now been addressed in the US and EU. However, the laws between the 
two systems differ in their approaches to key issues, and, there are still many other 
countries remaining which have so far not enacted laws to tackle this problem.29 The 
problem of legal lacunae results in uncertainty in relation to an investor’s interests in 
securities which are often held through a chain comprising many intermediaries 
operating securities accounts spanning numerous jurisdictions. In particular, the 
insolvency of one of the intermediaries in a chain could lead to unforeseeable losses to 
intermediaries and also investors lower down in the chain. The possible loss of 
investment for investors is also cause of regulatory concern in terms of investor 
confidence and systemic risk. Although rooted in a legal problem, the need of protection 
for investors’ assets in securities accounts is an example where a global response is 
required from securities regulators. It is submitted that any divergence in regulatory 
responses to this problem could aggravate the legal risk for investors.  
1.2 Problem analysis: From a regulator’s perspective 
In order to achieve the three objectives of securities regulation examined in Chapter 1, 
national regulators undertake to perform four main supervisory functions:30  
 
27
 See Ethiopis Tafara and Robert Peterson, ‘A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to US Investors: a New 
International Framework’, (2007) 48 Harvard International Law Journal 31, 47-48.  
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 Joanna Benjamin, Interests in Securities, (Oxford: OUP) 2000, Chapter1. A short history of the 
development of the modern-day clearing and settlement system can be found in Appendix 1. 
29
 Christopher Bernasconi, ‘Law applicable to dispositions of securities held through indirect holding 
systems’ (2002)1 Hague Conference on Private International Law. 
30
 Discussions in Chapter 1. 
A Case for a Global-level Regulatory Framework 
61 
1. Authorization of market participants; 
2. Provision of information to enhance market transparency; 
3. Monitoring of market participants and market surveillance; 
4. Enforcement of the rules and disciplining of transgressors. 
 In this part, the risks which cross-border transactions may pose for regulators’ 
supervisory functions are analyzed.  
 In relation to the first two functions, regulators are faced with the question of 
whether to impose their own rules on authorisation and information disclosure31 on 
foreign issuers and financial intermediaries operating in their territory. This question 
puts regulators between the Scylla and Charybdis of two apparently opposing 
considerations. The first consideration is the risks of de-regulated transnational 
securities markets for investor protection, market integrity and financial stability. If 
foreign issuers and services providers are not subjected to an adequate level of 
regulation, they could both pose risks to domestic investors, and, put domestic issuers 
and services providers at a competitive disadvantage as the foreign market participants 
are subject to less stringent regulation. The second consideration is regulatory 
inefficiency. If transnational market participants are exposed to duplicated and 
conflicting disclosure and registration requirements, the cost of compliance arising from 
operational burden and legal uncertainty may be such so as to destroy the economies of 
scale that a globalized market offers. It submitted that regulatory convergence in the 
area of authorisation and disclosure is the only appropriate resolution in this 
predicament. 32  There have been calls for international action in this area from the 
international market.33  
 The functions of surveillance and enforcement are at the heart of creating an 
effective regulatory system. A number of features may be identified in the modern 
transnational securities markets which cause difficulties for the supervisor when 
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 Especially financial reporting standards. 
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 See discussions in Chapter 5, Section 3.1. 
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 For example, a group of securities industry trade associations’ request to IOSCO for harmonization of a 
number of back office compliance standards faced by international financial intermediaries, on the 
basis that the high cost of different rules does not justify the policy goals of regulators. ‘Letter from 
David Schraa, Inst of Int’l Fin [IIF] & David Strongin, Sec Indus and Fin Mkt Ass’n [SIFMA], to 
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undertaking monitoring and enforcement functions. Firstly, multinational financial 
institutions are often made up of complex organizational structures sprawling across the 
global.34 Such organizational complexity renders the overall risk profile of the corporate 
group hard to ascertain and understand both for the institutions themselves in designing 
internal risk management arrangements and their supervisors in carrying out oversight.35 
Secondly, trading markets for securities have become fragmented through technological 
innovation and developments in commercial practices.36 For example, in equity markets, 
developments in electronic trading have led to the creation of numerous alternative 
trading venues to challenge traditional exchanges, as well as to large banks and brokers 
internalizing their order flows.37 In general terms, market fragmentation can raise issues 
of loss of market efficiency, less transparency and difficulties in risks monitoring. 
Thirdly, business practices have been developed to remove regulated activities from the 
jurisdictional reach of the national supervisor. The commercial practice of outsourcing 
is a good example.38 In order to benefit from the global labour market, back-office 
activities have increasingly been outsourced, to countries such as India, by firms in the 
investment banking industry. Although the firms still are being made directly 
responsible for the outsourced activities, the home supervisor would however have no 
direct investigatory powers for activities carried out abroad, and, must rely on the 
regulated firms to provide information, which are not easily verifiable. Another practice 
is removing assets of the firm out of a jurisdiction so as to frustrate enforcement actions 
brought against such assets.39 Fourthly, a fundamental structural problem underlying all 
cross-border transactions is that supervisors are restricted by foreign information law to 
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attain data and other material required for supervision and enforcement. For example, 
the auditor Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Shanghai has repeatedly refused to comply with 
the US SEC’s request to hand over documents and work papers related to their audit of 
Longtop Financial Technologies Limited, 40 on the ground that to do so would infringe 
Chinese laws, which prohibit such hand over of information without authorization.  
 Although bilateral cooperation could be used to address some gaps in 
supervision, multilateral collaboration often requires to be established in a way that is 
flexible and effective.41 
1.3 Systemic risk 
It will be recalled that systemic risk in securities market was brought to the fore during 
the GFC. Since systemic risk is of concern to both market participants and regulators, it 
is identified as a separate global-level regulatory problem. It is argued that within a 
fragmented regulatory environment, systemic risk cannot be adequately regulated. This 
problem is expounded by firstly outlining the channels by which risks can propagate 
throughout the financial system. Four channels of risk propagation may be identified.42 
 
1. The financial intermediaries channel. Deposit taking institutions, securities firms 
and insurance companies are interconnected through credit exposures inter se. 
For example, under the securitized credit model used before the GFC, securities 
firms made liquidity commitments with ABCP conduits, SIVs and hedge fund 
clients, while insurance companies were liable to other financial institutions under 
CDSs.43 
2. The payment system channel. Both banks and other financial intermediaries are 
linked through their participation in payment and settlement systems, including 
securities settlement systems. 
 
40
 Longtop is a Cayman Islands company, based in China, that listed its shares on the New York Stock 
Exchange in 2007, but trading of the shares were suspend in May 2011. ‘Deloitte Hides From S.E.C. 
Behind Chinese Wall Over Longtop’, www.forbes.com/sites/francinemckenna/2011/09/09/deloitte-
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3. The information channel. Financial markets, and the securities markets in 
particular, transmit information between firms and investors. Information impact 
on how investors and firms perceive and manage risk. 
4. The psychological channel. This is the mechanism by which panic spreads. 
 
 With the growth of multinational financial service providers and cross-border 
securities transactions, national markets have become interconnected. As a result, the 
channels of risk propagation have extended beyond national borders, causing financial 
risks to be transmitted globally.  
 The sequence of the problem of regulatory fragmentation may be explained as 
follows. First, the existence of different rules creates a regulatory arbitrage incentive for 
businesses to evade heavy regulation and opt for a least restrictive environment. 
National regulators may thus be encouraged to promulgate less stringent rules in order 
to attract foreign financial businesses. As a result, optimum rules for investor protection 
may not be produced. 44  Second, globalization increases the likelihood that market 
failure in one jurisdiction will spill-over into other jurisdictions, while, national 
regulators may not have the incentive to address externalities beyond their own 
jurisdiction. Third, since national regulators’ powers are limited within territorial 
borders, supervision of risks in the global market is impaired as a result of regulatory 
fragmentation. This leads to weak links – sub-optimal national regulation and risky 
market activities – being allowed to thrive undetected in the financial system.  
 However, as the collapsed of Lehman’s in 2008 showed that systemic risks have 
not regards for territorial borders. The scale of loss caused by systemic risk means that 
both the markets and regulators have an interest in addressing this global issue. 
 
44
 However, it should be noted that proponents of regulatory competition argue that through competition, 
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1.4 Global-level regulatory problems in-depth 
 In the foregoing analysis, examples were used to demonstrate that global-level 
regulatory problems have arisen as a result of securities markets globalization. The first 
problem concerns the impact of regulatory duplication and conflict of rules for market 
participants. It was shown that cross-border securities transactions suffer from legal 
uncertainty and increased transactional costs and that there is a demand for these market 
efficiency problems to be addressed. The second problem is associated with the 
difficulties experienced by national supervisors in carrying their oversight functions in 
globalizing securities markets. Without being able to conduct seamless supervision, the 
regulatory objectives could not always be achieved. The third problem is that systemic 
risks pertaining to securities markets and investment services providers cannot be 
contained within one jurisdiction or one market sector. The root of all three problems is 
regulatory fragmentation, which is the phenomenon of continuing governance of 
transnational financial markets through national regulatory systems.45 
 What must be done to address these problems? It has been revealed during my 
research that there are no easy answers to this question. The complexities in the above 
global-level regulatory problems will now be further explained. There are three possible 
facets to the problems. 
 The first issue is that none of the three problems identified can be properly 
addressed by countries acting individually, or in the absence of an appropriate level of 
coordination. This is because the markets are operating globally, any bilateral and even 
regional cooperation between regulatory authorities to foster convergence or widening 
oversight will still leave blind spots in the regulation of the financial system. Since it 
would not always be possible to know where systemic risks are, gaps in regulation and 
supervision could result in systemic risks developing unnoticed.46 Therefore, the three 
problems identified have been termed global-level problems, not only because they are 
found globally in the regulation of securities markets, but also because they require 
initiatives to be taken by policy makers at the global-level. 
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 The second issue is that the three problems although distinct, should always be 
considered together by regulators. For example, the European Commission’s Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP) (further discussed in Chapter 3) was an attempt to 
maximize the European capital markets integration. As a result, harmonization of laws 
and market access were the focus under the FSAP reforms. However, because the 
reform did not adequately address the second and third global-level problems, 
regulatory arbitrage risks and inadequacies of home country oversight were identified as 
the reasons for the EU financial system being greatly affected by the GFC.47 Moreover, 
when countries address the questions of systemic risk and supervision, they also need to 
take care to avoid protectionism and restrictions on market access that may prevent the 
yielding of the benefits of globalisation. 
 The third explanation of the complexity pertaining to the three global-level 
problems is a lack of tools for concurrently attaining a global market, state sovereignty 
and financial markets regulation. In short, we have a trilemma. 48  If one wishes to 
regulate markets and maintain state sovereignty, this could be achieved at the expense 
of financial market integration. But if one’s wish is to maintain sovereignty and also 
allow financial markets to integrate, then a de-regulated market at the global-level 
would be the outcome. However, since we have witnessed the dangers of lack of 
adequate regulation, global regulation for an integrated financial market means 
abandoning state sovereignty. 
 In my research, I seek to find trade-offs in order to address this trilemma. My 
aim is to establish a framework to address the global-level regulatory problem in 
securities markets which could contribute to financial systemic stability and duly 
respect national sovereignty. 
2 Literature Review 
This section surveys the literature in relation to the global-level regulatory problems 
above examined. Two main strands of literature may be identified. The first strand is a 
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body of literature emanated from the US around the New Millennium, addressing the 
issue of removal of regulatory barriers. As the demand for capital and investment 
opportunities grew in tandem with technological advancements, policy-makers and 
academics in other economic regions have also joined the debate on how to facilitate 
capital market access for foreign issuers and financial services providers facing 
diversity and conflict of laws.49 The second strand is the literature on regulation of 
global finance. The bourgeoning of academic interests in this area became visible in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis when the term ‘International Financial Architecture’ was 
first coined. The current debate on the GFC may therefore be seen as a continuation of 
this scholarly discourse. 
 There are three schools of thought in relation to removal of regulatory barriers, 
namely harmonization, mutual recognition and exemption. In two separate articles, 
Geiger argues from a global perspective for the need to harmonize disclosure rules in 
public offerings and also for the establishment of a Global Coordinator to draw up a 
Global Prospectus and supervise issuance of securities. 50  Teo has also supported 
harmonization approach for the globalizing securities markets.51 Towards the other end 
of the spectrum in the barrier-removal debate, advocates of regulatory competition have 
proposed different versions of mutual recognition. Romano argues for a regime 
allowing foreign issuers selling shares into the US to opt out of the federal securities 
laws and choose the laws of their country of incorporation. 52  Choi and Guzman’s 
proposal fully upholds party autonomy through permitting issuers to choose the rules of 
any participating country within a ‘portable reciprocity’ system to govern all aspects of 
securities-related regulation.53 Whereas the last two authors have advocated for issuer 
choice, Fox adopts a pure issuer-nationality approach which would prevent US law 
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from becoming part of a race-top-the bottom.54 Tafara and Peterson (two high-ranking 
officials in the SEC’s Office of International Affairs), published an article in 2007 to 
outline a proposal to apply mutual recognition to foreign stock exchanges and broker-
dealers on the basis of them being subjected to ‘substantively comparable’ foreign 
securities regulations, and supervision and enforcement regimes.55 Greene has argued 
for a more coherent mutual recognition programme between the US and EU. 56  An 
alternative approach to mutual recognition of foreign issuers is advocated by Scott, on 
basis of an extension of Regulation S, so as to allow the development of a deep and 
active primary offshore market in which US investors would be free to participate 
without waiting periods and direct-selling restrictions.57  
 The second strand of literature is concerned with stability of the global financial 
system. Writings on the ‘international financial architecture’ (IFA) emerged from 1998 
containing proposals for institutional and structural reforms in order to prevent 
international financial crises. 58  Despite its name, IFA did not comprise a coherent 
structure, but rather, it was an amalgam of so-called ‘international financial standards’ 
and various of bodies which produced the standards and fostered their implementation 
for the purposes of crises prevention and resolution.59 However, some authors, including 
Eatwell, argued for a unitary and centralized approach to global financial regulation, 
with proposals such as a World Financial Authority.60 In the aftermath of GFC, debates 
on global financial regulation may be divided into literature on functions of governance 
and those relating to the debate on form. 
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 Literature on functions concern the roles to be played by global-level bodies. 
Whereas before the GFC, debates on the roles had mainly concerned standards-setting, 
the issues of macro-prudential supervision, and, supervision of systemically important 
firms and their resolution have come to the fore. Authors converge in the view that the 
IMF, due to its expertise and position of relative independence, should play a lead-role 
in monitoring macro-prudential risks and issuing Early Warnings.61 Avgouleas argues 
for a ‘global micro-prudential authority’ for large financial institutions, on the basis of 
home supervisors’ lack of incentive to prevent cross-border contagion (as shown by the 
Icelandic bank collapses) and supervisory colleges’ lack of powers in intervention in 
terms of Prompt Corrective Action and resolution. Avgouleas also suggests that global 
supervision may in time be expanded into systemically important markets. Langevoort 
is also of view that cross-border convergence should be fostered for institutionalised 
areas of the securities market, as opposed to the retail sector.62 Bollen adopting an issue-
based approach argues that prudential supervision may be divided between 
'supranational entities' and national authorities, whilst conduct supervision should 
remain at a national/regional level.63 
 Debates on the form of global financial supervision resolve around whether the 
above-mentioned functions should be supported by hard law and possibly centralized 
supervisory models, or, whether the existing soft law and co-operative approach should 
remain. Avgouleas contends that treaties should be used as the means for establishing 
centralized structures in macro- and micro-prudential supervision and cross-border 
resolution.64 Similarly, Pan argues for the need to establish an international law body, 
under an international administrative law model, with regulatory, supervisory and 
enforcement powers in respect to cross-border financial institutions.65 Bollen is also in 
support of centralization and suggests an incremental route towards this end. Chaffee 
advocates the centralization in securities regulation as a means for removing barriers 
 
61
 Markus Brunnermeier, Andrew Crockett, Charles Goodhart, Avinash Persaud and Hyun Shin, The 
Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, Geneva Reports on the World Economy. Available 
at http://www.icmb.ch./index.php?rub=4&lang=fr&id=12. Emilios Avgouleas, Governance of Global 
Financial Market (Cambridge: CUP) (2012). 
62
 Donald Langevoort, ‘Global securities regulation after the financial crisis’, (2010) J.I.E.L. 799. 
63
 Rhys Bollen, ‘The international financial system and future global regulation’, (2008) J.I.B.L.R. 458. 
64
 Treaty-based approach was also advocated by Giovanoli, n 58 above. 
65
 Eric Pan, ‘Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: 
Beyond Transgovernmental Networks’, (2010) 11 Chi. J. Int'l L. 243. 
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and addressing systemic risk.66 Academics have also been arguing in support of the 
existing soft law governance structure. Arner and Taylor compare hard law structures of 
the IMF and WTO and consider these to be unsuitable for financial regulation. 67 
Brummer is of the opinion that soft law in international finance has coercive effect and 
argues for structural changes, particularly in relation to transparency on compliance, to 
enhance implementation.68 Karmel and Kelly, while in support of soft law as a means of 
preventing race to the bottom, advocates for the need to reduce problems relating to 
legitimacy.69 In terms of organization and structural issues, Blackmoore and Jeapes have 
argued against centralization from the perspective of practical infeasibilities and the 
need for cooperation.70 Cooperation is also the approach adopted by Brunnermeier et el 
in relation to cross-border resolution.71 Moreover, multi-layered governance approach 
based on shared values and principles is advanced by Weber as the future of financial 
regulation.72 
 Since it was argued above that any solutions to the global-level problems should 
be considered in the light of their impact on all three problems, both strands of the 
literature are to be brought together in designing a framework to govern the globalizing 
securities markets. 
3 Summary of Findings 
Perhaps it would not be erroneous at the present to state that the process of globalization 
cannot be reversed. Since financial markets and the securities sector in particular, 
provide important underpinnings in the fabric of our modern society, their globalization 
is required to facilitate the channelling of funds around the world to fuel economic 
 
66
 Eric Chaffee, ‘Contemplating the endgame: an evolutionary model for the harmonization and 
centralization of international securities regulation’, (2010) 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 587. 
67
 Rolf Weber and Douglas Arner, ‘Towards a new design in international financial regulation’, (2007) 29 
U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 391. 
68
 Chris Brummer, ‘How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn't)’, (2010), 99 Geo. L.J. 
257. 
69
 Roberta Karmel and Claire Kelly, ‘The hardening of soft law in securities regulation’, (2008) 34 Brook. 
J. Int'l L. 883. 
70
 Blackmore, V and Jeapes, E, ‘The global financial crisis: one global financial regulator or multiple 
regulators?’ (2009) 4(S1) C.M.L.J. 112 
71
 See n 61 above. 
72
 Rolf Weber, ‘Multilayered governance in international financial regulation and supervision’ (2010) 
J.I.E.L. 683. 
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growth and development. However, the GFC has clearly demonstrated the potential 
dangers of economic liberalisation and financial market integration. Therefore, in order 
to reap maximum benefits from globalization, policy makers should, on the one hand, 
facilitate the development of a globalized securities market, and, on the other, ensure its 
efficiency and stability. 
 The analysis of the operation of national laws and regulations from transactional 
and regulatory perspectives has shown that the development of a globalized and stable 
securities market is being hindered. Whereas cross-border securities transactions are 
rendered uncertain by conflicting, complex and incomplete national laws and 
regulations, the fragmentation of regulatory regimes can frustrate effective supervision 
and enforcement in globalizing securities markets. Within an interlinked and 
interdependent market, losses under one transaction or failures of a national regulatory 
regime may produce spill-over effect in transactions entered into in other jurisdictions. 
Therefore, it has been argued that a global-level framework is needed to govern the 
securities markets, so that the objectives of securities regulation discussed in Chapter 1 
may be attained. 
 With the development in the EU and at the global-level, some headway has been 
made in establishing an international governance structure in securities markets. In Part 
2, the existing initiatives for resolving the global-level problems are examined in detail, 
with a view to assessing their limitations and drawing lessons for constructing a global-
level regulatory framework. 
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PART 2 
 
 
‘If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.’ 
 
Sir Isaac Newton 
Remark in a letter to his rival Robert Hooke, dated on 5 February 1676, 
The Correspondence of Isaac Newton, edited by H W Turnbull, 1959, v.1, p.416. 
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Chapter 3:  Cross-border Securities Regulation in the 
EU and a Comparison with US Securities 
Law  
 
In the last chapter, the three global-level regulatory problems in the transnational 
securities markets were analyzed. It has been shown that the current state of regulatory 
fragmentation has contributed to hindrance in market integration, frustration of 
regulatory objectives and risks to financial stability. Therefore, it is argued that a global-
level governance framework is needed to resolve these problems. 
 Since the 1980s, reforms and initiatives have been taken at national, regional and 
transnational levels in order to address the problems arising from cross-border securities 
transactions and an emerging global securities market. The aim of this Chapter is to 
identify how EU and US securities regulation have addressed the three global regulatory 
problems theorized in Chapter 2, to discuss weakness in the existing laws and to draw 
lessons for a global-level regulatory framework. In Chapter 4, the initiatives of global 
actors will be considered. 
 My reasons for choosing the EU and US regimes are straightforward. These 
geographical areas are, at present, the homes to the world’s largest capital markets, 
harbouring the most creative market participants and most advanced securities 
regulatory regimes.1 Being the centres of gravity of the global capital markets, securities 
markets in the US and EU have been attracting issuers and investors, as well as 
professional financial services providers from many overseas countries. Moreover, 
globalization has also fuelled competition between these markets and other financial 
centres. As a result, regulating cross-border activities is an integral part of the rules on 
securities regulation in both the EU and US.  
 
1
 In 2007, 39% of global stock market capitalization was located in the US, closely followed by the EU-
15 at 26%. See European Financial Integration Report SEC (2007) 1696, 5 – 6. 
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 One needs to first point out the differences and similarities in the debates on 
cross-border issues taking place on either sides of the Atlantic. Debates in US have two 
prongs: (1) how to design the extra-territorial reach of the federal securities laws to 
ensure the proper protection of national markets and interests, and, (2) how to render the 
access into the US market less restrictive for certain types of issuers and service 
providers with the aim to benefit US investors and, again, the US national markets.2 In 
the EU, securities regulation focuses on approximating the laws between twenty-seven 
Member States (MS) with an aim to building an integrated EU capital market.3 Cross-
border securities regulation in the EU has two facets, one concerning intra-MS 
regulation and the other third country regulation. The regulation of cross-border 
securities transactions between persons (natural and legal) domiciled within the twenty-
seven MS addresses both the removal of regulatory barriers and also regulation of 
market participants and their activities. Where rules of EU regulation concern market 
participants from ‘third countries’, the issues raised are comparable with the second 
prong of the US debate. Therefore, the comparative aspect of this Chapter contrasts US 
law with the ‘third countries’ rules in the EU. 
 The Chapter is set out as follows. The intra-MS regulation in the EU is first 
examined, and a US-EU comparison is then made. The EU regulatory structure for 
securities market rule-making is examined in Section 1 to draw lessons for the global-
level. Methods of cross-border supervision in the EU are discussed in Section 2 to 
identify the new developments which depart from the traditional information sharing 
activities of national supervisors. The mutual recognition principle and harmonization 
of substantive rules are examined in Section 3, with the interplay between mutual 
recognition and harmonization analyzed in respect of removing regulatory barriers, and, 
the risks of harmonization as regulation also highlighted. In Section 4, a comparative 
study between the EU and US rules on foreign issuers and service providers is made, in 
order to pave way for the analysis on the tools of regulatory cooperation in Chapter 5. 
 
2
 See literature in Section 4. 
3
 Niamh Moloney, EC Securities Regulation (2
nd
 ed.), (Oxford: OUP) 2008, Introduction. 
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1 Regulatory Structure of EU Securities Regulation 
Regulation in the EU capital market may be viewed as operating along vertical and 
horizontal axes. The vertical axis comprises the processes of rule-making, 
implementation and enforcement, through which securities regulation promulgated by 
the EU institutions become incorporated and applied by MS. The horizontal axis 
consists of the day-to-day exercise of supervisory and enforcement functions by 
national regulatory authorities on the one hands, and establishment of cooperation and 
coordination between the MS authorities on the other. The regulatory structure of EU 
securities regulation is examined in this Section from the perspective of the 
superanational institutions, which have been empowered to create, implement and 
enforce regulatory rules, and, their rule making processes. The aims are to pave the way 
for discussions in later Sections, and draw lessons for standard-setting at the global-
level. To this end, the activities of the former Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) will also be discussed due to its consitutional similarities with the 
International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO). However, as far as 
regulation of EU securities markets is concerned, CESR’s roles are now superceded by 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which forms part of the 
institutional reforms took place in the aftermath of the GFC.  
1.1 The Lamfalussy process 
The present Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 4  and its 
predecessors have provided the legislative bases for the removal of regulatory barriers 
between MS and harmonization of substantive rules on securities regulation.5 Before 
2001, directives promulgated under the co-decision procedure were the primary 
 
4
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ OJ C 115/47, incorporated Lisbon Treaty changes to 
the Treaty of Rome, was signed by the MS on 13 December 2007, and entered into force on 1 
December 2009. 
5
 The legistlative bases are the specific Treaty freedoms (e.g., free movement of capital (Article 63 
TFEU), freedom of establishment (Article 50 TFEU),
 
freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU)), 
and general competences for the approximation of MS rules relating to the internal market. Article 
114 TFEU provides for the adoption of measures for the approximation of MS rules which have as 
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market, and Article 115 TFEU for 
directives to be adopted by the Council acting unanimously for the approximation of MS rules which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 
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instruments for establishing the EU capital market.6 However, the co-decision procedure 
was found to be slow, rigid and ill-equipped for rule-making in the modern 
computerized and interconnected securities markets, as it usually took more than two 
years to adopt a new directive.7 The impetus for change came as a result of the political 
drive to ensure the timely delivery of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) by 
2005.8 The FSAP containing forty-two harmonizing measures was aimed at engendering 
greater financial market integration in response to the introduction of the euro, and, also, 
providing protection against the risks of the emerging single European capital market. 
The Committee of Wise Men under the chairmanship of Baron Lamfalussy, convened 
by the Economic and Finance Ministers, proposed a four-level regulatory process to 
address the inadequacies of the co-decision procedure in financial law making.9 The 
subject matters of the Lamfalussy report concerned regulation along the above-
mentioned vertical axis. Levels 1 and 2 establish the law on the books, and Levels 3 and 
4 concern the law in action.10 
 
6
 Under Article 294 TFEU the co-decision procedure, the European Parliament (EP) and Council are to 
adopt regulations and directives, which are the legislative acts under Article 289 TFEU. 
7
 See ‘Final report of the Committee of Wise Men on regulation of securities markets’ (Lamfalussy 
Report), 14, 15 February 2001. 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.pdf, 
Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. (The Lamfalussy Report was endorsed by the European Council meeting in 
Stockholm on 23 and 24 March 2001. See ‘The resolution of the European Council on a more 
effective securities market regulation’ (Stockholm resolution).The European Parliament Resolution of 
5 February 2002 represented the Parliament's provisional approval of Lamfalussy; see President 
Prodi's declaration annexed to that Resolution.)  
8
 The Commission communication, ‘Implementing the framework for financial markets: action plan’ 
(FSAP), COM(1999)232. 
9
 The Lamfalussy report identified a plethora of weaknesses, including differences in legal systems, 
political and cultural barrier and long list significant gaps in European legislation. Lamfalussy Report, 
10. See Lastra, ‘The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe’, 
(2003) 10 Columbia Journal of European Law 49, particularly at 62. 
10
 Scholars have often made this distinction, e.g. Chiu, n 23 below.  
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1.1.1 Rule-making: Levels 1 and 211 
To achieve efficient and effective securities regulation in the EU, the Level 1 of the 
Lamfalussy process consists of framework norms which articulate the basic political 
choices, and Level 2 sets out detailed technical measures for implementing the 
objectives in the first Level. 12 The Level 1 framework principles are to be adopted by 
the co-decision procedures.13 At Level 2, detailed technical measures are to be adopted 
by the European Commission in accordance with legal restraints.  
 Before the GFC, the Commission’s Level 2 rule-making powers were exercised 
upon advice from the European Securities Committee (ESC) 14  and Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR), 15  and with oversight of the European 
Parliament (EP) and Council.16 CESR was established by a Commission decision as ‘an 
independent advisory group on securities in the Community’,17 to provide technical 
advice to the Commission.18 
 
11
 My thesis does not provide a general review on the success of the Lamfalussy process. This has been 
done at the EU level and in literature. Notably, Commission Staff Working Document ‘The 
Application of the Lamfalussy Process to EU Securities Markets Legislation’ (the Commission 2004 
Lamfalussy Review), 15.11.2004 SEC(2004) 1459; and the Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group’s 
reports monitoring the Lamfalussy Process. In 2007 the Commission’s FSAP Evaluation Part I: 
Process and implementation (FSAP Evaluation). As well as the literature already cited on CESR, see, 
Gabriel Gari and Rosa Lastra ‘Assessing the Lamfalussy process: successes and failures’ (2009) 24 
B.J.I.B. & F.L. 379. For an analysis of the law-making risks at levels 1 and 2 of the Lamfalussy 
process in the post-FSAP years, see Niamh Moloney, ‘Law-making risks in EC financial market 
regulation after the financial services action plan’ in Stephan Weatherill (ed.) Better Regulation (Hart 
publishing) 2007. 
12
 This two-layer characterization is almost ubiquitous in financial regulation. E.g. US Securities and 
Exchange Act 1934, section 4 creating the Securities and Exchange Commission. For detailed 
explanation see Lastra, n 12 above, 62 et seq. 
13
 Five Directives were adopted under the FSAP in the area of securities regulation: Tranparency 
Directive 2001/34/EC [2001] OJ L 390/38; Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC [2003] OJ L16/16; 
Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC [2003] OJ L 345/64; Directive on markets in financial instruments, 
(MiFID) 2004/39/EC [2004] OJ L 145/1; and the two UCITS Directives 2001/108/EC [2002] OJ 
L41/35 and 2001/107/EC [2003] OJ L41/20. 
14
 Commission decision on establishing the European Securities Committee No 2001/528/EC, [2001] OJ 
L 191/45. 
15
 Commission decision of establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators 2001/527/EC 
[2001] OJ L 191/43, repealed by Commission decision C (2009) 176 final of 23.1.2009. 
16
 The so-called ‘comitology process’, which was continuously being amended reflecting the EP’s 
demands for a greater role. The first Comitology Decision was passed by the Council in 1987, first 
amended in 1999, and then in 2006. See Pierre Shammo, EU Prospectus Law (Cambridge: CUP) 2011, 
12 et seq. 
17
 Article 1 of the Commission decision of 23 January 2009 (CESR decision) establishing CESR 
2009/77/EC [2009] OJ L25/18. Previously, Commission passed decision 2001/527/EC of 6 June 2001, 
which was amended by decision 2004/7/EC of 5 November 2003. 
18
 Ibid. Article 2.  
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 After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009, there are now two 
types of secondary measures which the Commission may enact: delegated acts (for 
amending or supplementing non-essential elements of the primary legislative acts) and 
implementation acts (for giving effect to legislative rules).19 The role of the advisory 
committees is retained for delegated acts. A new comitology regime governs adoption 
of the implementation acts. 20  Committees composed of MS representatives are to 
oversee the implementation acts through either advisory or examination procedure. 
However, neither the EP nor the Council have been accorded a direct role on the 
committees. The power of ESMA to produce draft Level 2 measures is further discussed 
below.  
1.1.2 Implementation and enforcement: Levels 3 and 4 
After uniform rules are adopted, the need to ensure their timely and consistent 
implementation comes into sharp focus. There are two stages in the implementation of 
securities regulations enacted by the EU.21 Firstly, in the transposition process, national 
laws need to be adopted or amended to give full effect to the provisions in EU 
legislations. Secondly, the day-to-day application of EU legislations must also be 
consistent in the different MS. In order to ensure consistent implementation of EU 
legislations throughout the EU, the Committee of Wise Men recommended a range of 
activities to be undertaken by Level 3 Committee, including guidelines, 
recommendations and peer reviews.  
 Moreover, the power to enforce the Treaty is conferred on the Commission 
under Article 258 TFEU. As part of its enforcement duties, the Commission has taken 
preventative initiatives to coordinate implementation between MS.22  
 
19
 Respectively, Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. Paul Craig, ‘Delegated Act, Implementation Act and the 
New Comitology Regulation’ (2011) 36 E.L. Rev. (Arguing that the distinctions between delegated 
act and implementation act are not clear.) 
20
 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 [2011] OJ L55/13. 
21
 See van Leeuwen and Demarigny, n 23 below, 210.  
22
 E.g. transposition guidelines, package meetings. See See van Leeuwen and Demarigny, n 23 below, 
210-211. 
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1.1.3 Lessons for global-level governance 
A number of lessons may be drawn from the Lamfalussy process for global-level 
governance in the securities markets. The role of the former CESR in formulating and 
implementation EU securities regulation is being highlighted here because of the light 
which may be shed by the Committees activities on global-level governance.23 CESR 
may be said to be similar to IOSCO in a number of ways. In terms of composition and 
constitution, both CESR and ISOCO were private organizations with no legal 
personality,24 and it was their membership, composed of national securities regulators, 
who determined the rules of internal organizations. In terms of function, CESR and 
IOSCO were, broadly speaking, both active in facilitating convergence of national 
regulations and exchange of information.25  
 The positive lessons are discussed first, to be followed by negative lessons. 
 
23
 Of the abundance of literature on CESR, I have found the following particularly helpful. Arthur 
Docters van Leeuwen and Fabrice Demarigny, ‘Europe's securities regulators working together under 
the new EU regulatory framework’, (2004) J.F.R. & C. 206 (the authors were respectively the first 
Chairman and General Secretary of CESR); Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The future of financial regulation and 
supervision in Europe’, (2005) 42 CMLR, 987 (the author was the second Chairman of CESR from 
2004 until its dissolution in 2010); Iris Chiu, Regulatory Convergence in EU Securities Regulation 
(London: Kluwer Law International), 2008, Chapters 3-5; Niamh Moloney, ‘Innovation and risk in 
EC financial market regulation: new instruments of financial market intervention and the Committee 
of European Securities Regulators’. (Moloney on CESR) (2007) 32 E.L. Rev. 627; Michael McKee, 
‘The Committee of European Securities Regulators: is it working?’ (2002) 4 J.I.F.M. (4), 111; 
Thomas Möllers, ‘Sources of law in European securities regulation - effective regulation, soft law and 
legal taxonomy from Lamfalussy to de Larosiere’. (2010) 11 E.B.O.R. 379; Guido Ferrarini, ‘Pan-
European securities markets: policy issues and regulatory responses’, (2002) 3 E.B.O.R. 249; Duncan 
Alford, ‘The Lamfalussy process and EU bank regulation: preliminary assessment and future 
prospects’, (2006) J.I.B.L.R. 59; Shammo, n 16 above, Chapter 1; D Vitkova, ‘Level 3 of the 
Lamfalussy process: an effective tool for achieving pan-European regulatory consistency?’ (2008) 
LFMR 158; (an example of political science literature) Lucia Quaglia, ‘The politics of financial 
services regulation and supervision reform in the European Union’, (2007) 46 European Journal of 
Political Research 269. 
24
 CESR was a non-profit association under French law, see Shammo, n 16 above, 20; IOSCO was 
established by statute by the Quebec Parlement as a nonprofit membership organization, See Chapter 
4. 
25
 However, whereas the IOSCO members have been enjoying independence in their activities within the 
Organization, CESR was subject to visible legal and political restraints under the EU institutional 
structure. The nature of CESR’s work was always dependent on the Commission’s regulatory agenda 
and its operations were under scrutiny from the EU institutions. On the MiFID Level 3 process, 
Professor Moloney opined that it was ‘largely driven by the Commission…rather than by CESR-
driven initiatives…[as] substantial proportion of the Level 3 agenda concerns the extensive reporting 
and review obligations required of the Commission under MiFID Art.65 at Level 1’. However, 
Professor Moloney was also of the view that where there were ‘potentially explosive issues’ such as 
the transparency regime for equity market, there were also potentially for CESR to yield its influence. 
Moloney on CESR, n 23 above, 653. 
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a. A positive lesson on balancing between legislative efficacy and democratic demand 
The success of the Lamfalussy process had hinged on whether faster and better-quality 
rule-making could be attained via the Level 2 technical measures stage. The initial 
proposals in the Lamfalussy report had effectively removed the European Parliament 
from Level 2. This caused underlying institutional tensions between EP, the 
Commission, ESC and CESR, which were a constant source of risk to the legislative 
process.  
 The persisting question was how to balance between legislative efficacy and 
democratic demand. This issue had been resolved pragmatically in the pre-GFC years 
by the EU institutions constantly maintaining information flows and communication 
links inter se.26 The Commission had engaged the EP in early discussions about the 
scope of its Level 2 rule-making powers and kept the EP informed on par with ESC 
about draft measures.27 The Commission attended meetings in CESR.28 The chairperson 
of CESR also participated in ESC’s meetings as an observer.29  
 Moreover, after CESR’s charter was reformed in 2006 with a view to address the 
issue of accountability, the processes of transparency and communication were 
strengthened.30 CESR’s members made a general commitment to work in an open and 
transparent manner.31 They were to keep their national ESC members informed about 
the Committee’s discussions.32 CESR was to send its annual reports to the Parliament 
and ESC when submitting them to the Commission.33 Moreover, CESR committed to 
making periodic reports to the EP.34 
 As will be discussed in Chapter 4, interactions between political actors and 
regulators have started to take place at the global-level. Good communications between 
 
26
 The three Ts - ‘transparency, trust and teamwork’ - were identified by the Commission 2004 
Lamfalussy review as the cornerstones of the Lamfalussy process. See n 11 above, 14. 
27
 Commission 2004 Lamfalussy review, n 11 above, 5. 
28
 The CESR Decision, Article 3. 
29
 The ESC Decision, Article 3. 
30
 The charter was adopted by CESR’s members setting out the organization and functions of CESR. 
CESR/06-289c, amending the first Charter adopted on 11 September 2001, CESR/01-002. 
31
 Ibid. Article 5.9. 
32
 Ibid. Article 1.3. 
33
 Ibid. Article 6.2. 
34
 Ibid. Article 6.1. 
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the different actors in the EU may therefore serve as an example for successful 
cooperation. 
b. A positive lesson on consumer group consultation 
The Lamfalussy process was found to have contributed to the timely delivery of the 
Lamfalussy measures.35 CESR’s technical advice to the Commission at Level 2 had led 
to swifter legislative preparations. 36  It is submitted that CESR’s commitment to 
consultation, in particular with consumer groups, was the foundation of its success. 
Consultation is an art which CESR had to learn to master through continuous 
experimentation. 
 CESR’s obligation to consult extensively in drafting its technical advice was 
highlighted in the Council’s Stockholm resolution. 37  The principles in the CESR 
consultation statement adopted an inclusive approach to rule-making explained in the 
FSAP.38 According to the statement, CESR would make early calls for contribution to 
all interested parties, use a variety of media and conduct face to face meetings where 
appropriate, and also publish feedback statements. By explaining in the feedback 
statement why certain comments of respondents had been incorporated into the final 
advice, whilst some had not been, ECSR could convey the message that it was 
responsive to stakeholders’ concerns and, at the same time, making independent 
decisions by itself. 39  The corollary, it was hoped, would be the increase of public 
acceptance of a legislative proposal.40 
 
35
 See Inter-institutional Monitoring Group, ‘Third Interim Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy Process’, 
IIMG 3
rd
 report (17 November 2004), Executive Summary, Point 1. Indeed, the Commission’s 
decision to extend the Lamfalussy process to the areas of investment funds, banking and insurance 
was testimony to its confidence in the process. For further details on this package of measures, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/finances/cross-sector/index_en.htm#committee. Accessed 
on 01/09/ 2012.  
36
 For example, 90% of CESR’s advice on implementing the Market Abuse Directive were included by 
the Commission in its first-ever set of Level 2 measures, which were to be voted unanimously in 
favour by the SEC. See IIMG 2
nd
 report, 10. 
37
 See ‘The resolution of the European Council on a more effective securities market regulation’ (23 and 
24 March 2001), point 6. 
38
 CESR/01-007c (CESR consultation statement) December 2001. 
39
 For a discussion of differences of views between the market and CESR over the MiFID Level 2 regime, 
see Moloney (2
nd
 ed.), n. 3 above, VIII 3.2.4. 
40
 See Inter-institutional Monitoring Group, ‘Second Interim Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy Process’, 
(IIMG 2
nd
 report) (10 December 2003), 28. 
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 At the start of CESR’s work, there were certainly very limited dialogues with 
consumers and end-users due to structural shortcomings.41 From 2005, CESR changed 
its consultation strategy in order to more actively engage with Retail Investor 
Associations (RIAs), e.g., through its annual Retail Investor Workshops. As a 
consequence, the numbers of RIAs responding to CESR consultations showed a small 
but gradual upward incline since 2005. In February 2007, following a two-day Retail 
Investor Workshop, which focused on key investor disclosures (KID) proposals 42 
relating to the operation of UCITS passport, CESR received 12 responses from RIAs 
(out of a total of 51 responses) to its consultation paper on the KID, making RIAs the 
second highest responding group after ‘insurance, pension and asset management’ 
which provided 18 responses.43 Furthermore, in the recent MiFID consultation reforms, 
a tenth of the written responses received were from Investor relations.44 The role of 
consumer consultation is being continually emphasized by the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA), with the establishment of Securities and Markets 
Stakeholder Group and Retail Investor Network.45 The experience of CESR therefore 
serves as an example of how consumer activism is potentially possible even in cross-
border regulation. 
c. Negative lessons from CESR’s incomplete constitutional makeup 
The ECSR charter in 2001 laid down a wide range of tasks at Level 3, reflecting 
recommendations in the Lamfalussy report.46 CESR’s Himalaya Paper later developed a 
whole range of Level 3 tools in three categories: 1) coordinated implementation of EU 
 
41
 See the van den Burg report which expressed ‘regrets [of] the lack of input from consumers and users 
with regard to financial services legislation’. CEPS Task Force ‘EU Financial Regulation & 
Supervision beyond 2005’, 7, Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2005. The FIN-USE forum 
set up by the Commission criticized the lack of meaning for information on consumer experience. 
FIN-USE Forum, ‘Financial Services, Consumers and Small Businesses, A User Perspective on the 
Reports on Banking, Asset Management, Securities and Insurance of the FSAP Stocktaking Groups’, 
October 2004. Also, IIMG 2
nd
 report (10 December 2003), 29. 
42
 CESR/07-669. 
43
 CESR annual report 2007, 54. 
44
 CESR annual report 2010, 52. 
45
 See ESMA, ‘Public Statement of Consultation Practices’, (ESMA Consultation Practices) 11 January 
2011 (ESMA/2011/11). 
46
 CESR charter, Article 4. 
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law, 2) regulatory convergence and 3) supervisory convergence.47 The main tools for 
fostering consistent implementation and application of EU legislations were CESR’s 
standards and peer reviews.48 However, the first CESR Decision in 2001 did not confer 
legally binding powers on CESR. Nor did the Decision expressly provide for CESR’s 
remit under Level 3, which was only referred to in the Recitals.49 As a result, there were 
many doubts about the legitimacy of CESR’s Level 3 activities, and also problems of 
implementation regarding CESR’s standards.  
 In the view of CESR’s former Chairman, its standards should be ‘“binding” on 
national regulators vis-à-vis each other in order to respect their commitment under the 
CESR Charter…and peer pressure’.50 The ‘binding force’ being referred to here was 
indeed a moral one only. From the peer reviews conducted by CESR, it was found that 
large percentages of members did not implement CESR’s standards.51 
 On balance, it should be pointed out that CESR’s standards were still very 
influential in many ways.52 One example is that some of CESR’s standards are in the 
process of becoming a part of EU legislations. In CESR’s recommendations on 
inducement, there was a restriction on portfolio management firms from receiving 
 
47
 First two categories concern vertical integration, i.e. consistent in implementation by MS of 
harmonized EU laws, they are the subject matter in this Section. The activities relating to supervisory 
convergence, which may be viewed as concerning the horizontal relationship between national 
regulators, will be discussed in the next Section. See CESR, ‘Which supervisory tools for EU 
securities markets?’ (Himalaya Paper) Oct. 2004, CESR/04–333f. The name of the paper refers to the 
use of the ‘Sherpas’ during the preparation phase; sherpas as we know come from the name for native 
guides in the Himalayas. I thank Professor Rosa Lastra for first pointing this out to me. 
48
 CESR Charter, Article 4(3). 
49
 Recital 9 in decision 2001/527/EC provided that CESR ‘should also contribute to the consistent and 
timely implementation of Community legislation in the Member States by…effective cooperation 
between national supervisory authorities…peer reviews and promoting best practice.’ Cf. the longer 
list of functions suggested for Level 3 in the Lamfalussy report, 39. 
50
 Leeuwen and Demarigny, n 23 above, 212. In relation to the Level 3 standards, the CESR charter 
provided that ‘the members will introduce in their regulatory practices on a voluntary basis’ (emphasis 
added).
50
 Despite the caveat, the preamble to the charter contained the words, ‘the members of the 
Committee resolve to adhere…to this Charter’. 
51
 For example, in 2008, the Review Panel looked into compliance with CESR’s guidelines to simplify 
the notification procedures of UCITS in Europe (CESR/09-1134) which is part of supervisory 
convergence. In the Review Panel’s findings published in 2010, five MS were said to have complied 
fully, and majority did not fully apply guidelines. But CESR noted that after the Peer Review, there 
was a higher degree of compliance with the guidelines in the jurisdictions of some members. See 
CESR Annual Report 2010, 72. 
52
 Some scholars have propounded various concepts in order to better place CESR’s standards within the 
EU normative hierarchy. E.g., Chiu, n 23 above, 106-109 (argued for recognition to be given on 
CESR’s standards as the MS’s ‘legal yardstick for regulatory convergence’. Also, Möllers, n 23 above 
(argued that CESR’s standards were a ‘secondary source of law’). 
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monetary benefits provided by a third party.53 As such restriction was absent from the 
current Level 1 and 2 measures, in its 2011 proposal to recast MIFID, the Commission 
incorporated the CESR’s restriction into the structure of the present MiFID Article 19, 
which is the key retail investor protection provision.54 If this part of the proposal were 
adopted, it would be a case of soft law in the EU becoming ‘hardened’. 
 Concerns about legitimacy culminated in the 2005 Van den Burg Report, in 
which the European Parliament was reported to urge CESR and the other Level 3 
Committees ‘to pay the utmost attention to providing a sound legal basis for their 
actions, avoiding dealing with political questions and preventing prejudice to upcoming 
Community law’.55 Sensitivity of its member regulators to this issue had resulted in 
CESR amending its Charter (as explained above) in an attempt to making its activities 
and decision-making more transparent. More specifically in relation to Level 3, CESR 
announced a shift away from regulatory convergence to focusing on supervisory 
convergence in operational matters. 56  Thus it can be seen that when a body lacks 
legitimacy to carry out a function, its potentials to contribute to governance would 
become restricted.  
 Addressing the problems of lack of legitimacy and implementation were part of 
the focus of the institutional reforms in the aftermath of the GFC. 
1.2 Institutional reforms in the aftermath of GFC 
In the midst of the GFC, the de Larosière report, in accordance with the Commission’s 
mandate, was published, urging immediate action from the European institutions.57 
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 CESR, ‘Inducements under MiFID’ (CESR/07-228b) (CESR’s Inducement Recommendations). CESR 
made recommendations to facilitate the implementation of Article 26 of the MiFID Implementing 
Directive on inducement. Article 26 is an implementation provision for Article 19(1) of the Level 1 
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discussed in Section 3.1.3b. 
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 See the Commission’s proposal COM(2011) 656 final, 78. 
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 European Parliament's Van den Burg Report on the Current State of Integration of EU Financial 
Markets (April 2005) A6-0087/2005, para. B. 20. 
56
 CESR, ‘The Role of CESR at “Level 3” Under the Lamfalussy Process’, 8 (2004) CESR/04-104b. 
57
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chaired by Jacques de Larosière to make recommendations on how to strengthen European 
supervisory arrangements. The de Larosière group presented its final report on 25 February 2009. The 
report was endorsed by the European institutions. See, Commission Communication of 4 March 2009 
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 The de Larosière report identified eight fundamental weaknesses in the 
European financial supervisory framework, including, lack of adequate macro-
prudential supervision, ineffective Early Warning mechanisms, failures to challenge 
inconsistent supervisory practices of national regulators, no means for the Level 3 
committees to impose common decisions, and their lack of resources. 58  The report 
recommended reforms to regulatory and supervisory framework in the EU.59  
 Institutional reforms were proposed within the ‘Supervisory Repair’ section of 
the de Larosière report to address the above mentioned lacunae in financial 
supervision. 60  Following these proposals, three European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs) were established to replace the Level-three Committees for micro-prudential 
and conduct supervision. To address macro-prudential supervision, the new European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was constituted. It would also act jointly with the ESAs in 
managing systemic risks. The functions of ESRB and issues of cross-border supervision 
are to be discussed under Section 2. The remainder of this Section examines the 
functions of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in relation to rule-
making, implementation and enforcement under the EU’s regulatory structure. 
1.2.1 EU Regulation establishing ESMA 
ESMA is one of the three ESAs established in December 2010 through the co-decision 
process.61 ESMA is a ‘Union body with legal personality’,62 and it must at all times act 
within the constraints under the ESMA Regulation and within the scope of the tasks 
 
to the Spring European Council, ‘Driving European Recovery’ - COM(2009) 114. Generally on the de 
Larosière report, see Jean-Victor Louis, ‘The implementation of the Larosière report: a progress 
report’, Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (eds.) International Monetary and Financial Law, the 
Global Crisis, (Oxford: OUP) 2011, Chapter 7. Emilios Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial 
Market (Avgouleas on Governance) (Cambridge: CUP) 2012 263-266; Guido Ferrarini and Filippo 
Chiodini, ‘Regulating cross-border banks in Europe: a comment on the de Larosière report and a 
modest proposal’, (2009) 4 CMLJ S1 23. 
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 de Larosière report, 39-42. 
59
 de Larosière report, Chapters II and III respectively. 
60
 For an overview of the new structure, see Avgouleas on Governance, n 57 above, 302-321. 
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 Regulation (EU) 1095/2010, OJ L 331/84. (ESMA Regulation) During the negotiations to establish the 
EFAs, there were considerable differences among the ‘trilogue’ (Commission/Council/Parliament). 
The trilogue first reached an agreement on the EBA (European Banking Authority) Regulation, which 
paved way finalizing the ESMA and EIOPA (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
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Regulation on 22 September. (P7_TA-PROV(2010)0339) 
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 ESMA Regulation, Article 5(1). 
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designated to it by the EU legislations.63 ESMA is conferred, as further discussed below, 
with powers to issue legally binding decisions. All its actions are subject to review by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union.64 Moreover, ESMA is directly accountable 
to both the Council and European Parliament.65 
 The institutional structure of ESMA seeks to ensure its independence through 
the positions of the Executive Director and Chairperson. The Chairperson is also 
accountable to the Parliament which has the power to remove him from office (on the 
basis of a Plenary Board decision). 66  Furthermore, MS competent authorities are 
required to act 'independently and objectively' in the European interest when fulfilling 
their tasks under the ESMA Regulation.67  
1.2.2 ESMA’s functions at Level 2 
The ESMA Regulation does not formally alter the Level 2 Lamfalussy process 
discussed in Section 1.1.1. It may be described as grafting onto the existing regulatory 
process an extra role for the new ESMA. Where an EU measure delegates powers to the 
Commission to adopt regulatory technical standards or implementing technical 
standards (pursuant to above-described Articles 290 and 291), ESMA has a right to 
develop draft standards in accordance with the conditions under the Level 1 measures 
adopted by the EP and Council.68 The Commission must consider whether to endorse 
ESMA’s draft standards. If the Commission rejects the standards, ESMA has a right to 
submit amended standards, or, if Commission itself proposes changes, these must be 
submitted to ESMA.69 One can see that ESMA is given greater powers to influence the 
 
63
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powers involving a wide margin. Case 9/56 Meroni v. High Authority [1957-1958] ECR 133. 
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See Pierre Shammo, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority: lifting the veil on the allocation 
of power’, 2011 (48) CML Rev. 1879. 
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 ESMA Regulation, Article 61. 
65
 Ibid. Article 3. 
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 Ibid. Article 48. 
67
 Ibid. Article 42 in respect to the Board of Supervisors. Ibid. Article 42 in respect to the Management 
Board. However this is to presume that ESMA members tendency to protect their national interests 
will change. 
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 Ibid. Article 10(1) on regulatory technical standards. Article 15(1) on implementing technical standards. 
69
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development of Level 2 measures than those conferred on CESR in relation to providing 
technical advice which needed to strictly adhere to the Commission’s detailed 
mandates.70  
 The de Larosière report, in addition to recommendation for structural changes, 
also addressed substantive regulatory issues. It discussed how the discretion left to MS 
under EU directives had resulted in wide divergence during transpositions.71 It argued 
that in order to avoid possible spill-over effects from a weak link in the regulatory chain, 
and, to build the necessary trust between MS authorities, ‘European Institutions and the 
level 3 committees should equip the EU financial sector with a set of consistent core 
rules’. 72  Therefore, future EU legislations are to be based on regulations, wherever 
possible. When directives are used, the de Larosière report expressly stated that 
maximum harmonization of the core issues is to be the goal. 73  ESMA Regulation 
therefore requires that the regulatory technical standards or implementing technical 
standards, drafted by ESMA, are to be adopted in the form of regulations or decisions, 
both being directly applicable measures.74 
1.2.3 ESMA’s functions at Level 3 
To facilitate uniform and consistent application of EU laws, and foster consistent 
supervisory practices, ESMA is to develop, on the basis of its peer review findings, 
guidelines and recommendations addressed to both MS competent authorities and 
market participants.
75
 Although the guidelines and recommendations are not legally 
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binding, competent authorities are required to make every effort to comply with them. If 
competent authorities have decided not to comply, they need to inform ESMA with an 
explanation about non-compliance.76 ESMA is to publish this information. Thus in the 
post-crisis era, the soft law nature of guidelines and recommendations is being 
progressively hardened by the ‘comply or explain’ and public disclosure mechanisms.77 
Moreover, guidelines and recommendations will likely be used by ESMA in exercising 
its power (as described below) to investigate alleged breaches of EU law. 
 Under Article 17, ESMA is conferred the power to investigate any breaches of 
EU legislations, and, to issue a ‘recommendation’ to the competent authority concerned 
setting out the action necessary to comply with EU law.78 ESMA is also empowered to 
issue, in accordance with the ESMA regulation, ‘an individual decision addressed to a 
financial market participant requiring the necessary action’ for the latter to comply with 
its obligations under a directly applicable regulation.79 
 The powers conferred on ESMA to adopt binding individual decisions addressed 
to competent authorities and market participants are also found under Articles 18 (on 
emergency powers) and Article 19 (on dispute settlement).80 In respect to the law on 
books, these powers are the most potent in ESMA’s armoury. In particular, ESMA’s 
power to issue decisions on market participants, for the purpose of replacing MS 
authorities’ rules, has been described as ‘boundary-stepping’, 81  ‘circuit-switcher’ 82 . 
However, provisions under the ESMA Regulation have strictly limited the situations in 
which ESMA could consider making a direct decision on market participants. 83 
Moreover, the relevant provisions contain a number of uncertainties. For example, it has 
not been specified that ESMA could act as supervisor to monitor those market 
participants who are subject to its decisions. This position may result in market 
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participants being caught between the Scylla of EU law infringement and the Charybdis 
of MS enforcer retaliation. But it may have been deliberately left unaddressed by the 
EU institutions, demonstrating an intention not to confer on ESMA general supervisory 
powers.84 
 The peer review mechanism is the fulcrum that supports ESMA’s Level 3 
tasks.85 The new Review Panel (RP) established by ESMA has adopted the ‘ESMA 
Review Panel Methodology’.86 The Methodology setting out the tools and processes of 
the RP is based on a number of principles for an effective review process. First, 
cooperation by MS competent authorities is the key to a meaningful review outcome.87 
Unlike the top-down nature of enforcement mechanisms, peer review is essentially a 
participatory process that depends on the participating authorities producing high-
quality responses to questionnaires, and, exerting peer pressure on non-compliant 
counterparts. Second, the peer review process operates both on the basis of specific 
tools and dialogues between supervisory counterparts. For example, a finding of serious 
non-implementation of law is proceeded by bi-lateral discussions between the Chair of 
the Review Panel and the relevant competent authority.88 Third, the outcomes of the 
review must feedback to the law-making, implementation and enforcement processes 
constituting the vertical axis of financial regulation in the EU. From the implementation 
perspective, the Methodology provides that the publication of the peer review report is 
to be followed by (1) further actions by MS authorities to address the identified 
shortcomings, and, (2) the sharing of best practices.89 From, the law-making perspective, 
the ESMA Regulation provides for ESMA to take into account the peer review 
outcomes in drafting technical standards and Article 16 guidance.90 Moreover, the peer 
review outcomes may also be used by ESMA to instigate Article 17 investigations. The 
fourth principle of effective peer review is that openness and transparency of peer 
review methodologies and outcomes need to be maintained. It is submitted that 
transparency would like to engender exogenous implications on both the Review Panel, 
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causing it to update review practices, and, the reviewed authorities, rendering them to 
‘fully comply’ as a result of peer pressure. It will be shown in Chapter 6 that these 
principles also underlie the Financial Stability Board’s peer review. 
 The above discussions show that ESMA, as a legal institution of the EU, has 
been conferred regulatory powers in accordance with the Treaty. ESMA’s legitimacy 
has been ensured through political and judicial accountability mechanisms. However, 
ESMA’s standards remain as a form of soft law, the implementation of which is to be 
supported by an incentive structure.91 
2 Supervision of Cross-border Securities Markets and 
Transactions in the EU 
The purpose of this Section is to provide an outline on how the problems of cross-
border supervision discussed in Chapter 2 are being addressed in EU law.92 Supervision 
of securities markets participants and activities in the EU is traditionally the role of 
national regulators who are subject to obligations to cooperate. 93  The crisis has 
highlighted an urgent need to strengthen the EU-level supervisory structure. The 
recommendations in the de Larosière report consisted of two trends in financial 
supervision in the EU: the need for both micro-prudential and macro-prudential 
supervision, and conferring of supervision-related powers to EU bodies. 94  I have 
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organized my discussion on the supervision-related tasks of the ESAs (particularly 
ESMA) and ESRB by following the micro/macro distinction.95 
2.1 Micro-prudential supervision 
2.1.1 Common supervisory culture 
The Himalaya Paper identified ‘supervisory convergence’, which relates to operational 
issues of EU securities regulation, as a third aspect of the Level 3 process. 96  This 
concept is renamed under the ESMA Regulation as the ‘common supervisory culture’, 
which envisages consistent supervisory practices and uniform procedures being 
established in the EU through ESMA.97 In this respect, ESMA has three tasks. Firstly, as 
above-mentioned, it needs to issue guidance and recommendations on supervisory 
approaches and cooperation, and, to monitor their adoption by MS competent 
authorities. 98  Secondly, ESMA is to facilitate the exchange of information between 
regulators, e.g. through its oversight of the operation of the Multilateral Memorandum 
of Understanding.99 Thirdly, ESMA is to issue binding decisions to resolve members’ 
disputes.100 
 During the crisis, weaknesses of home country control regimes were exposed. 
Cases such as the collapse of Iceland banks have shown that where home country 
supervision fails, branches of collapsed foreign international financial institutions may 
detrimentally affect systemic stability of their host countries.101 Therefore, in accordance 
with the de Larosière report, the philosophy on the supervision of cross-border groups is 
shifting to supervisory colleges.102  
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 ESMA along with the other two ESAs is to contribute to the supervision of 
financial institutions in two ways. It is to become a lead member in the supervisory 
colleges to coordinate information exchange and stress testing.103 Moreover, ESMA is to 
adopt guidance and recommendations which would harmonize supervisory standards 
across the college; thereby removing supervisory competition and also arbitrage risks. 
As the resolution of cross-border groups is still a national responsibility, ESMA is also 
to contribute to the coordination of resolution of securities firms.104 
2.1.2 Direct supervision 
The 2011 amendment to the EC Credit Rating Agencies Regulation (1060/2009), which 
has conferred on ESMA exclusive powers to authorize and supervise CRAs in the EU, 
may be described as a template for the future of European financial supervision.105  
 In the view of the de Larosière group, authorization and supervision of CRAs 
would be far more efficient under a centralized model.106 This is because CRAs have 
wide cross-border reach, yet, they do not maintain territorial links with any MS and the 
rating business currently does not involve material fiscal risk of MS. 107  Under the 
amendment to the CRA Regulation, ESMA is conferred extensive investigation powers, 
including the powers to summon and hear persons and examine and take copies of any 
relevant records,108 as well as power to issue administrative sanction and fines.109 The 
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role of MS competent authorities in CRA supervision is to provide information and 
specific forms of assistance to ESMA, e.g., in performing the ‘specific supervisory 
tasks’ the latter has delegated.110 
 An interesting comparison may be made with the Commission’s proposals on 12 
September 2012 for a ‘Banking Union’ in the Eurozone. The proposals seek to set up a 
single supervisory mechanism (SSM), under which specific tasks relating to financial 
stability and banking supervision are to be given to the European Central Bank 
(ECB). 111  Under the proposed SSM, national supervisory authorities would remain 
responsible for carrying out tasks not conferred on the ECB, including, supervision of 
consumer protection rules and operation of the banking passport.  
 The proposals on ‘Banking Union’ were made in response to the Council’s 
request on 29 June 2012. At the root of these initiatives is the ongoing sovereign debt 
crises in the EU. Centralized prudential supervision is being held as the pre-condition 
for ‘possible direct recapitalisation of banks’ by the ECB, which could be crucial for 
financial stability in an environment of persisting doubts concerning the sustainability 
of public debt and economic growth prospects.112 
 Therefore, the immediate consideration to confer supervisory powers for CRAs 
on the ESMA was one of expediency. However, the impectus driving the proposed 
‘Banking Union’ is the need to consolidate supervision and crisis management, for the 
sake of the survival of the Eurozone, and, stability of the EU more widely. 
2.2 Macro-prudential regulation 
2.2.1 ESMA role in regulating systemic risk 
ESMA is given specific powers in the area of regulating systemic risk. These powers 
may be broadly categorized as monitoring powers and powers of market intervention. 
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ESMA’s powers in the former category are provided under Article 22. ESMA is to 
cooperate with ESRB to reach a common approach for the identification and 
measurement of systemic risk posed by key financial market participants. 113  When 
ESMA identifies using the common approach that a key financial market participant 
poses systemic risk, ESMA is to issue recommendations directed to that entity regarding 
the risk.114 Where that entity is under the supervision of a college, ESMA is to ensure 
that all the members of the college take into account the systemic risk posed by their 
supervised entity. 115  Moreover, where systemic risk is identified in relation to a 
particular financial product or activity, ESMA is to make recommendations to the 
competent authorities concerned.116  
 Under Article 9(5) of the ESMA Regulation, ESMA has the power to 
temporarily restrict or prohibit certain financial activities and products which are 
ascertained to pose systemic risk. This general power is applied in the Short-selling 
Regulation. 117  Article 28 of the Short-selling Regulation provides that ESMA may 
require a notification or disclosure by persons of their net short positions, or, a 
prohibition on short-selling transactions, when systemic risk has arisen and national 
authorities have not taken action. 
 Article 18 of the ESMA Regulation has also conferred on the Authority to adopt 
decisions addressed to market participants where an ‘emergency situation’ has arisen, as 
determined by the Council.118 Like its decision-making powers under Articles 17(6) and 
19(3), ESMA may only make individual decisions and address them to market 
participants where the competent authorities has failed to act, thereby endangering the 
compliance of EU regulation. 
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 ESMA’s powers of market intervention have been limited to situations when 
inaction from MS would result in breach of EU law by market participants. Therefore, 
they will only be utilized in very exceptional circumstances.119 
2.2.2 ESRB 
Discussions in Chapter 1 have revealed that inadequate macro-prudential supervision 
was the gap in securing global financial stability. In the EU context, the Larosière report 
has found that the EU supervisory arrangements placed too much emphasis on the 
supervision of individual firms, and not enough on the macro-prudential side. 120 
Moreover it was opined that effective macro-prudential supervision needs to encompass 
all sectors of finance and the wider macro-economic context. 121  The ESRB was 
established by EU regulation in accordance with the report’s recommendations.122 
 The ESRB is established as part of the European System of Financial 
Supervision, which also comprises the ESAs, the Joint Committee and national 
competent authorities.123 ESRB’s main responsibility is ‘the macro-prudential oversight 
of the financial system within the Union in order to contribute to the prevention or 
mitigation of systemic risks’.124 The ESRB’s tasks include data collection and analysis; 
systemic risk assessment and prioritisation; issuing systemic risk warnings and 
recommendations for remedial action and monitoring follow-up; coordinating with 
international institutions and relevant bodies in third countries on matters related to 
macro-prudential oversight.125 To accomplish its tasks, the ESRB has powers to request 
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information from ESAs, the ESCB, national supervisory authorities, national statistical 
authorities, and Member States.126 
 In order to overcome constitutional hurdles, the ESRB has no legal personality 
under EU Law as it was established under Article 114 TFEU.127 The effectiveness of the 
ESRB has been questioned on the grounds of its soft-law status and composition of its 
membership.128 It has been argued that the ESRB’s soft-law status per se should not 
inhibit its effectiveness. MS are under EU law obligations to provide information to 
ESRB and disclose to the ESRB and the Council about any actions taken, and, to 
explain any inaction in relation to risk warnings.129 Any deviation from the obligations 
would constitute a breach of EU law by MS, with formal enforcement action likely to 
result.130 The ESRB’s General Board, which is the decision-making organ, comprises 
voting members who are the Governors of national central banks, the President and the 
Vice-President of the European Central Bank, a member of the European Commission, 
the Chairpersons of the three ESAs, the Chair and the two vice Chairs of the Advisory 
Scientific Committee, and the Chair of the Advisory Technical Committee. 131 
Representatives from MS competent authorities are to attend the General Board as 
members without voting rights. Unlike the FSB’s Plenary (discussed in Chapter 4), 
there is limited MS ministerial presence in the ESRB Board. This has led Buiter to 
argue that, since it is finance ministries and not central bankers who are legitimate 
politically to make decisions involving important trade-offs between political and 
economic objectives, the composition of the ESRB, with its central bank dominance, is 
not suitable for its mandate. 132  Moreover, regulators from insurance and securities 
markets are also underrepresented in the ESRB. As a result, ESRB would need to rely 
on communications channels established between the ESRB and the ESAs so as to 
ensure that systemic risks arising from those sectors are not overlooked. 
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3 Regulatory Harmonization and Mutual Recognition 
In tandem with an overall movement towards economic integration, different models of 
harmonization and mutual recognition have been adopted for the construction of a 
European capital market.133 In this Section, I will first examine how regulatory barriers 
to entry have been removed between MS securities markets, through an analysis of the 
interplay between harmonization and mutual recognition. Secondly, the risks pertaining 
to harmonization as a means of regulation are considered. 
3.1 Removing regulatory barriers 
I intend to approach the question how regulatory barriers of entry have been removed 
between MS securities markets from a historical evolutionary perspective. I will move 
from the earliest EU Directive toward the present-day law reforms. Since the current 
global securities market is akin to the beginning stages of EU market integration, a 
study of how all the various barriers-removal approaches have worked in practice, is 
beneficial to point out the traps and snares for global actors. However, the aim of this 
part is not to give a comprehensive account of the vast EU legislations spanning nearly 
half century, but, to explain by using specific examples the mechanisms of barrier-
removal and explore their difficulties. 
 The four phases which may be identified in the evolution of securities regulation 
in the EU134 are each associated with a different model of harmonization and mutual 
recognition. In the period before 1980, harmonizing the rules on issuers’ access to 
capital was the means for cross-border regulation in the (then) EC. Between the 1980s 
and 1999 the principles of mutual recognition and minimum harmonization through 
framework measures were the touchstone in the construction of a single market in 
investment services. Then during the FSAP period, maximum harmonization was the 
chosen means to support home country control and market integration. In the aftermath 
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of the GFC, with the emphasis oriented towards systemic risk, a single rulebook and, in 
some areas, centralized regulation and supervision are hallmarks of the new phase.  
3.1.1 Harmonization before 1980 
The development of a European capital market may be traced back to the Segré report, 
produced by a group of independent experts entrusted by the Commission to study the 
problems confronting the EC capital markets.135 In Part IV of the Segré report, the 
authors identified that differences among the laws of the then six Member States, in 
respect to investment companies and issuer disclosure, had resulted in problems for 
market integration. It was propounded that ‘harmonization measures would remove all 
need for the restrictions…held to be justified by the need to protect the interests of 
savers’ (emphasis added). 136  The authors had also recommended the approach of 
minimum harmonization of rules, which would leave MS free to enforce additional 
regulations.137 
 It was on the basis of the Segré report that the Commission commenced its work 
on harmonizing mandatory disclosures rules on issuers, resulting in the passing of  
the Admission Directive138 on 5 March 1979 and the first Listing Particulars Directive139 
on 17 March 1980. The former set out the minimum conditions for the admission of 
securities to official stock exchange listing. The latter contained detailed information 
disclosure standards for issuer disclosure throughout the EC. 
 From hindsight, the detailed disclosure provisions in the Listing Particulars 
Directive were not adequate for obtaining equivalence in protection of investors in each 
MS.140 Firstly, there were gaps in the itemized information requirements in the Annex of 
the Directive. For example, there was no requirement for disclosure of related party 
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transactions or information concerning conflict of interests.141 The lists in the Annex, 
crudely distinguished between shares and debt instruments, also did not cater for 
informational demands pertaining to other instruments such as structure financing 
instruments and derivatives. Secondly, the choice of a directive as instrument of 
harmonization raises difficulties on a number of grounds. Any amendments to the 
Directive, even to the technical aspects, would need to undergo the cumbersome co-
decision procedure. This meant that the Directive would be out of step with market 
developments and MS would always have a justification for invoking their own rules. 
Since a directive instrument was already subject to different ways of application by MS, 
any attempts of MS to derogation from provisions in the Listing Particulars Directive 
would have further accentuated divergence. However, there was uncertainty as to 
whether MS could stipulate additional information, as the Listing Particulars Directive 
had made no express provisions. This point was considered by Wymeersch, in whose 
view, based on the allowance for additional information contained in the Admissions 
Directive, a similar allowance should be made under the Listing Particulars Directive.142 
Moreover, the directives were often the products of political compromises which may 
not provide optimum rules for investor protection.143 
 From the forgoing, divergence of regulations on issuer disclosure had continued 
to exist in Europe, acting as barriers to entry for issuers. Moreover, at the time of the 
first Listing Particulars Directive, mutual recognition had not been established for 
listing particulars vetted by the home MS authorities of the issuer.144 Therefore, issuers 
in cross-border listings in Europe were still faced with the need to prepare separate 
documentations under different rules. 
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3.1.2 Internal Market framework 1985~1999: mutual recognition and 
minimum harmonization 
Mutual recognition, as an alternative barrier-removal mechanism, had been developed 
by the European Court of Justice, first in the area of free movement of goods in the 
ground-breaking judgment in Cassis de Dijon, 145  thereafter in relation to the other 
fundamental freedoms. In the Commission’s 1985 White Paper on the Internal 
Market, 146  to ‘move away from the concept of harmonization towards…mutual 
recognition and equivalence’ was the chosen approach for facilitating the completion of 
the Internal Market.147 According to the Commission, it would be necessary for each 
legislation to clearly distinguish between ‘what is essential to harmonize and what may 
be left to mutual recognition’.148 The principles of mutual recognition and home country 
control, supported by minimum harmonization of rules became the ground rules in 
cross-border regulation of financial services in the EC. By using the ISD as an example, 
discussions in this part will focus on the difficulties relating to the operation of mutual 
recognition between MS. 
 Unlike the previous directives adopted on issuer disclosure, the ISD adopted in 
1993 had addressed the secondary trading market place and the wider investment 
services landscape. 149  The key features of the ISD were the passport device and 
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minimum harmonization of substantive prudential and protective rules. The primary 
objective of the ISD was the removal of the regulatory barriers faced by investment 
services providers who operated cross-border within the EC150. 
 The barrier removal mechanism under the ISD may be summarized as follows. 
MS were required to ensure that investment firms, which were duly authorized in home 
MS, would be able to provide services within their territories, whether via a branch or 
under the freedom to provide services, without further authorization being required151. 
The home MS were allocated the responsibilities of authorization and supervision of 
firms’ on-going compliance with the authorization conditions and the prudential 
supervision.152 The scope of the home authority’s powers were however significantly 
curtailed under the ISD, as the competent authority in a MS ‘in which a service is 
provided’ could apply its conduct of business rules on a firm,153 as well as, additional 
capital adequacy rules, 154  and other laws and regulations adopted in the interest of 
general good.155 
 Reflecting the Commission’s white paper on Internal Market, the ISD only 
harmonized substantive rules on investment services regulation to the extent required 
for the functioning of the passport mechanism.156 Thus high-level principles were used 
for authorization conditions and conduct of business rules. Therefore, divergence in the 
implementation of the ISD by MS was an expected result.157  
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 Some positive reactions had been generated by the ISD. For example, there were 
increasing cross-border linkages between secondary securities markets between MS.158 
However, market participants had encountered difficulties with the operation of the 
investment services passport due to the many uncertainties in relation to Article 11, the 
key mutual recognition provision. Firstly, the ISD did not provide the determinants for 
ascertaining when an investment firm would be deemed to be providing services within 
another MS, thereby triggering its conduct of business rules.159 A number of connecting 
factors were possible: place where the service contract was entered into, actual place 
where the service was provided, and place of domicile of the recipient of the service. 
Since these locations might not necessarily coincide and might alter during the term of 
the service contract, it was therefore unclear where services were provided.160 Moreover, 
with the development of the internet, provision of services online brought new 
challenges to the physical conceptions which underlay Article 11. Secondly, it was 
unclear under Article 11 whether the host MS authority could apply all its conduct of 
business rules, or only those fulfilled the general-good condition.161 Thirdly, there was 
no express provision relating to whether Article 11 would apply to professional and 
retail investors in the same manner. Fourthly, as the issue on conflicts of interest was 
mentioned in both Article 10, the prudential regulation provision, and Article 11, there 
was confusion as to whether the supervision of conflicts of interest fell within the home 
or host authority’s remit.162 Finally, it has been also been argued that as result of the 
operation of divergent conduct of business rules by host MS authorities, there were 
greater costs for cross-border provision of services.163 
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 The uncertainties pertaining to Article 11 were addressed in a Communication of 
the Commission. 164  The prominent feature of the Communication was a strong 
preference for regulation and supervision of conduct of business rules by the home MS. 
However, the Communication was an aid to application of the ISD and it had no legal 
binding force. The problems with the application of Article 11 of ISD were therefore 
only finally overcome upon the adoption of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) in 2004 which enshrined the home country control principle by 
removing the host MS regulator’s role in conduct of business165. 
 Two lessons could be learnt from the ISD decade. First, uncertainties would 
always be likely to arise from provisions on allocation of supervisory responsibilities, 
but could not be countered with rigid rules due to changes in market practices. Second, 
the costs of the uncertainties would be likely to be aggravated due to lack of adequate 
substantive regulatory harmonization. 
3.1.3 FSAP 1999~2005: home country control and maximum 
harmonization 
The objectives of the Commission’s FSAP and reasons for the adoption of the 
Lamfalussy process have been outlined in Section 1. The entwining goals of these 
reform initiatives were financial market integration and protection against the risks of 
integration through re-regulation. To facilitate market integration, the home MS 
competent authorities would be the one-stop-shop for the regulation and supervision of 
issuers and financial services providers in the EC. Rights are conferred on issuers and 
financial services providers to enter and operate in other MS without further 
requirements after their authorization by home MS authorities.166 Home MS has been 
defined in the directive to mean the member state of registration of issuer or investment 
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service provider.167 To ensure proper functioning of the home country control principle, 
regulatory harmonization at a high level of detail was therefore required to foster trusts 
between national regulatory authorities and a level-playing field for market participants.  
 This part seeks to assess whether the harmonization of securities regulation was 
adequate to support of the functioning of the home country control principle. The 
assessment is approached from two aspects. Firstly, whether the law on books have 
been clearly drafted so as to provide for consistent application? Secondly, what 
initiatives have been taken by the former CESR to foster uniform application and 
interpretation of rules by MS authorities. It will be argued that harmonization, even to a 
high level of detail, cannot always result in regulatory convergence, which requires 
horizontal cooperation between MS regulators. 
 Due to space limitation, the argument is again set out by using examples. 
Continuing from the discussions in the previous part, the regulation of investment firms 
under the MiFID is to be the subject matter of discussions below. In particular, the 
discussions focus on investment services passport and regulation of conflicts of 
interests. 
a. The investment services passport under MiFID  
The MiFID was adopted to respond to technological innovations in electronic trading,168 
and, to granted banks and investment firms a strengthened ‘passport’ for providing 
investment services across the EU.169 
 The Articles 31-35 under Chapter III of MiFID provide for the mechanism of 
mutual recognition and home MS control.170 Article 31 concerns the passport rights of 
an authorized investment firm. It provides that MS shall not require further 
authorization or impose further requirements on an investment firm carrying on 
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investment activities within its territory, when the firm has been authorized in relation 
to such activities by the competent authorities of home Member State in accordance 
with MiFID. The firm is required to notify its home MS authority of its wishes to 
provide services covered by its authorization into another MS. In addition to the role of 
supervision, the home state has the function of communicating with the host state 
information in relation to where the investment firm intends to operate, the identity of 
tied agents and any changes to firms authorized activities. 171  The effect of these 
provisions was to take away the host MS’s powers to supervise conduct of business 
which was conferred under ISD, and, replace them with a co-operational role.172 
 The role of the host state is however preserved in the case where an investment 
firm establishes a branch therein. According to Art 32(7) of MiFID where an investment 
firm establishes a branch in a host state, the latter has the responsibilities to ensure that 
activities of the branch within its territory are in compliance with its rules and 
regulations which it has adopted pursuant to Section 2 and Section 3 in Chapter II of 
Title II under MiFID. The home MS authority is still to have a right to carry-out onsite 
inspections in the branch.173 
 Article 32(7) is another example of the difficulty of dividing supervisory 
responsibility between supervisors. The scope of the problem under MiFID is, arguably, 
much more limited than the above discussed problems for Article 11 of ISD. This is 
because under MiFID, investment firms’ transactions with professional 
investors/counterparties are not subject to the provisions which have been assigned to 
the remit of the branch MS authority.174 Therefore, the issue of the application of Article 
32(7) only arises in transactions with retail clients. Two potential problems may be 
identified in the application of Article 32(7). First, what constitutes a branch? Second, 
what is the (territorial) scope of the branch MS jurisdiction? 
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 The term branch is defined in Article 4(1). According to subparagraph 26, 
‘branch means a place of business other than the head office which is a part of an 
investment firm, which has no legal personality and which provides investment 
services’. From this definition, the physical presence of an investment firm appears to 
be the defining factor. Indeed, according to Recital 32 in MiFID, an investment firm’s 
physical presence via its branch operations puts the host MS authorities – being ‘closest 
to the branch’ – in a better position than the home MS authorities to regulate and 
supervise the branch,175 and, to take enforcement actions.176 The tangible approach to 
finding ‘branch’ under MiFID is therefore in contrast with the conceptual requirements 
of ‘duration, regularity, periodicity and continuity’ which have often been invoked to 
find the existence of a branch under EU law, even in short of a physical appearance.177 
One may envision situations where the application of the physical presence criteria 
could be problematic. For example, an investment advisor authorized in Member State 
A, holds meetings with clients in Member State B by using an office of an affiliate of 
the advisor located in B. Another example is that an investment advisor authorized in 
Member State A maintains its contact details within Member State B but conducts all its 
business from outside B. In these situations, it is not certain from the outset whether a 
competent authority in Member State B could regulate the service advisor on the basis 
of Article 32(7). In such cases, a weighing exercise would be needed to determine 
whether the home or host MS authority is closets to the operations. A resulting case-by-
case approach however, might weaken ex ante certainty as required by market 
participants. 
 The second problem of interpretation relates to the phrase ‘services provided by 
the branch within its territory’ in Article 32(7). The question is whether the supervisory 
powers of the branch MS are limited to those services provided by the branch within the 
branch MS territory, or, whether the supervisory powers could be exercised in relation 
to any services provided by the branch, wherever its clients may be located. The 
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consideration here is the need to balance between legal certainty and home country 
control. Legal certainty for market participants could be provided through the 
application of a single rulebook to branches. 178  Thus branch activities would be 
supervised by the branch MS, no matter where the clients are located. However, this 
wide interpretation of Article 32(7) overlooks the role of this provision as a mere 
exemption, and may result in fragmentation of supervisory control of the home MS.179 
This problem has attracted much attention from the EU institutions, whose attempts to 
seek solutions provide an excellent example of the regulatory aspect of the Lamfalussy 
process in operation.180  
 The response to the problem of allocation of supervisory responsibility for 
branch operations has been described as ‘multilayered’ and ‘inter-institutional’.181 CESR 
first took an initiative to publish in May 2007 ‘The passport under MiFID’.182 Among 
CESR’s recommendations were a proposal for a protocol to be signed by MS authorities, 
and, a request to the Commission to provide interpretive guidance on Article 32(7). 
Accepting CESR’s request, the Commission and MS representatives collaborated 
through the ESC to publish guidance on Article 32(7) in June 2007.183 
 The solution that was reached on the question of branch supervision was not a 
set of detailed rules on how responsibility is to be allocated between the home and 
branch MS, but mechanisms to forge supervisory cooperation between MS authorities 
should a question on branch supervision arise. While the Commission reinstated the 
position of home state control in relation to services provided by the branch to clients 
located in the home state, it nevertheless left open the question of whether the home or 
branch MS authority should supervise the services provided by the branch to clients in 
other MS.184 This question, in the view of the Commission, would be best left to the co-
operation between the authorities.185 CESR’s Protocol on MiFID passport was signed by 
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MS authorities, 186  giving it greater moral force than the MiFID passport 
recommendations. The MiFID passport protocol comprised standard notification forms 
and a framework for branch supervision. The outcomes of these initiatives were 
certainty, in respect to some defined situations, on when MS authorities would have 
supervisory responsibilities under MiFID, and, standardization of practice, so as to 
ensure no gaps or overlaps in the oversight of investment firms. 
 In sum, although the Level 1 MiFID framework provisions on mutual 
recognition has presented practical difficulties like the ISD, through a timely dialogue 
between national and supranational stakeholders and law-makers, a flexible solution 
was reached before the MiFID entered into force in November 2007. 
b. Conduct of business and conflicts of interests 
The conduct of business rules were revamped under MiFID with the aim to ensure that 
investors would be effectively protected and the efficiency and integrity of the overall 
market safeguarded. 187  The notion of using harmonization as a regulatory tool is 
discussed in the next part. My objective here is to further explore to what extent the 
harmonization of substantive regulations under MiFID has supported the home country 
control principle. My selected topic is the regulation of conflicts of interests. 
i) Maximum harmonization under MiFID and the Level 2 Implementing Directive 
In contrast with minimum harmonization during the pre-FSAP years, there is ample 
evidence of maximum harmonization in the measures adopted under Lamfalussy 
process. Maximum harmonization refers to an intention of the EU institutions to 
regulation a specific area exhaustively. 188 The corollary is that MS may not impose 
further rules under maximum harmonizing measures. In other word, ‘goldplating’ is to 
be avoided.189 A consequence of maximum harmonization is a level-playing field being 
established through a uniform implementation of EU measures. 
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 Since maximum harmonization has not been expressly mentioned in the 
measures adopted under the Lamfalussy process, its presence is a matter of 
interpretation, which ultimately rest with the European Courts. 190  A maximum 
harmonization measure may be identified because the measure is either a regulation,191 
or, a directive that contains detailed rules of comprehensive coverage so as to oust MS 
discretion. However, some measures may expressly provide that they are minimum 
harmonizing measures, e.g., the Transparency Directive, or, that MS may derogate from 
certain provisions.192  
 The regulation of investment services and markets in the EU is subject to 
maximum harmonization. Although MiFID at Level 1 does not expressly mention 
maximum harmonization, it has widely been recognized as such.193 Moreover, a Level 2 
regulation is adopted on record-keeping, report and transparency, 194  and, a detailed 
Level 2 directive passed to implement organisational requirements and operating 
conditions for investment firms.195 Article 4 of the MiFID Implementing Directive may 
be viewed as a rejection of ‘goldplating’ by the Commission. It provides that MS may 
only impose additional requirements so far as these are proportional to addressing the 
specific risks that are not adequately addressed by the MiFID Implementing Directive, 
either because the risks are idiosyncratic to the national market, or, because they have 
emerged after the adoption of the Directive. 
 While maximum harmonization approach may in theory be beneficial for market 
integration, it does not automatically lead to consistent implementation and application. 
The FSAP directives and their implementation measures were shown to contain 
discretions and open-textured provisions. 196  Therefore there is likelihood that MS 
regulators, by issuing guidance directly at their national markets, could side-step the 
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harmonized rules. Thus, consistent implementation of maximum harmonization 
measures had also required CESR to issue guidance and recommendations based on its 
dialogues with national regulatory authorities and the markets. 
ii) Regulatory framework for conflicts of interest under MiFID 
Conduct of business rules for investment firms are found within Chapter II of Title II of 
MiFID, with regulation of conflicts of interest at the heart.197 With investment firms’ 
business models shifting away from traditional underwriting and discounting activities, 
towards complex client-oriented services198 together with own account activities,199 the 
risk of conflicts of interest is higher than before. The need for conflicts regulation arises 
from the costs of ex ante monitoring of firms’ activities and retail investors’ lack of 
resources on the one hand, and, the potentially inadequate ex poste private law rights in 
respect to arms-length transactions on the other.200 However, there is no definition of 
conflicts of interest at the EU level.201 As a working definition in this thesis, conflicts of 
interest means a factual situation in which an individual or legal entity pursues two or 
several interests, which, at times, may be contradictory, possibly resulting in gains made 
by some holders of the interests at the expense of the others.202 
 The regulatory framework for conflicts of interest under MiFID may be outlined 
as follows.203 Article 18 of MiFID lays down the framework principles which subject 
investment firms to identify, manage and disclose conflicts of interest. The objective to 
avoid conflicts of interest is implicit in Article 19(1) of MiFID, which requires MS to 
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ensure that an authorized ‘investment firm act honestly, fairly and professionally in 
accordance with the best interests of its clients’ (emphasis added). Requirements in this 
paragraph are fleshed out in the ensuing paragraphs of Article 19, in relation to financial 
advice and portfolio management services.204 Moreover, conflicts raised by brokerage 
services are addressed by rules relating to best execution, 205  order-handling 
requirements206 and client asset management.207 While the obligations under Article 13 
and on asset management are applicable to all authorized investment firms at all times, 
only retail transactions (i.e. non-eligible counterparties) are subject to the other conduct 
of business rules.208 
iii) A critique of measures on ‘identify’, ‘manage’ and ‘disclose’ conflicts of interests 
The above mentioned Article 18 of MiFID imposes on investment firms the obligation 
to take reasonable steps to identify conflicts of interest and disclose them when damage 
to clients’ interest would be resulted in spite of the arrangements made according to 
Article 13(3).209 Articles 21-22 of the MiFID Implementing Directive provide greater 
details on these requirements, in particular, the criteria for conflicts identification210 and 
conflicts management arrangements.211 The upshot of these provisions is that firms can 
no longer rely on disclosure, the time-old approach used in many jurisdictions,212 they 
must always first seek to manage the conflicts by taking all reasonable steps.  
 Before analyzing the substantive provisions on conflicts regulation, it is first 
necessary to give an overview of the Commission’s approach in the MiFID 
Implementing Directive. The starting point is that internal risk management is the 
cornerstone of investment firm regulation under MiFID, with Articles 13, 21-22 
expressly provide for the adoption of procedures and arrangements by the firm. In this 
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light, it is easy to see why the Commission avoided a ‘one-size-fit-all’ approach to 
implement the conduct of business provisions, as it would not be possible to dictate 
what procedures and arrangements firms are to adopt to manage conflicts and other 
risks. The Commission has made it clear that its choice of a ‘principle-based model’ 
was aimed at providing firms with the flexibility and incentive to design internal 
arrangements in ways best compatible with their business models.213 Following from 
this, the Commission’s choice of a directive as the instrument of implementation was a 
logical one since it would not be technically feasible for a set of principles to be 
immediately applicable as national regulatory rules. Moloney has provided a robust 
critique of the Commissions principle-based approach, by drawing, partly, from the 
experience of and literature on the UK Financial Services Authority’s principles-based 
regulation model.214 Moloney identifies the tension between the stated principle-based 
approach and the restriction on ‘goldplating’ under Article 4. The crux of this potential 
problem is that while a principle-based approach, unlike box-ticking, exerts a greater 
demand on the role played by supervisors (in terms of interpretation and guidance), 
there was no indication as to how MS authorities should cooperate so as to ensure 
consistent application of the principles for creating a level-playing field to support home 
country control. Discussions below will show that the open-textured nature of the 
conflicts of interest provisions creates problems for consistent application. 
 Although Article 18(1) of MiFID lists the various relationships between firms 
and their clients within which conflicts of interests may arise,215 it gives no direction on 
how to identify a conflicts of interests situation. Article 21 of MiFID Implementing 
Directive provides, ‘by way of minimum criteria’, five types of situations arising in the 
course of providing investment services which may point to the presence of potential 
conflicts of interest. The phrase ‘minimum criteria’ being used here does not indicate a 
derogation from Article 4 prohibiting ‘goldplating’, but to allow firms to include other 
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situations not appearing on the list, in their internal arrangements to identify conflicts. 
Therefore, this is an example of Commission’s high-level principles-based and non-
exhaustive approach to risk management. 
 However, the non-exhaustive criteria under Article 21 are stated in very broad 
terms. For example, the point (b) in Article 21 provides that conflicts of interest may be 
identified when ‘the firm or that person has an interest in the outcome of a service 
provided to the client…which is distinct from the client's interest in that outcome’. The 
broadness of this criterion may be illustrated with a factual scenario. An employee of a 
regulated firm acts for a client, whom he knows to be a market competitor of a friend. 
Would the employee be deemed to have ‘an interest in the outcome of a service [he] 
provides to the client…which is distinct from the client's interest’, by the mere fact of 
the presence of his friendship? Or does the answer to the question also depend on the 
particulars of the friendship and any propensity of the firm’s employee to act in favour 
of his friend? What if it is a mere acquaintance?216 The point being made here is that a 
wide range of different decisions may be made by firms under the Article 21 criteria for 
identifying conflicts of interest. The issue, being highlighted, is the potential risk to 
consistent application of EU law.  
 To carry the debate on identification a step further, it is argued that although the 
application of the Article 21 criteria appears to have been limited by point (a) of Article 
22(2), which requires the firms under their arrangements to identify ‘the 
circumstances…give rise to a conflict of interest entailing a material risk of damage to 
the interests of…clients’ (emphasis added), the issue of potential lack of uniform 
application remains. It appears that firms are only required to identify and manage risks 
material to clients’ interests, and could therefore exclude some peripheral circumstances. 
However, the meaning of material risk is not provided in the Implementing Directive, so 
there are likely to be variations in firms’ application of the Article 21 criteria. In a 
supervisory brief published by the former CESR in 2008, it was stated that firms will 
have to undertake a holistic review of their business.217 Yet there was no guidance on the 
issues on Article 21 raised above. 
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 According to Article 22(1) of MiFID Implementing Directive, firms must 
establish a conflicts of interest policy containing internal conflicts management 
arrangements.218 Article 22(3) provides that the internal arrangements of a firm need to 
be adequate to ensure that the person(s) associated with situations of conflicts of interest 
are carrying out their activities at an appropriate level of independence. A list is 
provided on the steps firms would need to take to ensure independence. 219  MS 
competent authorities are also permitted to choose alternative methods for ensuring 
independence. For example, the French Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) has 
prescribed for installing of Chinese walls by firms in managing conflicts;220 and similar 
approach is taken by the Italian Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa 
(CONSOB). 221 The UK’s Financial Services authority (FSA) on the other hand has 
incorporated Article 13(3) of MiFID and Article 22(3) of MiFID Implementing 
Directive in verbatim, without requiring firms to use Chinese walls as a conflicts 
management device.222  
 The upshot of the above analysis on conflicts of interest provisions under the 
Level 1 and Level 2 MiFID directives is that, even though these are maximum 
harmonization measures, divergence may result due to their flexible nature. Therefore, 
home-country control may be weakened with no level-playing field in the EU. 
3.2 Harmonization as regulation  
The above discussions have focused on harmonization as a means for engendering 
market integration. In this final part of this Section, I will consider the regulatory aspect 
of harmonization in EU law. 
 During the FSAP years, the degree of harmonization in securities regulation in 
the EU had shifted beyond what was necessary to provide for the passport regime, to 
proactively laying down rules for market participants.223 The reach of MiFID over retail 
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market regulatory issues is a case in point.224 However, from the above discussions on 
the Commission’s principle-based approach under MiFID, it may be seen that national 
supervisors have a high degree of discretion in the implementation and application 
process. Therefore, regulation of securities markets was often a shared task between the 
EU institutions and MS competent authorities.225 
 In the future, the ‘single European rulebook’ is to become the norm. Although 
not a totally novel notion and may be seen as a logical extension of maximum 
harmonization, the de Larosière Group expressly upheld the single rulebook and 
maximum harmonization as the strategies for addressing regulatory arbitrage and 
ensuring financial stability.226 The conception of the single rulebook, according to the 
Commission, expresses two goals: the more consistent application of EU law and the 
removal of differences in national implementation.227 The sources of the single rulebook 
are a combination of European legislations adopted at level 1 and level 2, and ESMA’s 
non-binding level 3 guidelines.228 
 The heavy legislative machinery of the EU is deep in the process of constructing 
the single European rulebook. The process began with the adoption of the CRA 
Regulation, which, with an amendment Regulation to confer centralized supervisory 
powers on ESMA, may be considered as the most extreme version of the single 
rulebook. Other examples of the single rulebook are Shorting Selling Regulation,229 and 
the Commission’s proposed regulations on OTC derivatives,230 on securities settlement 
and central securities depositories,231 and on insider dealing and market manipulation.232 
Moreover, since adequate sanction is vital to enforcement and MS sanctioning regimes 
have been considered as ‘weak and heterogeneous’,233 the Commission has proposed 
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minimum rules on criminal offences and on criminal sanctions for market abuse. This is 
a stark departure from the long-held view that decisions on criminal sanctions pertains 
to state sovereignty and should be determined by MS themselves. 
 Due to limitation of space, the details of the above listed harmonization 
measures will not discussed here. In line with my search for the tools of global 
cooperation, I consider the risks of harmonization as regulation. 
 The first risk is the increasing politicisation of regulatory issues during the 
harmonization process.234 Since distributive problems are acute in the area of financial 
regulation, with some MS markets likely to lose out more than others as a result of 
regulatory outcomes, harmonized rules may not be optimum in achieving regulatory 
objectives. Secondly, detailed rules which could become fossilized may not be capable 
of addressing emerging market risks. The difficulty of how to balance the need to 
respect local regulatory variations and prevent regulatory arbitrage still remains. Thirdly, 
harmonization could heighten the risk of systemic regulatory error. 235 As shown by 
Basle I experience, uniformity could result in systemic effect. Fourthly, as discussed in 
Section 1, ESMA’s guidance remains non-binding. Implementation of the guidance 
therefore relies on the willingness of MS regulators to monitor and exert pressure on 
each other, which is a variable yet unknown. Therefore, it still remains to be seen 
whether a single rulebook could be established and successfully operate in practice. 
4 ‘Third Countries’ under EU Securities Regulation and a 
Comparison with US Law 
It will be recalled that the aim of this chapter is to investigate the approaches and tools 
of cross-border regulation in the EU and US, with a view to drawing some lessons 
(whether positive or otherwise) for securities regulation at a global-level. The European 
model of mutual recognition anchored on harmonization and home MS supervision is a 
sui generis creation of the EU’s internal market project, under a supranational law-
making framework. Therefore, in a comparison with US, an appropriate methodological 
approach would be to compare how EU securities regulation deals with the access of 
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issuers and market participants registered in third countries, with how similar issues of 
foreign firms’ access are addressed under federal US law. 
 On the EU side, I will focus on the notion of equivalence which is conceived by 
the FSAP directives and now making its impact on the securities markets. Following 
this, I will identify and discussed the various tools of cross-border regulation being 
experimented in the US, namely, exemption, convergence and mutual recognition.  
4.1 Facilitating EU securities market access for ‘third countries’ 
The notion of ‘equivalence’ denotes the approach in the EU of giving direct market 
access to market participants registered in ‘third countries’, whose laws (crudely 
speaking) are recognized as having the same effect as the relevant EU securities 
regulations. ‘Equivalence’ is found in the Prospectus Directive (PD), Transparency 
Directive (TD) and CRA Regulation.  
4.1.1 Equivalence under the Regulation on credit ratings agencies 
Article 4(1) CRA Regulation only permits the credit ratings issued by a CRA which is 
established in the EU and registered under CRA Regulation be used in the EU for 
regulatory purposes. Article 5 is an exception to Article 4. It confers a right to use a 
credit rating issued by a third country CRA directly for the purposes of Article 4(1), 
provided that certain criteria are fulfilled. The criteria relevant for my discussions are: 
the third country’s legal and supervisory framework must be ‘equivalent’ to the 
requirements of the CRA Regulation; and there must be an operational cooperation 
arrangement in place between ESMA and the third country regulator. The determinance 
of ‘equivalence’ is conferred on the Commission, who is to adopt ‘an equivalence 
decision’ in accordance with Article 5(6).236 Moreover, under Art 4(3), ratings of a third 
country CRA may be used if endorsed by EU-registered CRAs in accordance with the 
CRA Regulation.237 This provision facilitates indirect access by third country CRAs. 
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 By examining ESMA’s recently technical advice to the Commission, 238  the 
analytical approach to determining ‘equivalence’ under CRA Regulation comes to light. 
ESMA adopts an objective-based approach to assessing equivalence. It examines 
whether the third country’s regime, when assessed from a holistic perspective, is 
capable of meeting the objectives of the EU Regulation, which are essentially consumer 
and investor protection.
239
 Although the analytical approach does expressly require 
uniformity between EU and third country’s rules, regulatory convergence has 
nevertheless been a by-product of ESMA’s assessment activities. Taking the situation in 
the US as an example. In May 2010, ESMA found that US law on CRAs were weaker 
than EU law in the two aspects: (i) requirements for methodologies and ratings quality, 
and (ii) level of disclosure.
240
 ESMA had been in close contact with US regulatory 
authorities during the 2010 assessment. Then in its latest report, ESMA established that 
changes made in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 
July 2010 has enhanced the US’s law capability of satisfying the objectives of the EU 
CRA regulation.241  
4.1.2 Equivalence under the Prospectus Directive 
Article 20 of PD provides that, upon meeting certain conditions, competent authorities 
of home MS has the option to approve a prospectus drawn up in accordance with the 
legislation of a third country, where an issuer has its registered office. The first 
condition is that ‘the prospectus has been drawn up in accordance with international 
standards set by international securities commission organisations, including the 
IOSCO disclosure standards’ (emphasis added).242 The second condition is that the third 
countries laws are ‘equivalent’ to the requirements under PD.243  
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 A number of questions arise from the application of Article 20 PD. First, what is 
meant by ‘equivalent’ for the purposes of PD? Since the Commission has yet to exercise 
it powers under Article 20(3) to make a decision on ‘equivalence’ for PD, ESMA has 
recently filled this gap by publishing a Public Statement.
244
 It provides that ESMA is 
first to carry out an examination of the third country prospectus regime to identify gaps 
in the third country’s disclosure requirements.245 The analytical approach here is an 
item-by-item comparison to ascertain whether the third country’s laws equally require 
the information set out in the PD implementing regulation. Where gaps are found, 
ESMA will stipulate specific additional information on issuers from the assessed 
country. An operational issue not addressed in ESMA’s PD equivalence framework is 
how a MS competent authority is to ascertain whether a prospectus in fact fulfils the 
third country’s laws. There is uncertainty as to whether a MS authority must interpret 
the foreign law by itself or may rely on other means. 
 The second question arising from Article 20 PD relates to what regard must 
competent authorities have in respect to the international standards when exercising 
their function of approving a prospectus of a third country issuer? ESMA’s PD 
equivalence framework does not expressly address this question. However, Article 20(3) 
PD provides that the Commission is to base its equivalence decision on international 
standards. Therefore, MS authorities now have the discretion to determine whether to 
impose additional or modified disclosure requirements on the basis on international 
standards. There is therefore a risk of distortion of level-playing field in the EU. 
4.1.3 Exemption under the Transparency Directive 
Article 23(1) of TD provides MS competent authorities with an option to refrain from 
imposing on-going disclosure obligations under TP on third country issuers, provided 
that the laws of that country have laid down equivalent requirements. This provision is 
similar to the above-discussed ‘equivalence’ provision in PD. 
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 The Commission Regulation 1569/2007 246  was adopted for determining 
equivalence of third countries’ accounting standards. Equivalence is to be ascertained 
by the Commission on the basis of whether a third country’s accounting standards 
would ‘enable investors to make a similar assessment of the assets and liabilities…of 
the issuer as financial statements drawn up in accordance with IFRS [International 
Financial Reporting Standards]’.247  
 As for various qualitative disclosure requirements, e.g. interim management 
statements, it is up to the home MS competent authorities to make a determination on 
equivalence at the present. 
4.2 Cross-border regulation in the US 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has, over the years, developed 
tools of cross-border regulation in order to address the extraterritorial reach of federal 
securities law,248 and to enhance the competitive position of the US capital market. 249  
The various versions of exemption and mutual recognition discussed below are a 
continuum of initiatives of the SEC for achieving the above policies. 
4.2.1 Exemptions to securities laws 
Under section 5 of Securities Act 1933 (SA), issuers and any other persons offering 
securities to the public must file registration statements with the SEC and abide by 
stipulated marketing conditions.250 This provision covers all offers and sales of securities 
that make use of any means of transportation or communication between the US and a 
foreign country.
251
 As a consequence of such broad geographical reach, not only are 
foreign issuers with no intention of raising capital in the US being exposed to the risk of 
liabilities under Securities Act, but US investors have encountered difficulties of 
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investing in foreign securities, due to foreign issuers’ concern that mere presence of US 
investors among shareholders could trigger section 5 of Securities Act.
252
 
 This led to the promulgation of Regulation S by SEC with the aim to restrict the 
potentially extraterritorial reach of the Securities Act.
253
 The effect of Regulation S 
under Rule 901 is to exempt issues which are made ‘outside’ US from the scope of 
section 5 of Securities Act. Rules 903 and 904 establish two safe harbours, respectively 
for issuance and resale of securities, so that an offer or sale satisfying the stipulated 
conditions in these rules are deemed to occur ‘outside’ US and thereby exempted.254 The 
scope of the Regulation S exemption applies not only to section 5, but also in respect to 
civil liabilities under ss. 11 and 12(a)(a) Securities Act in respect to false information in 
a registration statement and prospectus. These new rules represented in a shift in the 
goalpost by the SEC, from investor to capital market protection.
255
 Their result was 
approximating the US federal securities law to the territoriality principle. 
 To facilitate access of foreign issuers into the US capital market, SEC has used 
international convergence of disclosure and accounting standards as the stepping stone. 
Form 20-F, the basic disclosure document devised specifically for foreign private 
issuers, was revised to implements IOSCO’s international disclosure standards for non-
financial information disclosure. 256  Moreover, in November 2007, SEC released its 
decision to accept financial statements from foreign private issuers prepared using 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board.
257
 
 
252
 Ibid. 210. 
253
 Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.901-904 (2000). 
254
 In brief, Rule 903 requires that any offer or sale by the issuer, a distributor, or their affiliates, be made 
in an ‘offshore transaction’ without ‘directed selling’ efforts in the US. An ‘offshore transaction’ is 
found when the offer of sale itself is not made to a US resident and sales transaction takes place 
outside the US. ‘Directed selling’ refers to activities to condition the US market, such as placing an 
advertisement in a publication with a general circulation in the US or conducting a road show in the 
US. 
255  ‘[T]he registration of securities is intended to protect the US capital markets and all investors 
purchasing in the US market, whether US or foreign nationals… As investors choose their markets, 
they would choose the disclosure requirements applicable to such markets’. See Securities Act 
Release No. 6779, (June 10, 1988) at 128. 
256
 SEC, ‘Final Rule: International Disclosure Standards’ www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-41936.htm. 
Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. Roberta Karmel, ‘The EU challenge to the SEC’, (2007) 31 Fordham Int'l 
L.J. 1692, 1696. 
257
 SEC, ‘SEC Takes Action to Improve Consistency of Disclosure to U.S. Investors in Foreign 
Companies’ www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-235.htm. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
Cross-border Securities Regulation in the EU and a comparison with US 
122 
 Exemptions have been established by the SEC for the professional markets. For 
example, Rule 144A excludes private placement of securities from the scope of section 
5 Securities Act and on-going disclosure under the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 
(Exchange Act). OTC markets, e.g. the GSTrUE (Goldman Sachs Tradable 
Unregistered Equity), have been established for listing unregistered 144A securities, 
thereby creating liquidity and price-formation mechanisms.258 
4.2.2 Mutual recognition 
a. US and Canada 
Under the multijurisdictional disclosure system ("MJDS") with Canada,
259
 adopted in 
1991, Canadian companies may issue securities into the US by using the disclosure 
documents filed with their home securities regulator, and US companies may likewise 
issue securities into Canada. However, the application of the MJDS is limited in a 
number of ways rendering it less effective in facilitating cross-border capital raising.
260
 
 The MJDS does not apply to Initial Public Offerings, and it applies only to 
equity and investment-grade debt of companies with market capitalization of over $75 
million. For a Canadian issuer using the MJDS, additional disclosure requirements 
could be stipulated so as to satisfy US regulation where these requirements are not 
found under Canadian law.261 One scholar has therefore argued that the effect of MJDS 
has been to force Canadian regulators to amend to their rules to follow the securities law 
in the US.
262
 Moreover, the scope of the mutual recognition is limited to contents of the 
registration document, thus the Securities Act rules on distribution, and civil liability 
rules for public issues, most importantly Sections 11 and 13 of Securities Act, and Rule 
10b-5 under Exchange Act, remain in place.  
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b. US and Australia 
The US SEC and the Australian ASIC (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission) entered into a Mutual Recognition Arrangement
263
 (‘Arrangement’) in 
August 2008. The two authorities agreed to consider, applications for exemption made 
by stock exchanges and broker-dealers regulated by each other. The effect of the 
granting of an exemptive relief is to permit the exempted entity to operate in the host 
country subject only to its home country’s laws and regulations.264  
 The scope of application of the Arrangement has been expressly restricted as 
follows. Exempted broker-dealers may only access ‘Qualified Investors’ without further 
restrictions.
265
 Therefore where a broker-dealer wishes to provider cross-border services 
to retail investors, it must seek further registration with the SEC/ASIC. Under the 
Arrangement, exempted exchanges may only conduct cross-border business with 
foreign investors in US/Australia provided that the investors act through broker-dealers 
which have been registered in the investors home country.
266
 Moreover, the exemption 
does not prevent the application of US anti-fraud protections and Australian market 
misconduct provisions.
267
 
 The Arrangement was entered into on the basis of an initial comparability 
assessment in respect to ‘core securities regulatory principles’ applied by the SEC and 
ASIC.
268
 Regulatory differences were recognized to be justifiable as these reflected 
market idiosyncrasies existing respectively in US and Australia. 
 The most important element of the Arrangement is the framework for 
supervisory cooperation between the SEC and ASIC laid down in the Arrangement 
itself and two MoUs.  
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 The Arrangement requires periodic meetings of the chairmen of the SEC and 
ASIC and the two authorities to inform each other of material changes in their 
regulatory systems.
269
 In an MoU on supervision,
270
 regulators are required to exchange 
information and maintaining confidentiality in a spirit of ‘the fullest possible 
cooperation’. For example, the home supervisor is to provide confidential market 
information to the host supervisor as stipulated in the conditions attached to an 
exemption relief.
271
 In an MoU on enforcement,
272
 detail categories of the information 
to be shared for enforcement purposes are provided, as well as requirements on mutual 
assistance, including freezing proceeds of possible regulatory violations, obtaining 
testimony and statements. 
 The Arrangement is soft law in nature. Therefore it endeavours to retain as much 
freedom and flexible as possible for the cooperating authorities to exercise their 
competences under national law. Thus both the SEC and ASIC when granting an 
exemptive relief may subject the exempted entity to ‘such terms and conditions as each 
[a]uthority may find appropriate’.273 An exit arrangement is also provided allowing the 
authorities to terminate the Arrangement at any time by giving a sixty days written 
notification.
274
  
 The Arrangement has so far not been successful, as to date no exemption has 
been granted.
275
 The lack of participation points to a lack of market demand for the 
initiative, since large institutional investors already have substantial access to foreign 
securities markets, and, the Arrangement is unlikely to significantly increase efficiency 
for retail investors.
276
 Thus a lesson from the SEC-ASIC Mutual Recognition 
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Arrangement is for authorities to carry out market consultation to seek to establish the 
areas where mutual recognition is most required.277 
4.3 US-EU comparison 
The US mutual recognition models may be comparable with the notion of ‘equivalence’ 
used in the EU. This is because both these regimes have the effect of enabling laws of 
another (home) country to be applicable, without convergence being expressly required. 
I will draw some comparisons between the US and EU regimes in relation to their 
nature, supervisory structure and operation. 
 In terms of their nature, a stark difference between US versions of mutual 
recognition and EU equivalence regime is the presence of reciprocity in one and its 
absence in the other. The US mutual recognition regimes are based on an exchange of 
commitments between two regulatory authorities. Thus the scope of these regimes was 
subject to negotiations and has been expressly restricted, in order to ensure consistent 
interpretation and operational certainty by the authorities. For determining equivalence 
in the EU on the other hand however, a reciprocal acceptance of EU securities 
regulations by a third country is not one of the criteria. It is for the European 
Commission to unilaterally determine the existence of equivalence by considering 
whether a third country’s regulatory and supervisory framework was capable of 
satisfying objectives of the EU legislation in question. Therefore, there appears to be 
less urgency for ex ante certainty under a unilateral recognition regime, thus, as shown 
above, there are still many unaddressed questions, in the Level 1 Directives in relation 
to equivalence.  
 In the respect to supervisory structure, the CRA Regulation has laid down a 
similar supervisory arrangement to that under the US-Australia Mutual Recognition 
Arrangement. Under the Arrangement, the authorization and supervision of an 
exempted entity rest with the home country, but continuous exchange of information is 
required to ensure that the host country regulator is satisfied that its investors are duly 
protected. Under CRA Regulation, when Article 5 applies, the third country CRA can 
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be registered and subject to supervision of the third country regulators, where 
cooperation arrangements between ESMA and the third country regulators have been 
established.  
 However, differences are found in the oversight of issuer disclosure. In the TD 
and PD, the supervisory functions of approving the prospectus and accepting filings of 
periodic reports remain with the home MS regulator in the EU. But, under the US-
Canadian regime, the home country authority of the issuer has the power to review 
registration statements to be used under the MJDS. Arguably the mutual recognition 
arrangement is more efficient, since a host country regulator may not have the necessary 
expertise to interpret and apply a home country’s laws. 
 Lastly, similarities may be drawn between the MJDS and the PD in terms of 
operations. As above discussed, SEC may require further disclosure from Canadian 
issuers where such requirements are needed to meet the standards of US regulation (and 
vice versa). It will be recalled that a similar approach has been taken by ESMA in its 
recently published PD equivalence framework.
278
 
5 Summary of Findings 
Having analyzed EU securities regulation, and made comparisons with the cross-border 
aspects of the US federal securities laws, some lessons are drawn for global-level 
governance of the securities markets. 
 In the above analysis, it was shown that the first global-level problem of 
regulatory divergence and conflict may be resolved either through regulatory 
convergence together with mutual recognition, or, simply via exemption. The latter 
approach is one of deregulation, which is usually only used when there are no systemic 
risks issues and retail investors’ interests are not violated, e.g., in a private placement 
situation. A number of lessons are drawn from the EU experience in relation to the 
operation of the principles of harmonization and mutual recognition. Firstly, since 
harmonization (whether minimum or maximum) of substantive regulatory rules is the 
bedrock upon which market confidence and mutual trust between MS supervisors are 
built, the risks pertaining to harmonization can hinder the effectiveness of mutual 
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recognition. The notable risks in harmonization are follows: politicising of regulatory 
issues, inertia in keeping up with market developments, variations in interpretation and 
implementation of rules, and, potential exacerbation of systemic risk in an internal 
market environment. Second, rules on allocation of supervisory responsibilities between 
home and host MS are prone to ambiguities, thereby frustrating the operation of mutual 
recognition. The former CESR and the present ESMA were created for the purpose of 
ensuring consistent application of EU legislations. However, it was shown that the 
effectiveness of the non-binding Level 3 guidances and recommendations requires 
resolving the issues of legitimacy and implementation, which is partly achieved through 
the creation of the ESAs. 
 In relation to the second and third global-level regulatory problems, the above 
investigation into the EU and US laws has provided some models for addressing 
supervisory fragmentation and systemic risks. Both in the EU and under the US-
Australia mutual recognition arrangements, cross-border supervision consists of 
division of supervisory functions between the home and host countries, with the former 
given the primary role. This is accompanied by convergence of supervisory powers and 
provision for information exchange and rules on confidentiality.  
 The new supervisory framework created in the EU has conferred powers on 
ESMA to intervene in securities markets in order to remedy MS breach of EU law and 
address systemic risks. Furthermore, ESMA is part of the macro-prudential supervisory 
framework which facilitates the bottom-up exchange of market information and top-
down distribution of early warnings and policy recommendations between MS and the 
ESRB. 
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Chapter 4:  Global-level Cooperation in Securities 
Market Regulation 
 
Following on from discussions in Chapter 3, this Chapter examines various 
international and transnational actors and their initiatives. It will be seen that the origins 
of each of the actors discussed in this Chapter are different, and their initiatives are 
often not directly linked to regulatory barrier removal or cross-border supervision. 
Furthermore, unlike the institutional structure in the EU, there is an absence of a legal 
framework at the global-level. Therefore, in this Chapter, an extrapolating approach is 
adopted to link up the various aspects of the initiatives of international and transnational 
actors with the three global-level regulatory problems discussed throughout my thesis. 
The new concept of ‘soft law’ is highlighted in this chapter, since it provides the 
conceptual basis for discussing the initiatives mentioned below. 
 This Chapter seeks to identify strengths and limitations of the existing 
approaches of global-level regulatory cooperation. In particular, my discussions will 
focus on the work and operation of the International Organization of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO), since it is the main body for cross-border securities regulation. It 
will be seen that while certain features of IOSCO may be beneficial for resolving the 
global-level problems, they do not go far enough and need to be further expanded. 
 Discussions in this Chapter comprises two substantive Sections. In Section 1 the 
work of the various global actors are outlined so as to provide an overview of how 
regulatory cooperation presently functions at the global-level. In Section 2, the work 
and operation of IOSCO is discussed with a view to highlighting how the Organization 
contributes to addressing the three global-level problems and how its operations should 
be changed to enhance its impact. 
1 Global-level Cooperation in Securities Markets Regulation 
– An Overview  
Discussions in this Section is organized around the numerous actors who, having been 
created to address monetary, trade finance and economics issues, have also made impact 
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on the regulation of transnational securities markets. In order to assess whether and the 
extent to which the current initiatives of the actors could adequately address the global-
level regulatory problems, one first needs an overview of the initiatives. Since the actors 
differ in their membership, history, remit and constitution, so the rationale of their 
creation and scope of their activities will be the main issues considered in this short 
overview. Moreover, as global finance, being distinguishable from global trade,1 relies 
almost exclusively on ‘soft law’, this scholarly construction will be expounded at the 
end of this Section. 
1.1 International institutions 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) were the 
international organizations created under the Bretton Woods Treaty to govern the post-
World War II international economic system. 2 The former was originally given the 
mandate to oversee the workings of the par value regime, while the latter, according to 
the original plan, was to provide assistance to post-war reconstruction and 
development.3 
 The IMF was established by the Articles of Agreement, which presently sets out 
three categories of powers, namely, regulatory powers, financial powers and advisory 
powers.4 The regulatory powers relate primarily to the IMF’s responsibility to monitor 
 
1
 For example, see Chris Brummer, ‘Why soft law dominates international finance - and not trade’ 2010 
J.I.E.L. 623. 
2
 The Bretton Woods Conference, or, properly called, the International Monetary and Financial 
Conference of the United and Associated Nations, was convened on 22 July 1944, almost a year 
before the end of WWII, in which delegates established the framework for the post-war future of 
international economic cooperation. The framework, as originally proposed by Henry Dexter White 
and John Mayard Keynes, had also comprised an International Trade Organization (ITO) for liberating 
trade and investment flows. ITO never came into life, and its role is being assumed by the present 
WTO system. A concise overview of Bretton Woods Agreement is found in Richard Gardener, ‘the 
Bretton Woods-GATT system after sixty five years: a balance sheet of success and failure’, (2008) 47 
Col. J. Trans L. 26; Rolf Weber and Douglas Arner, ‘Toward a new design for international financial 
regulation’, (2007) 29 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 391. 
3
 For a succinct exposition of the par value regime, see Rosa Lastra, Legal foundations of international 
monetary stability, (Oxford: OUP) 2006, Chapter 12. 
4
 IMF’s Articles of Agreement, first came into force on 27 December 1945, has been amended twice. The 
First Amendment adopted on 31 May 1968 established the special drawing right, the Fund’s reserve 
assets. The Second Amendment adopted on 30 April 1976 occurred after the collapse of the gold 
standard. See Lastra, n 3 above, Chapter 13. IMF’s Articles of Agreement and other publications on 
governance is available at www.imf.org/external/pubs.  
Global-level Cooperation 
130 
and promote the observance by members of their obligations under Article IV.5 The 
IMF is also empowered to make use of its general resources, on a conditional basis, to 
assist members in resolving their balance of payments problems.6 Moreover, as part of 
its advisory powers, IMF has provided technical service through the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) jointly conducted with WB.7 
 IMF’s role in the global financial system has been changing in tandem with 
rapid world events. As the par value regime ended in the early 1970s with IMF 
members switching their currencies from fixed to floating exchange rates, IMF began to 
expand its role into other monetary and financial issues. IMF had established its 
reputation in its financing role by leading sovereign debt restructurings (such as 
Argentina) in the 1980s, and, supplying funding in financial crises (Mexico and Asian) 
in the 1990s.8 IMF’s technical assistance to the former Communist economies during 
the 1990s was instrumental in their transition to market economies. During the GFC, the 
Group of Twenty leaders made commitments to strengthen IMF’s role in global 
economic recovery and promote global financial stability. To this end, the resources 
available to the IMF to facilitate lending to emerging markets and developing countries 
have been trebled.9 More importantly, for my discussions on cross-border regulatory 
and supervisory cooperation, IMF is to conduct strengthened FSAP and also early 
warning exercises in collaboration with the Financial Stability Board.10  
1.1.1 FSAP and ROSCs 
The FSAP was established by the IMF and WB in 1999 following the Asian crisis, to 
assess member countries’ financial sector vulnerabilities and developmental needs. The 
Boards of the IMF and WB have endorsed eleven Standards and Codes of the twelve 
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designated by the FSB.11 Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), 
often published with the Financial System Stability Assessments (FSSA), examine how 
far countries have implemented international standards on Banking Supervision, 
Securities, Insurance, Payments and Securities Settlement Systems, and Anti Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT).12  
 IMF’s FSAP, as a primary means of gauging countries’ level compliance with 
international standards, suffers from fundamental weaknesses. First, participation in the 
FSAP is voluntary. Thus, the US, one of the most systemically important countries and 
the origin of the recent GFC, had not been assessed before the crisis.13 Second, there 
was much inconsistency in countries’ adoption of recommendations in the FSAPs.14 For 
example, the findings in the FSAP and ROSCs for Iceland and Spain have accurately 
identified risks in the financial sectors of these countries, 15  yet the FSAP 
recommendations have not been incorporated in time to avoid financial system crises. 
Therefore, one could only speculate what could have happen if US did undergo FSAP 
assessment before the crisis and countries did follow FSAP recommendations. These 
two concerns (as will be seen below) are now partly addressed through the FSB.  
 In 2009, IMF staff launched a comprehensive review of the FSAP making 
proposals for more efficient FSAP and compulsory FSAP for IMF member countries 
with systemically important financial sectors.16 Article IV, Section 1(ii) of the Articles 
of Agreements has been identified as an authority for requiring IMF members to engage 
in FSAP as part of bilateral surveillance.17 According to this subsection, members are 
required to ‘seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and 
financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic 
disruptions’. In the view of IMF staff, the proposed differential treatment of members 
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01/09/ 2012. See Sean Hagan, ‘Enhancing the IMF's regulatory authority’ (2010) J.I.E.L. 955. 
17
 IMF, ‘The Fund's Mandate--The Legal Framework’, 7 
www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/022210.pdf. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
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on the grounds of systemic risk falls within the scope of the above Section.18 Thus 
through the means of hermeneutic techniques, the Articles are adapted to better serve 
the needs of global financial governance. 
1.1.2 IMF’s role in macro-prudential supervision 
Compared with its monetary role, IMF’s role in financial market oversight is relatively 
limited. Under its Article IV ‘bilateral surveillance’ function, IMF’s powers to consult 
members are restricted to ensuring their obligations under the Articles of Agreement are 
fulfilled.19 Therefore where a member is not found to be in breach of its obligations, 
even where a domestic policy has spill-over effects, the policy is outside of the scope of 
‘bilateral surveillance.20 Moreover, IMF’s ‘multilateral surveillance’ function relates to 
oversight of ‘the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective 
operation’.21 While the definition of ‘international monetary system’ is narrow, the IMF 
has nevertheless examined domestic financial policies under its ‘multilateral 
surveillance’, particularly in the ‘World Economic Outlook’, ‘Global Financial Stability 
Report’ and the Early Warning Exercise.22 In the context of multilateral surveillance, the 
IMF has also engaged in policy discussions with members to recommend particular 
actions to address risks. However, members do not have an obligation to consider the 
recommendations, and only an obligation to provide the required information to the 
IMF.23  
 After the re-establishment of the FSB, the IMF and FSB are now to carry out the 
Early Warning Exercise. Its aim is to identify and report to the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee and the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
on the build-up of macroeconomic and financial risks and the actions needed to address 
 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 The legal basis for Article IV consultations is (i) with respect to members’ exchange rate policies, the 
specific obligation to consult with the Fund under Article IV, Section 3(b), and (ii) with respect to 
members’ domestic policies, the obligation to collaborate with the Fund and other members under 
Article IV, Section 1.  
20
 Hagan, n 16 above, 963-964. 
21
 IMF Articles of Agreement, Article 3(a). 
22
 Hagan, n 16 above, 963. 
23
 IMF, ‘The Fund's Mandate--The Legal Framework’ (the Legal Framework Paper), 9-12. 
www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/022210.pdf. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
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them. 24  As FSB members have committed to ‘pursue the maintenance of financial 
stability’, they have at least a moral obligation to consider the recommendations.25 
1.2 G20 and the FSB 
During the GFC, the Group of Twenty (G-20) emerged as the principal co-ordinator of 
regulatory and economic reforms.26 The leaders of the G-20 countries have met through 
annual ‘Leaders’ Summits’ to seek to establish common positions on global issues.27 In 
particular, in their Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (London 
Declaration), the leaders of the G-20 have set out a roadmap for regulatory reforms 
which are in the process of being implemented. The most significant act by the G-20 
leaders was its decision in 2009 to transform the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) into 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and to strengthen the latter’s mandate.  
1.2.1 Re-establishment of FSB 
 The FSF had been the creation of the G-7 countries following the 1998 Asian 
Crisis to undertake initiatives to promote a stable international financial system.28 FSF’s 
roles were threefold: (1) to assess vulnerabilities affecting the international financial 
system, (2) identify and oversee actions needed to address these vulnerabilities, and (3) 
improve co-ordination and information exchange among the various authorities 
responsible for financial stability. The FSF adopted twelve key standards29 which were 
recognised as essential for the well-functioning of financial systems. However, despite 
 
24
 London Declaration, 1. 
25
 See Section 1.2.1 below. 
26
 See G-20, ‘What Is the G-20?’, www.g20.org/about-what-is..g2O.aspx. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. The 
G-20's members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, UK, United States US, 
and the EU. 
27
 See Pittsburgh communiqué, preamble. Before the leaders first meeting in Washington on 14 
November 2008, G-20’s activities took the form of annual meetings between financial ministers and 
central bank governors. 
28
 The history of the FSB may be found in George Walker, ‘Market Stability and the Financial Stability 
Forum’, (1999) 4 Y.B. Int'l Fin. & Econ. L. 491; Kern Alexander, ‘Global financial standard-setting, 
the G10 committees and financial economic law’, (2008) 34 Brook. J. Int'l L. 861; John Eatwell and 
Lance Taylor, Global Financial at Risk (Polity Press) 2000, 204-205. 
29
 The standards are divided into three categories: macroeconomic policy and data transparency; 
institutional and market infrastructure; and financial regulation and supervision. The standards are 
available from www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/key_standards.htm. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
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its activities in areas such as highly leveraged institutions and offshore financial centres, 
FSF’s influence was limited and had made no contribution in preventing the GFC.30 
 The FSB’s Charter was adopted at the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, at 
height of crisis, to set out its mandate and internal organization. 31  In response to 
criticisms on the exclusiveness of the former FSF,32 the FSB’s membership has wider 
territorial reach, comprising 24 countries, 33  4 International Financial Institutions, 34  6 
standard-setting/regulatory committees, the European Central Bank and the European 
Commission.35 The internal organization of the FSB consists of the Plenary, a Steering 
Committee, a Chairperson, and a Secretariat. The FSB Plenary is the decision-making 
organ of the FSB in which participants act through consensus. 36  The Steering 
Committee is an executive organ that provides operational guidance in the six months 
period between plenary meetings to carry forward the directions of the FSB.37 Since 
financial crises are often rooted in a combination of micro-regulatory failures and 
adverse macro-economic shocks,38 the composition of the FSB Plenary is reflective of 
the dual nature of crises. FSB’s member countries are represented by the heads of 
central banks, supervisory authorities and treasury departments. Moreover, while the 
international financial institutions provide surveillance on the health of the global 
financial system, the standard-setting bodies (SSBs) set standards for sound financial 
regulation and supervision.39 
 The FSB’s objective is to continue to address vulnerabilities affecting the 
international financial system, with an emphasis on coordinating the work of SSBs and 
national authorities to develop and promote the implementation of financial sector 
 
30
 For detail discussion of criticism of FSF, see Jason Liberi, Comment, The Financial Stability Forum: A 
Step in the Right Direction...Not Far Enough’, (2003) 24 U. PA. J. INT L ECON. L. 549, 571-74. 
31
 FSB, ‘Financial Stability Board charter’ (FSB charter). 
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925d. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
32
 The G-7 plus Hong Kong, Singapore, the Netherlands, Australia, and Switzerland. 
33
 The new country members are Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey, Spain and the European Commission. 
34
 These include International Monetary Fund (IMF) www.imf.org, World Bank www.worldbank.org, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) http://www.oecd.org, Bank for 
International Settlement www.bis.org . 
35
 FSB charter, Annex A. 
36
 Ibid, Article 7. 
37
 Ibid, Article 12-13. 
38
 See Chapter 1, Section 4.3. 
39
 FSB charter, Article 8. 
Global-level Cooperation 
135 
policies.40 The G-20 has set out an extensive list of tasks for the FSB, which include, 
monitoring market developments and advising on their regulatory implications; 
ensuring the work of SSBs is coordinated in addressing priorities and gaps; promoting 
implementation of international financial standards; setting guidelines for establishing 
supervisory colleges; contingency planning for cross-border crisis management; and, 
already mentioned, collaborating with the IMF to conduct Early Warning Exercises.41 
FSB is also to undertake further tasks upon the request of the G-20, such as monitoring 
implementation of recommendations contained in G-20 Communiqués.42 
 Although the G-20 leaders have declared an intention to provide FSB with a 
‘stronger institutional basis’, the Charter does not create any form of legal personality 
under international or national law. According to Article 16, the ‘Charter is not intended 
to create any legal rights or obligations’. Therefore, the charter is essentially a soft law 
instrument. As a result, FSB has no means of enforcing its members’ commitment under 
Article 5,43 nor can it impose sanctions.44 Two other institutional issues need also to be 
discussed.45 Firstly, there is no clear mechanism regarding accountability of the FSB, 
gives rise to legitimacy concerns.46 Secondly, linkages have not been clearly established 
between the FSB and the SSBs, and with the non-FSB member countries. 
1.2.2 Enhancing implementation of international financial standards47 
The FSB is now undertaking to monitor implementation of the FSAP recommendations 
by its member countries by means of peer review. The ‘Handbook for FSB Peer 
 
40
 Ibid, Article 1. 
41
 Ibid, Article 1. London Declaration, 1. 
42
 See FSB, ‘A Coordination Framework for Monitoring the Implementation of Agreed G20/FSB 
Financial Reforms’, 18 October 2011. www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111017. 
Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
43
 FSB member countries have committed inter alia to maintain financial stability, and openness and 
transparency of the financial sector, implement international financial standards (including the twelve 
key Standards), and agree to undergo periodic peer reviews.  
44
 See Mario Giovanoli, ‘The international financial architecture and its reform after the global crisis’, in 
Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (ed.) International Monetary and Financial Law, the Global Crisis, 
(Oxford: OUP) 2011, 19. 
45
 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
46
 See discussions in Chapter 5. 
47
 ‘International financial standards’ refers to minimum financial standard for preventing systemic riskand 
ensuring financial markets integraity and transparency. See Mario Giovanoli, ‘A New Architecture for 
the Global Financial System: Legal Aspect of International Financial Standard-setting’, in Mario 
Giovanoli (ed.), International Monetary Law: Issues for the New Millennium (Oxford: OUP) 2000, 5. 
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Reviews’ (PR Handbook) sets out composition of the review teams, selection of review 
topic, the review and follow-up processes. 48  Through its Standing Committee on 
Standards Implementation (SCSI), the FSB conducts country peer reviews and thematic 
peer reviews. The objective of FSB country peer reviews is to examine the extent to 
which national authorities have taken steps to address FSAP recommendations to 
achieve certain outcomes.49 Moreover, thematic peer reviews have also been carried out 
across FSB membership in respective to particular issues, such as remuneration, to 
encourage consistent cross-country and cross-sector implementation. 50  Prima facie, 
FSB’s members’ commitment to undergo the FSAP every five years as well as the 
FSB’s peer reviews would likely to promote implementation of international financial 
standards.  
 In March 2010, FSB commenced an initiative to encourage adherence by all 
countries (i.e. including non-FSB members) to standards on international cooperation 
and information exchange established by the SSBs.51 A pool of 60 jurisdictions were 
assessed (including all 24 FSB member jurisdictions), on the basis of their potential to 
pose risks to the financial system. 52  The findings show that all except two have 
implemented the standards on international cooperation. The two jurisdictions have 
been identified as non-cooperating countries.53 As the purpose of the review was to 
identify non-cooperative jurisdictions and assisting them with improving adherence, 
FSB’s finding of wide compliance is encouraging. The data indicate that standardization 
using broad principles is a viable approach to forge cooperation at the global-level.54  
 Moreover, FSB’s initiative to assess adherence of standards on international 
cooperation and information exchange may be seen as a blueprint of FSB’s ambitious 
project of strengthening adherence to international financial standards by all countries 
 
48
 Available at www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120201. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
Contents of the PR Handbook will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
49
 PR Handbook, 2. Beginning in 2010, the FSB conducted peer reviews on Mexico, Italy, and Spain and 
by 2011 Austria, Canada, and Switzerland have also been subject to peer review. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 FSB, ‘Promoting global adherence to international cooperation and information exchange standards’, 
10 March 2010. www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100310.pdf. Accessed on 01/09/2012. 
Annex B. (Principles 8-15 of IOSCO’s O&P discussed below are part of the benchmark standards.) 
52
 Ibid. 6. 
53
 FSB, ‘Global adherence to regulatory and supervisory standards on international cooperation and 
information exchange’, 2 November 2011. 
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111102.pdf. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
54
 Cf. results of CESR’s peer review under the EU harmonization regime. See Chapter 3, Section 1.1.3c. 
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and jurisdictions.55 Chapter 6 will discuss problems of legitimacy arising from FSB’s 
‘extraterritorial’ approach. 
1.3 International standard-setting bodies 
SSBs are soft law organizations which provide fora for regular co-operation among 
nation financial regulatory authorities in different financial sectors and issuer areas.56 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is the SSB for banking 
supervision and International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) the SSB for 
insurance. FSB also carries out standard-setting functions. The various SSBs relevant 
for securities regulation are as follows. 
1.3.1 IOSCO 
IOSCO is the leading international policy forum for securities regulators.57 IOSCO was 
formerly the Inter-American Association of Securities Commissions, a forum 
established in 1974 under the leadership of the US SEC, to address matters of common 
interest to regulators in the Western Hemisphere. 58  The present Organization was 
established in 1983 at a conference in Quito, where, a decision to open up its 
membership globally was taken. This decision was in response to lobbying by financial 
market participants and securities regulators for an organization that could address the 
common concerns of securities participants located outside the countries in the former 
inter-American association.59 The consequence of the 1983 open-membership strategy 
has been continuing expansion of IOSCO’s membership – now encompassing more 
than 95% of the world’s securities markets – and progressive evolution of its 
organizational structure and strategic vision.60  
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 FSB, ‘Framework for Strengthening Adherence to International Standards’, 1, 10 January 2010. 
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100109a.pdf. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
56
 As will be seen in Chapter 5, SSBs are an example of transgovernenatl regulatory networks. 
57
 www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=history. Accessed on 01/09/2012. 
58
 For historical accounts of IOSCO, see A. Sommers Jr., ‘IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement’, (1996) 
17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 15; Michael Blair & George Walker (eds.) Financial Markets and Exchange 
Law (Oxford: OUP) 2006, Chapter 13, 455. 
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 See Blair & Walker, n. 58 above. 
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 The fundamental role of IOSCO has always been to facilitate between its 
members information exchange and cooperation in enforcement, setting of standards in 
securities regulation, and, exchange of supervisory experience and mutual assistance. In 
the last decade, the focus of IOSCO’s work has been on the first role, as much efforts 
and resources were put into ensuring that its members would become signatories to the 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU).61 The changes to IOSCO’s by-
law in May 2012 point towards greater commitments by its member to ensuring 
implementation of its standards, which are the benchmarks for securities regulation and 
supervisory cooperation. IOSCO’s MMoU and standard-setting are important aspects of 
global-level cooperation and will be further discussed in Section 2. 
1.3.2 International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) aims to develop a single set of 
high quality, understandable, enforceable and globally accepted financial reporting 
standards, known as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).62 This is 
consistent with the call of the G-20 in the aftermath of the GFC.63 
 The IASB began life as a forum for professional accountancy bodies from 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, UK and Ireland, 
and US, for the development of comparative studies of accounting and auditing 
practices in these countries. 64  IASB is now an independent standard-setting board, 
overseen by a geographically and professionally diverse body of trustees, and, publicly 
accountable to a Monitoring Board of public capital market authorities. The Monitoring 
Board comprises chairperson of IOSCO.65 
 
61
 IOSCO, ‘Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and 
Exchange of Information’ was endorsed by the President's Committee during its May 2002 annual 
meeting. The Resolution can be found at www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_main. 
Accessed on 01/09/2012. The MMoU signatory process was officially opened in August 2002. The 
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 ‘International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation’ (Revised Constitution), 5, March 2010. 
www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/B611DD9A-F4FB-4A0D-AEC9-0036F6895BEF/0/Constitution2010.pdf.  
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 See Pittsburgh statement, 9. 
64
 History of the IASB may be found on www.iasplus.com/restruct/chrono.htm. Accessed on 01/09/2012. 
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1.3.3 Other key SSBs in securities regulation 
With the growth of an increasingly integrated market, the Joint Forum (JF) was 
established in 1993, bringing together banking, securities and insurance regulators, in 
order to address risks of joint and system-wide concern, such as financial conglomerates, 
credit risk transfer and outsourcing.  
 In the area of securities clearing and settlement, joint work has been taken by 
IOSCO and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), e.g. the ‘Core 
Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems – Recommendations of 
Securities Settlement Systems’.66 
1.4 Soft law 
Literature on the notion of ‘soft law’ has proliferated since it was first coined just over 
three decades ago.67 The growth of literature is reflective of the increasing usage of non-
legally binding norms in the international arena, particular in the area of regulation of 
finance.68 In this part, I will first provide a working definition of soft law, and then 
discuss its benefits and limitations within context of the debates in my thesis. 
1.4.1 Definition of soft law 
‘Soft law’ may simply be defined as rules of conduct without legally binding force, but 
may nevertheless have practical effects. 69  However, many scholars have expressed 
doubts as to the usefulness of a black and white distinction between hard and soft law 
on the basis of a simple binary divide between the notions of binding and non-binding. 
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 See www.bis.org/cpss/index.htm.  
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 The earliest writings on ‘soft law’ in the field of international economic law include, Ignaz Seidl-
Hohenveldern, ‘International Economic “Soft Law”’ (1979) 163 Recueil des Cours 165; Joseph Gold, 
‘Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements’ (1983) 77 Am. J. Int'l L. 443. 
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 E.g. Lastra, n 3 above; Giovanoli, n 47 above; Chris Brummer, ‘How International Financial Law 
Works (and How It Doesn't)’, (2010) 99 Geo. L.J. 257; Roberta Karmel and Claire Kelly, ‘The 
hardening of soft law in securities regulation’, (2008) 34 Brook. J. Int'l L. 883; and other literature 
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69
 For supporter of this definition see, Francis Snyder, Soft Law and International Practice in the 
European Community, in Stephen Martin (ed.) The construction of Europe: essays in honour of Emile 
Noel, (The Hague: Kluwer Acadmic Publishers) 1994; K Wellens and Borchardt, ‘Soft law in 
European Community Law’ (1989) 14 ELR, 267, 274; Jan Klabbers, ‘The Redundancy of Soft Law’, 
(1996) 65 NORDICJ. INT'L L. 167, 168. 
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They have demonstrated there to be a continuum of progression from what is soft law to 
hard law, and possibly vice versa.70 Therefore, it has been considered useful to analyze 
the nature of a rule, not only from an ‘ex post enforcement perspective’ (i.e. whether a 
rule could be enforced), but also from an ‘ex ante negotiation perspective’.71  
 The widely cited analytic approach expounded by Abbott and Snidal is an 
example of considering a rule from both ex ante and ex post perspectives.72 Under 
Abbott and Snidal’s approach, the core elements of hard law are first identified, then, 
the notion of soft law is to be understood in terms of any deviation from the core 
elements. Hard law is defined as ‘legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be 
made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that 
delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law’.73 Thus a rule may be soft 
law when it is non-binding, or its content is vague thereby leaving negotiating parties 
the discretion relating to its implementation, or when there is no a third party delegated 
with the authority of interpretation or monitoring its implementation. Using this analysis, 
it will be seen in discussions below that international standards and principles in the 
area of securities regulation are different variations of soft law.  
 A following question is: what is the scope of soft law? Does soft law comprise 
every decision taken by collective actors that is outside of hard law? Another well-cited 
definition by Wellens and Borchardt provides that soft law refers to ‘[s]uch 
rules…directed at…the conduct of States, international organizations and individuals 
[which] is influenced by those rules, without [the rules] containing international legal 
rights and obligations’.74 Accordingly, the status of soft law may be accorded to rules or 
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 As Professor Lastra elegantly points out: ‘there is hard “soft law” (e.g. the international standards on 
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any agreed arrangements that have some moral binding force on global actors, which 
arises either from a demonstrable intention of the parties to be bound, or, from 
consensus-based decision-making process. 
1.4.2 Benefits and limitations of soft law 
The ubiquitous adoption of the soft law approach in international finance may be 
explained by their flexibility, low impact on state sovereignty and relatively small 
negotiation and transposition cost.75 International standard-setting arrangements usually 
have little formal requirement in terms of quorum and voting rules. This would permit 
standards to be adopted in the most time and cost efficient manner, with a potential to 
cope with changes in markets. The broadness of international standards allows for 
discretion as to how they are implemented into different national legal systems, thus 
allowing for costs and impact on sovereignty to be kept to minimal.  
 However, the strengths of soft law are also the very causes of its ineffectiveness. 
There are in generally two difficulties with negotiating international standards and co-
operational arrangements. 76  First, there is the presence of distributive problems in 
financial regulation. 77  Second, national regulatory authorities possess an inclination 
towards protectionism. Due to the flexibility and informality of SSBs, there may be a 
lack of institutional mechanisms to resolving these difficulties. As a result, concerns 
about legitimacy of international standards and their actual implementation have arisen. 
These concerns are to be addressed in detail throughout the rest of my thesis. 
 
75
 Lastra, n 70 above, 463-465. Shaffer and Pollack, n 71 above, 719; Emilios Avgouleas, Governance of 
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2 IOSCO 
IOSCO is not a treaty organization under international law. It was incorporated as a 
non-profit membership organization by an act of the Quebec Parlement. 78  Thus 
IOSCO’s by-laws which set out its members’ common intent and the Organization’s 
internal structure and procedures, is an example of soft law described above.79 National 
regulatory authorities, upon accession to IOSCO membership, become morally bound to 
act in accordance with IOSCO’s by-laws through their voluntary consent.80  
 This Section first provides an overview and raison d'être of IOSCO by 
discussing the by-laws and the ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’. 
Then, the effectiveness of IOSCO’s work in respect to standard-setting and information 
exchange will be assessed. It is argued that IOSCO still lacks a coherent structure to 
foster implementation of its standards, which needs to be addressed by the Organization. 
2.1 IOSCO’s internal structure  
IOSCO’s by-laws were amended in during the Beijing Annual Conference in May 2012. 
The purpose of the amendment was to reform the Organization’s internal structure, so as 
to reflect the worldwide call, during and in the aftermath of the GFC, for better 
representation of emerging market members in global financial market governance.81 
Moreover, an updated statement of intention was inserted into the Preamble of the new 
by-laws to reflect the priorities which have come to light during the GFC.82 
 IOSCO presently comprises 115 ordinary members, 12 associate members and 
76 affiliate members.83 The six organs of IOSCO are the Presidents Committee; the 
 
78
 An Act Respecting the International Organization of Securities Commissions, ch. 143, 1987 S.Q. 2437 
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IOSCO Board; the General Secretariat located in Madrid, Spain; the Emerging Markets 
Committee;84 the Regional Committees;85 and the Consultative Committees.86 Other than 
the IOSCO Board, all the other organs had existed prior to the amendment of the by-
laws. The creation of the IOSCO Board reflects the structures of the FSB and IMF, 
which are comparable with shareholders’ meeting and board of directors in a 
commercial corporation.87 The converging of institutional arrangements in these three 
global actors suggests that the soft law bodies are becoming increasingly formal in their 
organization. 
 IOSCO's Presidents Committee (PC), as the name suggests, is composed of the 
presidents/chairpersons of ordinary members.88 It is empowered by the by-laws to take 
all necessary measures to achieve the purposes of the Organization. 89  The powers 
include, examining and approving the Resolutions submitted by the IOSCO Board or by 
a member; voting IOSCO Board members; determining annual contribution and 
imposing sanctions. Resolutions of the PC are adopted through voting by members 
during annual meetings. Ordinary members have one vote each.90 A qualified majority is 
required to amend the by-laws and a simple majority of members present is to be used 
for all other resolutions. 91  Moreover, the by-laws also provides for procedures for 
conducting annual meetings and inviting observers to the meetings.92 
 Before the by-law amendments, the operations of IOSCO were run by the 
Executive Committee. The Committee oversaw the work of the two important working 
committees, the Technical Committee (TC) and the Emerging Markets Committee 
(EMC). 93  TC was originally made up of regulatory authorities from fifteen of the 
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world's most developed markets.94 Its reports were the most influential among IOSCO’s 
members and in the development of transnational cooperation. With China, Brazil and 
India joining the TC in 2009,95 the divide between TC and EMC had no longer reflected 
the growing relevance of the emerging markets in general. Therefore, a new IOSCO 
Board was constituted at the Annual Conference in Beijing in May 2012, through a 
three-way merger of the Executive Committee, TC and the EMC Advisory Board.96 The 
operational decisions of IOSCO are now undertaken by its Board. 97  Under the 
streamlined organizational structure, the Executive Committee and TC have ceased to 
exist. It is however still relevant to record the old structure here because the reports 
discussed below were mostly the works of the TC. 
 The last point on organization is that the Secretary General who is responsible 
for the operation of the Secretariat, is to represent IOSCO in external meetings e.g. in 
the FSB, while subject to the review of the Chairman of the IOSCO Board.98  
2.2 IOSCO’s ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ 
To achieve the three identified objectives of securities regulation, namely, protection of 
investor, markets fairness, efficiency and transparency, and, reduction of systemic risk, 
implementation of the principles contained in IOSCO’s ‘Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation’ (O&P) is considered the foremost step to attaining the goal.99.  
 The O&P has attained ‘soft law’ status. Firstly, the O&P has been endorsed by 
IOSSCO’s members through PC resolution, which demonstrates their intention to 
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implement.100  Secondly, the importance of the O&P for stable and well-functioning 
financial systems has been underscored by the principles becoming part of FSB’s 
Compendium of Standards, which all FSB member countries have committed to 
implement and adhere.101 
2.2.1 An overview of the principles 
The current Objectives & Principles contains 38 principles, eight of which were newly 
added in 2010.102 The principles, outlined below, are grouped into nine categories, each 
covering an aspect of securities regulation. 
 Principles 1-8 set out the requirements for establishing the regulator, including, 
operational independence and accountability, adequate powers and clear regulatory 
processes. The principles 6, 7 and 8 were added in 2010. Principle 6 requires a 
securities regulator to contribute to the monitoring and management of systemic risks. 
Principle 7 requires regular reviewing of the perimeter of regulation. Principle 8 
requires management of conflicts of interest by the regulator. 
 Principle 9 gives support to the use of self-regulatory organisations and stipulate 
their oversight by the regulator. 
 Principles 10-12 deal with powers of enforcement to be conferred on the 
regulator. 
 Principles 13-15 require the regulator to have authority to share information with 
and provide assistance to their counterparts and to establish efficient mechanisms for 
these purposes. 
 Principles 16-18 set out requirements for the issuer on disclosure of information 
and equal treatment of shareholders. 
 
100
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 Principles 19-23 provide for the regulatory standards of auditors, CRAs and 
analysts. 
 Principles 24-28 provide for the establishment of a regulatory system for 
collective investment schemes (including hedge funds). 
 Principles 29-32 relate to supervision of secondary markets. 
 Principles 33-38 require the authorization and oversight of trading and clearing 
and settlement systems. 
 The above principles are said to be the raison d’être of IOSCO by providing a 
clear sense of direction to regulators both in their exercising of powers and 
collaboration with counterparts. 103  The principles have been formulated in a 
conceptually broad manner, in order to accommodate the different laws, regulatory 
frameworks, and market structures among IOSCO’s members and to withstand changes 
in the markets.  
 The broadness of the principles does not mean a lack of substance. The 38 
principles function as an umbrella for the standards formulated by IOSCO’s committees. 
In the 2003 version of IOSCO’s O&P, the original thirty skeletal principles were 
expanded through accompanying notes and the various IOSCO’s reports listed in the 
footnotes.104 As for the newly adopted nine principles, relevant reports may be identified 
addressing issues such as systemic risk, auditors, CRAs.105 Therefore the O&P may be 
seen as an encapsulation of the consensus of IOSCO’s members regarding the most 
crucial issues in securities regulation.  
 As mentioned above, most of IOSCO’s reports were produced by the former TC, 
which comprises a minority of IOSCO’s membership. Since the TC’s reports 
findings/recommendations have been transferred into conceptual principles in the O&P, 
members who did not participate in producing the reports have been indirectly 
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endorsing them through implementing the O&P. Without members having direct 
ownership in the contents of the reports, the question of legitimacy is therefore raised, 
causing risk to implementation.106 
2.2.2 The 38 principles and the three global-regulatory problems 
On the one hand, the O&P may be seen as a tool for resolving the global-regulatory 
problems. However, on the other hand, there are a number of important limitations to 
this tool.  
 It has been seen from discussions in Chapter 2 that regulatory duplication results 
in greater costs in international securities transactions. The establishing of principles for 
enhancing investor protection, e.g. in the area of issuers disclosure and collective 
investment schemes, could provide an incentive for investors to diversify their portfolio 
overseas. This could increase demand for foreign investment opportunities, thereby 
creating an impetus for regulators to remove regulatory barriers to attract foreign issuers, 
service providers and markets.107 However, as the principles are very broad, regulators 
will use different approaches to achieve what they perceive to be the appropriate level 
of protection in their national markets.108 Therefore, the O&P would not likely foster the 
level of convergence necessary to remove regulatory barriers. For this to happen, it 
would require further barrier-removal mechanisms e.g. exemption and mutual 
recognition, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 The principles have also provided a framework for addressing systemic risk in 
the financial system. The new Principle 6, which requires securities regulators to have 
‘a process to monitor, mitigate and manage systemic risk’, is significant as investor 
protection rather than systemic risk had been the focus of securities regulation before 
the GFC. The TC’s systemic risk discussion paper considers the issues of identification 
and mitigation of systemic risks. For example, the initiative of the Canadian Securities 
Administrators to develop processes for identifying, analyzing and monitoring systemic 
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risks was provided in the discussion paper to promote the sharing of experience among 
IOSCO members. However, the upshot of TC’s systemic risk discussion paper was that 
there is still limited development by securities regulators in respect to reducing systemic 
risk. 109  IOSCO established a new Research Department in 2012, with the aim to 
facilitate the cooperation between members, and supplement initiatives of the FSB, IMF 
and the other SSBs in examining systemic risk pertaining to the markets.110 
 Principles in IOSCO’s O&P (particularly, principles 29-32 on prudential 
regulation and principles 35-38 on market transparency and conduct) along with issue-
specific standards, did not prevent the GFC, nor mitigate its impact. Firstly, there are 
many important gaps in international standards relating to the regulation of systemic 
risk.111 For example, IOSCO members failed to adopt a set of capital rules for securities 
firms as a result of conflicting preferences between the US and the UK, the two major 
financial powers.112 One could only speculate about the fate of Lehman and Bear Sterns 
had such international capital rules existed. Secondly, IOSCO’s standards glossed over 
difficult issues. An example is the ‘Principles For the Valuation of Hedge Fund 
Portfolios’,113 in which the issues of the valuation and accounting methods for ‘hard-to-
value’ assets were not adequately addressed, which had turned out to be a cause of the 
fire sale of subprime-related asset during the crisis.114  
 Moreover, principles 13-15 which require regulators to establish information 
sharing mechanisms and provide assistance to foreign counterparts are useful for 
addressing the difficulties in cross-border supervision identified in Chapter 2. The 
IOSCO’s MMoU puts into place a framework under which IOSCO members become 
signatories on the grounds of their compliance with the principles 13-15. 
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2.3 Assessing the two key aspects of IOSCO’s work 
As above mentioned, the preambles in the amended by-laws contain an updated 
statement of intentions of the IOSCO’s members. Accordingly, the members have now 
resolved to engage in the following collective actions. Firstly, members have resolved 
to implement and promote adherence to ‘internationally recognized and consistent 
standards’ on issues relating to securities regulation and supervision. Since the lack of 
proper implementation of internationally standards and adequate supervision were the 
key failures that contributed to the GFC, IOSCO members have shown their intention to 
implement the O&P and other standards the Organization promulgates, thus addressing 
the pre-crisis problems head on. However, as it will be shown below, there is no 
reference in the by-laws, or, in other published documents of IOSCO, as to what counts 
as internationally recognized standards, and, what new tools are required for promoting 
adherence to the standards. This causes problems for implementation. Standard-setting 
is the first aspect of IOSCO’s work discussed. 
 Secondly, IOSCO members have resolved to strengthen information exchange 
and cooperation not only in an enforcement situation, but also for the purpose of 
workday supervision of markets and market intermediaries. In the early days of the 
GFC, there was an absence of adequate information exchange and cooperation. These 
are the second aspect of IOSCO’s work considered below. 
 Thirdly, IOSCO members have resolved to share experiences and provide 
mutual assistance. These activities have become mixed with standard-setting and 
information exchange and will therefore be discussed in relation to the first two 
resolutions. 
2.3.1 IOSCO’s standards 
IOSCO’s standards are assessed by examining the issues of the process of stand-setting, 
types of standards and their implementation. 
a. Standard-setting process 
Neither the by-laws nor any other public document have set out a coherent account of 
the standard-setting process of the former TC and EMC. It is submitted that a fair and 
transparent process is important because the standards contained in TC’s reports, which 
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are prepared by various TC’s standing committees, have been indirectly accepted by 
IOSCO’s members even without a PC resolution, due to the umbrella function of the 
O&P.115 
 From extrapolating the TC reports and my interview with staff at IOSCO’s 
Secretariat, a pattern of the Organization’s stand-setting process emerges. First, the 
issue for which international standards need to be developed is identified, either through 
the networks of regulators in TC’s standing committees with market participants’ 
input,116 or, through the FSB, who has often requested work from IOSCO after the GFC. 
Second, after a mandate for work is given by the chair of the TC, a survey is often 
carried out to ascertain how the issue is being addressed under national regulations.117 
Third, where appropriate, standards are established on the basis of existing national 
regulations administered by the participating members in a particular standing 
committee.118 Fourth, consultation is procured from other IOSCO members, its SRO 
Committee and other market participants before a final report is issued.119  
 The composition of TC’s standing committees was made up of the TC members 
and IOSCO’s members whose markets are particularly associated with a particular 
issue.120 After amendment to the by-laws, seven policy committees, comprising forty-
four ordinary members from both developed and emerging markets, 121  have now 
replaced the former TC and EMC’s standard-setting committees. The area of work of 
the policy committees reflect the main work streams of IOSCO, which are Accounting 
and Disclosure, Secondary Markets, Markets Intermediaries, Enforcement and 
Exchange, Investment Management, Credit Rating Agencies, and Commodity Futures 
Markets. Although the policy committees now comprise of a wider range of members, 
the number of members in the committees is still less than half of the ordinary 
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membership and about half of the committee participants only take part in one of the 
seven committees. With the practice of establishing international standards of securities 
regulation on the basis of the regulations of the participating regulators in the policy 
committees, it is important that membership of the committees should be composed 
fairly and transparently. Since IOSCO has not provided a public explanation for the 
policy committees’ composition and the processes for reviewing their composition, the 
question about legitimacy of the standard-setting process still remains.  
b. Taxonomy 
There are a number of types of soft law.122 IOSCO’s standards may be classified in two 
ways. Firstly, they may be classified according to their degrees of specificity. Secondly, 
classification may be based on the actors to whom the standards are addressed.  
 In terms of the degree of specificity, IOSCO’s standards range from highly 
detailed requirements, to high-level principles and to broad recommendations. IOSCO’s 
‘International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and Initial Listing by 
Foreign Issuers’ (I.D.S.) is an example of detailed standard-setting.123 The purpose of 
the I.D.S. is to facilitate the acceptance by IOSCO’s members of disclosure documents 
which have been produced by foreign issuers in accordance with the I.D.S.. To this end, 
the I.D.S. set out a comprehensive list of items and issues to be disclosed by issuers of 
public offers and cross-border listings.124 IOSCO members endorsed the I.D.S. through a 
1998 Presidents Committee Resolution.125 In 2000, IOSCO’s TC carried out a survey on 
how far its seventeen members had implemented the I.D.S.. The results showed that the 
members were either already accepting documents prepared in accordance with the 
I.D.S. from foreign companies, or, they have taken steps, such as changed laws or 
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regulatory practices, to be in a position to do so.126 In the past decade, further steps have 
taken by IOSCO to complete the international disclosure framework and facilitate cross-
border capital raising. The most important milestone is the development of IFRSs, in 
which IOSCO is participating through IASB’s Monitoring Board.127  
 High-level principles and broad recommendations are generally adopted in areas 
outside of issuer disclosure. For example, during the crisis, IOSCO’s Task Force 
examined the new issue area of short-selling.128 The short-selling report contained four 
general principles, stating the need for appropriate controls, timely reporting and 
enforcement regimes on short-selling activities. The report lacked substance on the 
contents of disclosure and nature of regulatory intervention. 129 Moreover, it did not 
address thorny issues such as uncovered short positions. This is a reflection of limited 
experience of IOSCO members in the area of short-selling and absence of market 
demand for convergence.  
 Many of IOSCO’s reports contain either vague principles, which may not be 
capable of steering consistent regulatory reforms, or ‘recommendations’, the effect of 
which has not been clearly stated by members. As a result, such reports do not fulfil the 
definition of soft law discussed in Section 1.4, even though they are mentioned in 
references of the O&P. Without IOSCO clearly distinguishing which non-PC endorsed 
reports should be implemented by MS and which are merely for information-sharing 
purposes, it renders an assessment of implementation difficult.  
 The second means of categorizing IOSCO’s reports is by examining their 
intended effect. IOSCO’s standards are usually addressed to the Organization’s 
members, recommendations and codes of practice have also been issued for market 
participants. The ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies’ (CRA 
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code) is an example.130 The CRA code was based on a self-regulatory model. It provided 
a framework for assisting CRAs in developing their own code of conduct, and, for users 
of credit ratings to monitor how CRAs have incorporated the code. 
 The former CRA Task Force at IOSCO had conduct two surveys (in 2007 and 
2009) on the degree of implementation of the CRA code by CRAs. The results of both 
surveys showed implementation of the code had been carried out by large CRAs, while 
smaller CRA varied in the degrees of implementation.131 In the eruption of the GFC, it 
came to light that self-regulation did not result in conflicts of interest and transparency 
being adequately addressed. 132  As a result, national regulators began to establish a 
regulatory framework by CRAs on the basis of the CRA code.133 
c. The issue of implementation 
IOSCO had first highlighted the importance of proper implementation of international 
financial standards during the aftermath of corporate scandals which took place early 
this century. 134  In the wake of Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat collapses, IOSCO’s 
Parlamat report found that although many of the regulatory failings had already been 
addressed by existing standards, these had not been effectively implemented. 135 
Therefore even in the years before the GFC, IOSCO’s members were increasingly 
focusing on ways to facilitate implementation. In general, three approaches to 
facilitating implementation – some mentioned already - may be identified, namely, self-
assessment, survey of member jurisdictions and centralized implementation. 
 IOSCO had first developed its ‘Methodology for Assessing Implementation of 
the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ (Methodology) in 
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October 2003. 136  The Methodology provides a set of criteria, written guidance and 
questions for assessing the implementation of each principle. Assessment is to be 
carried out by IOSCO’s members themselves by answering the questions, which enable 
members to ascertain whether the desired elements of regulatory and supervisory 
framework have been put into place.137 The outcomes of the assessments are categorised 
as, ‘fully’, ‘broadly’, ‘partly’ or ‘not’-implemented. The Methodology is used in the 
ROSCs conducted by the IMF/WB. 
 IOSCO has conducted surveys to monitor the level of implementation of its 
standards. The surveys vary in scope. The frequently used approach has been to 
surveyed the members of the former TC to ensure that this core group of jurisdictions 
have met the standards they contributed to establishing. 138  Moreover, pan-IOSCO 
surveys have been carried out by the Secretariat pursuant to the General Secretary’s 
power to monitor compliance with the O&P.139 Following the Parmalat report, a pan-
IOSCO survey was also carried out in 2004 to identify the extent to which members’ 
auditor-oversight arrangements had encompassed the TC’s principles on auditors.140 The 
survey’s responses showed variation in the implementation of the principles on 
auditor. 141  However, there had been no follow-up actions to enhance the levels of 
implementation. 
 The corporate scandals were also the impetus for IOSCO’s members to join the 
MMoU. The provisions in the MMoU, to be discussed below, have essentially 
implemented the O&P principles 13-15 on cooperation. The arrangements for accession 
to the MMoU are as follows. First, in a PC resolution of the Presidents Committee, 
ISOCO’s members established the 1st January 2010 as the date by which all its 
members needed to either have been accepted as MMoU signatories or have shown a 
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commitment to seek the necessary legal authority for becoming signatories.142 Thus the 
members had subjected themselves to a strong moral obligation to uphold the MMoU. 
Second, the Executive Committee of ISOCO undertook to vet the applications of 
members to join the MMoU, in accordance with requirements therein.143 Due to the 
rigorous vetting process, becoming signatories of the MMoU is recognized by the FSB as 
strong evidence of the principles on cooperation being satisfied.144 Third, the Executive 
Committee was also given the role of monitoring members’ progress and to ‘name and 
shame’ non-applicants. 145  This arrangement embodies a centralized implementation 
process, which has resulted in almost all IOSCO’s members becoming the MMoU 
signatories.146 
 A number of structural weaknesses come to light from my investigation into 
IOSCO’s approaches to facilitate implementation. First, IOSCO does not have a 
systematic review process for assessing the implementation of its standards, as the 
above-discussed approaches have been deployed haphazardly.147 Second, a related issue 
is that IOSCO has no arrangements for promoting implementation, once this is found to 
be lacking. More fundamentally, IOSCO’s members’ view that the standards are only to 
assist members, without them needing to consider any specific changes to their 
regulatory and supervisory practices, could be regarded as a systemic weakness 
hindering implementation. 148  It is submitted that such view is out of step with the 
interconnected global financial system and the unique position of IOSCO as the 
securities markets standard-setter. Therefore, IOSCO’s members should take into 
account the externalities of their collective actions and any inertia to act.  
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2.3.2 Information exchange 
Sharing of information between national regulators constitutes the hub of international 
cooperation in the regulation of globalizing securities markets. Principle 14 of the O&P 
requires national regulators to establish information sharing mechanisms. Through the 
networks within IOSCO and bilateral arrangements between regulatory authorities, 
information is shared in various ways.149  
 In general, when entering into information sharing arrangements, regulators are 
confronted with two key issues.150 First, the ability of a national regulator to cooperate, 
and second, its willingness to do so. The ability of a regulator to cooperate may be 
limited by domestic laws, 151  and also by lack of resources. 152  A regulator may be 
unwilling to act because of differences in regulation on establishing liability, or of 
conflicts of interests involved in the provision of information. 
 IOSCO’s MMoU which concerns exchange of information for enforcement 
purposes has addressed these two issues. First, when applying to become a signatory, 
IOSCO members must show a vetting committee that they have the legal capacity to 
fulfil all the terms and conditions in the MMoU. Second, upon becoming a signatory, 
regulators undertake to provide information and confidentiality in a manner specified in 
the MMoU. The MMoU is non-legally binding and may be viewed as ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’.153 An incentive for IOSCO’s members to uphold their commitment under 
the MMoU is the stipulation that any regulator who fails to cooperate with reasonable 
 
149
 Bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) have been used as a basis to obtain information. The 
scope of MOUs may be limited to only cover law enforcement and may not cover general market 
oversight. There are, however, exceptions. The U.S. SEC and the U.K. FSA recently signed an MOU 
Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Related to the Supervision of 
Financial Services Firms and Market Oversight. See http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-36.htm. 
Additionally, the U.S. CFTC and U.K. FSA signed an MOU to address cross-border market 
surveillance concerns. Finally, the U.S. CFTC and CONSOB, and the CFTC and AMF, respectively, 
have entered into supplemental MOUs to facilitate the reciprocal sharing of specific fitness related 
information with regard to remote exchange members. Michael Mann and William Barry, 
‘Developments in the Internationalization of Securities Enforcement’ (2005) 39 Int'l Law. 667. 
150
 Blair & Walker, n. 58, para. 13.72 et seq. 
151
 Such as banking secrecy laws that inhibit access to confidential information concerning depositors or 
investors. 
152
 A regulator’s lack of resources may arise either from inadequate provision for record keeping and 
reporting by the regulator and firm, or lack of resources or adequate contact arrangements to 
communication the information within a useful time frame. 
153
 For a taxonomy of soft law, see Lastra, n 3 above, 461-463. Also see, Roberta Karmel and Claire Kelly, 
‘The hardening of soft law in securities regulation’, (2008) 34 Brook. J. Int'l L. 883, 910-916 
(discussing MoU as an example of soft law hardening). 
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request from a fellow signatory could result in it being de-listed as a signatory of the 
MMoU. 154  The effectiveness of the incentive is questionable. Firstly, there is no 
Organization-wide process for uncovering defections and resolving members’ 
disagreements on applying the MMoU.155 Moreover, the MMoU expressly permits any 
member to terminate its participation, 156  which evinces members’ preference for 
flexibility.  
 In relation to information exchange for supervisory (as opposed to enforcement) 
purposes, IOSCO’s approach has adopted a piecemeal approach. In its various reports, 
IOSCO has made recommendations on information sharing for specific issue areas. The 
recommendations related to information sharing may be broadly divided into two 
groups. The first group of recommendations concern the types of information which 
may need to be shared to carry out a regulatory function. For example, in the report 
‘Multi-jurisdictional Information Sharing for Market Oversight’, the former TC set out 
in different categories, the information to be shared for different ‘internationalised’ 
securities markets.157 Moreover, in a report jointly published by IOSCO and the BCBS, 
the types of information to be shared between regulators in order to facilitate monitoring 
of derivatives and trading activities were identified. 158  The second group of 
recommendations on information sharing contain principles for making information 
sharing arrangements. 159  Some common principles are: ensuring confidentiality, 
conducting consultation on the arrangements, and maintaining the rights of regulators to 
refuse to provide the information for public policy reasons.160 
 
154
 Section 16(b), MMoU. 
155
 Section 16(b), MMoU provides a bilateral consultation process.  
156
 Section 16(a), MMoU. 
157
 The three ways of internationalisation referred to in the report are as follows. 1) Investors (or their 
agents) can buy and sell foreign securities and derivatives using intermediaries in the country where 
the financial instruments have their primary listing and/or are predominantly traded. 2) Markets may 
offer direct (electronic) access to participants in other countries. 3) The same and/or closely related 
financial instruments are listed and/or traded in parallel in different countries. See ‘Multi-
jurisdictional Information Sharing for Market Oversight’ Report of the Technical Committee, April 
2007, p. 2. 
158
 ‘Framework for Supervisory Information about Derivatives and Trading Activities’, September 1998. 
159
 TC, ‘Guidance on Information Sharing’ 1998 (IOSCOPD86), ‘Principles for Memoranda of 
Understanding’ (September 1991) are examples. 
160
 The concept of public policy would include issues affecting sovereignty, national security, or other 
essential interests.  See para. 11(1) in ‘Cooperation Between Market Authorities’ 1996 (IOSCOPD49), 
first paper in ‘Guidance on Information Sharing’ 1998 (IOSCOPD86). 
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 During the GFC, it was found that ‘incomplete information during times of 
market stress can complicate the work of both regulators and markets’.161 Therefore, the 
need to enhance supervisory cooperation and information-sharing among the world’s 
securities market regulators was one of the lessons from the GFC. In the IOSCO’s 
supervisory report published in 2010, TC members analysed issues of supervisory 
cooperation going beyond information exchange. In Chapter 5, I will further discuss the 
tools of cooperation provided in the IOSCO supervisory report. The report however 
merely serves as guide for IOSCO members in developing cooperative supervisory 
arrangements, and does not require members to adopt any particular approach to 
supervision.162  
 It may be noted that in the spirit of fostering greater cooperation after the GFC, 
IOSCO has added two new features to its work.163 First, IOSCO is seeking to strengthen 
capacity building activities in the emerging markets. Second, the Organization is 
involved in greater level of inter-organizational cooperation with the FSB and Joint 
Forum. The second feature represents a pragmatic means of addressing cross-sectoral 
risks and is set to become a dominant aspect of the governance of transnational 
securities markets. 
2.4 Recommendations 
In relation to the above identified hindrance to implementing IOSCO’s standards and 
effective cross-border cooperation, a number of preliminary recommendations are 
proposed. 
1) Every report of the policy committee should contain details on who the intended 
addressees are, and, what intended effects the report findings are to have. Where 
a report requires to be taken into account by members, it should also provide 
details on how implementation of principles may be assessed (similar in format 
to the O&P Methodology). 
 
161
 IOSCO TC, ‘Principles Regarding Cross-Border Supervisory Cooperation’ (IOSCO supervisory 
report), May 2010, 3. (IOSCOPD322) 
162
 Ibid. 4. 
163
 Media Release IOSCO, ‘IOSCO Prepares for the Regulatory and Financial Challenges Ahead’, 
(16/05/2012). (IOSCO/MR08/2012) 
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2) To complement the ROSCs, a peer review framework should be established to 
provide information on implementation of IOSCO’s standards and promote 
further implementation. A peer review committee can also assist with 
interpretation of IOSCO’s standards. 
3) A central database should also be created for i) bilateral MoUs entered into by 
members; ii) members’ experience of exchanging information; iii) information 
on supervisory cooperation’s relating to globally-operating securities firms and 
markets. 
3 Summary of Findings 
From an examination of the existing international initiatives, information sharing and 
standard-setting are the approaches identified for facilitating cooperation in the 
globalizing securities markets. It was discussed in the context of IOSCO how these 
approaches could contribute to resolving the three global-level problems. However, the 
above discussions have revealed weaknesses in the implementation structure of the 
international standards promulgated by IOSCO. As a result, regulatory fragmentation is 
still prevalent causing hindrance to market integration, frustration of regulatory 
objectives and risks to financial stability. It is argued that as a body of global 
membership, IOSCO should take the lead to reform global-level securities regulation by 
enhancing the transparency of its standard-setting process and ensuring higher level of 
implementation.  
 The issues of macro-prudential supervision and implementation of international 
financial standards are now starting to be addressed by FSB and IMF through soft law 
processes. Effectiveness of these processes will be reflected by the extent of countries’ 
willingness to undertake the FSAP, participate in FSB’s peer reviews, and, take into 
account the Early Warnings for their policy making. It will be seen in the following 
Chapters that the issue of legitimacy is a crucial one for the success of soft law bodies 
such as IOSCO and FSB. 
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PART 3 
 
 
‘We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when 
we created them.’ 
 
Albert Einstein 
The Ultimate Quotable Einstein, collected and edited by Alice Calaprice, 
Princeton University Press, 2011. 
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Chapter 5:  Towards a Global Regulatory Framework for 
Transnational Securities Markets 
 
The thread that runs through these pages of discussions and debates is the concept of 
‘global-level regulatory problems’ theorized in Chapter 2 of the thesis. Finding a 
pathway towards establishing a framework, under which these global-level problems 
may be considered and eventually addressed, is the spirit and purpose of this research 
project. I have embarked on this quest by being fully aware that no framework could 
encompass every emerging issue, nor could the global-level problems be completely 
uprooted due to the perennial conundrum of transnational markets and states 
sovereignty. However, in this and the next chapter, I shall be presenting my findings to 
explain the route I have followed and destinations reached so far, and to outline our 
journeys ahead. 
 It was the genius who said that ‘We can't solve problems by using the same kind 
of thinking we used when we created them’. In my research, I was nevertheless 
prompted to remember that all problems have their individual origins, only by acquiring 
a thorough understanding of whence a problem arose could one ascertain whether a 
proposal could be an adequate solution.1 Therefore, I shall first summarise the three 
global-level regulatory problems which have arisen in the globalizing securities market.  
 The first problem concerns regulatory duplication and conflict of rules, resulting 
in legal uncertainties and increased transactional costs for cross-border securities 
transactions. This problem takes a market participants’ perspective, which contrasts 
with the second problem proceeding from the perspective of regulatory authorities. The 
second problem may be described as the risk posed by market globalization to the 
authorities in their attempts to achieve regulatory objectives. The third problem is the 
systemic risks pertaining to securities markets and services providers which cannot be 
contained within one jurisdiction or one market sector. The root of all three problems is 
 
1
 I very much thank Dr J H Yin for pointing this out to me.  
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regulatory fragmentation, which is caused by national regulatory and supervisory 
systems operating in transnational securities transactions. 
 The concept of Global Regulatory Framework (GRF) is the central thesis being 
advanced, based on the notion of governance, to address the global-level problems in 
securities markets. 
 Firstly, the Framework approach is adopted so as to provide the theoretical 
underpinning for the various arrangements, processes and principles adopted by global 
actors for addressing specific cross-border issues, which are different variations of the 
three global-level problems. Secondly, the term Global is chosen over international, 
because the notion of governance, as discussed below, envisages the potential 
participation by governments of states, substate actors, and non-state actors in the 
governance of securities markets. Thirdly, the Framework is Regulatory in nature as it 
addresses issues of regulation,2 as opposed to legal issues concerning private rights and 
duties.  
 In this Chapter, the two Pillars of the GRF are proposed. Pillar I comprises the 
‘governance structure’ for the transnational securities markets. Pillar II is constituted by 
the mechanisms of cross-border cooperation. 
 To establish the ‘governance structure’ under Pillar I, literature from political 
sciences has been used to analyse who the actors are in global governance of securities 
markets, what should be their respective roles and how should they be linked within the 
governance structure. It is found that state, substate and non-state actors together have 
formed a functional layer of global governance with at least three distinctive functions. 
They are, identifying and addressing externalities in the financial system, building a 
supervisory network, and standardization of rules and regulations. In order to foster 
better functioning of the global governance structure for solving the global-level 
problems, a number of recommendations are made. 
 In Pillar II of the GRF, the mechanisms of cross-border cooperation are 
identified, and their benefits and costs analyzed to assist decision-making by the global 
actors. 
 
2
 Regulation and regulatory are used here in their wide sense, according to Julia Black’s definition which 
has been discussed in Chapter 1, Section 3.2.1. 
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 As noted in the Introduction, the global-level regulatory problems may be found 
in all the financial market sectors. The GRF is therefore potentially adaptable to govern 
the global financial markets as a whole. However, the establishment of the GRF is 
addressed from the angle of the securities markets, with banking and insurance 
regulation mentioned only if there is some overlap or opportunity for a meaningful 
comparison.3 
 The chapter is set out as follows. Section 1 first explains to concept of 
governance and why it is relevant to the global-level problems. Section 2 establishes the 
governance structure of the GRF. Section 3 investigates the various mechanisms 
available to global actors in their cooperation. 
1 Governance in Transnational Securities Markets 
To lay the foundations for discussions on the Global Regulatory Framework, this 
Section examines the concept of ‘governance’ in securities markets. Three issues are 
discussed. First, what the term ‘governance’ denotes. Second, how ‘governance’ relates 
to the trilemma in the global-level problems explained in Chapter 2. Third, what the 
constituent elements of global governance are. 
 Governance may be explained by contrasting it with the term ‘regulation’, which 
has already been examined in Chapter 1.4 It will be recalled that in the wider social 
sciences context, regulation refers to the sustained and focused attempt to alter the 
behaviour of others in order to address a collective issue or attain an identified end(s).5 
Regulation may be viewed as a micro behavioural concept, with the conducts of 
individual persons and firms as the target of a regulatory authority. The components of 
regulation are rules or norms relating to behaviour, and, structures and processes 
through which rules and norms are made and enforced. Moreover, regulation is always 
established according to the rules of a particular legal system.6 
 Governance is described by Hale and Held as ‘the processes and institutions, 
formal and informal, whereby rules are created, compliance is elicited and goods are 
 
3
 For example Section 3.3.5 makes reference to the Basle Concordat. 
4
 Regulation was discussed in Chapter 1 from a number of perspectives – social sciences, financial law. 
5
 Julia Black 'Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes' 
(2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 137, 139. 
6
 Even self-regulation by market participant can be placed within a national legal framework. 
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provided in pursuit of collective goals’.7 Alternatively, governance has been defined by 
Rosenau to consist of ‘steering mechanisms through which authority is exercised to 
preserve the coherence of the governed and enable it to move towards desired goals’.8 
When speaking in governance terms, one’s vision is no longer resting on an individual’s 
behaviour but on processes and institutions designed for achieving broad public interest 
goals. These processes and institutions at times do not fit easily with constitutional law 
conceptions, because they have been developed outside national constitutions, or, at the 
transnational level, outside the treaty system. Therefore, informality is another feature of 
governance. The term of governance has acquired the connotation that both state and 
non-state actors become part of the steering process.9 
 Moreover, the term ‘global governance’ has been said to ‘emphasize the multi-
level character of governance activities: it tends to overcome the division between 
international, supranational and national phenomena’.10 To this list I will also add the 
phenomenon of transnational markets. 
 In sum, governance contrasts with regulation in that instead of focusing on 
changing individuals’ behaviour, it envisages the establishment of processes and 
institutions – formal and informal – of which both the state and private persons and 
entities become a part. The fundamental question is how the governance concept may be 
used to address the global-level regulatory problems? 
 In Chapter 2, the global-level problems are explained in terms of a trilemma.11 It 
was explained that the three goals of continuing national sovereignty, supervision of 
financial markets and the benefits of global capital markets cannot all be attained 
simultaneously. The notion of governance is developed to provide the necessary trade-
 
7
 Thomas Hale and David Held ed. Handbook of Transactional Governance (Polity press) 2011, 12. 
8
 James Rosenau, ‘Strong Demand, Huge Supply: Governance in an Emerging Epoch’ in Bache and 
Flinders (ed.), n 105 below, 31. 
9
 Black, n 5 above, 141. Following Black at p. 139, the terms ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ are used in this thesis 
to distinguish, in broad terms, those regulators which have a legal mandate, such administrative bodies 
in international organizations founded by treaty and those which do not. 
10
 Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann and Matthias Goldmann, 'Developing the Publicness of Public 
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities', (2008) 9 German 
Law Journal 1375, 1378. (It was noted that the origins of the term global governance can be traced 
back to James Rosenau, ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics’, in James Rosenauand 
Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.) Governance without governments (Cambridge: CUP) 1992. 
11
  Chapter 2, Section 1.4. 
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offs between them.12 The sovereignty of states is not impinged in formal terms because 
legally binding decisions are not made by global actors. Instead, the actors engage in 
cooperation to create the conditions for regulatory barriers removal and convergence of 
national regulatory rules, thereby laying the foundation for resolving the three global-
level problems. Thus legal certainty is exchanged for pragmatism under an informal 
governance framework. Global governance could therefore go farther than national 
regulations.  
 In designing the GRF, the objective should be to achieve adaptable institutions 
and processes, which can result in predictability, legitimacy and accountability of the 
global-level cooperation, so that sovereignty and the goal of market stability can both be 
safely guarded. 
 There are at least five components in the GRF: structure, actors, co-operative 
mechanisms, rule of law and governance principles. The first three components are the 
subject matter of this Chapter, and they relate to the issues of function and form. In 
Chapter 6, the issues of legitimacy and implementation are examined by considering 
role for the rule of law and governance principles in the globalizing securities markets. 
2 Pillar I: Governance Structure in the Globalizing 
Securities Markets 
Pillar I of the GRF comprises the actors and structure of securities markets governance. 
The following questions are addressed in turn for establishing a global governance 
structure in securities markets. 
 Who are the potential actors in global governance? 
 What collective action roles should global actors partake? 
 How should the actors be interlinked to form a governance structure? 
It should be noted that the first question is prescriptive in nature, while the latter two are 
normative. 
 
12
 Louis Henkin, ‘That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera’, (1999) 
68 Fordham L. Rev. 1. (arguing that the ‘S word’ now obstructs more than it accomplishes). Cf. Guy 
Peters and Jon Pierre, ‘Multi-level Governance and Democracy: A Faustian Bargain’, in Bache and 
Flinders (ed.), n 73 below. (Warning of the dangers of flexibility in global governance.) 
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 I have already discussed in Chapter 4 many of the global actors whose initiatives 
contribute to resolving the three global-level problems. In particular, I have examined 
the formation and work of the IMF, FSB and IOSCO (with reference made to the other 
SSBs). Another two potential groups of actors in global governance of securities 
markets are national regulatory authorities and transnational market participants. 
 In Chapter 3, I have discussed how national regulatory authorities have been 
providing some solutions to the global-level problems on themselves, outside of 
international bodies, e.g. by entering into bilateral MoUs or mutual recognition 
agreements.  
 In the global arena, where there is an absence of unified legitimate authority for 
financial markets regulation, market participants through applying their own standards 
are said to be responsible for the generally orderliness and regularity in cross-border 
transactions.13 So far in my thesis, I have not discussed the role of securities market 
participants in regulating the globalizing markets, this issue will be address in detail in a 
separate section under this Pillar.14 
 I will now proceed to examine the second and third questions raised above for 
Pillar I. 
2.1 Global governance theories 
National governments and, increasingly importantly, non-state actors have invented 
collective processes and institutions in their attempts to address a growing list of global-
level issues – ranging from national security to humanitarian aid, environment to trade, 
and indeed financial stability to economic growth. Global governance theories have 
been developed to explain how processes and institutions of global governance operate, 
 
13
 According to Rouch, ‘A market is essentially a forum in which multiple participants set commercial 
standards...The bed-rock of shared understandings on which those transactional relationships rest 
depends only partly on standards set by the public sector’; in ‘Self-regulation is dead: long live self-
regulation’ (2010) L.F.M.R. 102. The debate on the extent to which the markets should regulate 
themselves, the ‘public–private’ debate, is an ongoing one in national law. I will not be addressing the 
debate directly in my thesis, and shall premise my discussions on international cooperation on a 
generally accepted view that the private sector should always have some role in regulation so as to 
engender commercially feasible outcomes. For an excellent literature review on public–private 
governance, see Iris Chiu, ‘Enhancing responsibility in financial regulation – critically examining the 
future of public–private governance: part 1’ (2010) L.F.M.R. 107. 
14
 See Section 2.4 below. 
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and, also how governance should become. 15  Without an international legal system, 
global governance theories are being utilized in order to establish the function and form 
of global governance in securities markets.  
 The four main theories of global governance are ‘neorealism’, ‘neoliberal 
institutionalism’, ‘transgovernmentalism’ and decentred governance. 16  The theory of 
decentred governance is part of the debate surrounding the role of transnational market 
participants and will be separately considered below. The contents and critical analysis 
of the other three theories form the topic of under this part. It will be argued that there is 
no one theory which fully explains the dynamics of the actors in securities market 
governance, the pendulum has indeed been swinging to and fro: from neorealism to 
transgovernmentalism, and back again. 
2.1.1 Neorealism 
Realists embrace the view of the Westphalian model of sovereignty.17 Under this model, 
the state is both ‘the sole arbiter of legitimate behaviour’ within its physical territories,18 
as well as the only subjects of international law and capable of entering into agreements 
with other countries and exercising any influence and power in the international arena.19 
Realists contend that since each state is pursuing its own survival, this imperative will 
always override any other conflicting considerations, resulting in little possibility of 
enduring cooperation by states.20 The realists’ argument that global governance is nearly 
 
15
 See generally, Thomas Hale and David Held ed. Handbook of Transactional Governance (Polity press) 
2011. Also Anne-Marie Slaughter1 and David Zaring, ‘Networking goes international: an update’ 
(2006) 2 Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 211, 212-215. 
16
 For an overview discussion, see Hale and Held, n 7 above, 5-10. There is no room to discuss 
neofunctionalism developed by Ernst Haas in relation to European integration. Uniting Europe 1950-
1957(1958). The theory was first expounded in David Mitrany's Work Peace System 1943 in relation 
to the new agencies born out of America's New Deal. For an excellent summary of the 
neofunctionalism theory see David Zaring, ‘International Law by Other Means: The Twilight 
Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations’ (1998) 33 Tex. Int'l L. J. 281, 312. 
17
 Hale and Held, n 7 above, 5. The Westphalian system, established under the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia 
which brought an end to the bloody religious wars of sixteenth-century Europe, marked a new phase 
in the consolidation of State powers. 
18
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order’ (2004) 40 Stan. J. Int'l L. 
283, 284. 
19
 David Bederman, ‘Diversity and permeability in international governance’ (2007) 57 Emory L.J. 201, 
203. 
20
 Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, (1994) 19 INT'L SECURITY, Winter, 
at 5, 7; John J. Mearsheimer, A Realist Reply, 20 INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1995, at 82. 
(Defending the realists’ view that institutions do not have significant independent effects on state 
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always futile is based on the Westphalian view of states being ‘unitary’ actors ‘with 
coherent national interests’.21 In addition, I will also point out a further basis of the 
Realists’ contention, namely, an assumption of divergent interests among states out of 
which conflicts arise. 
 Prima facie, the realists’ view of global governance is supported by empirical 
evidence.22 From my own research into cooperation in securities regulation, a number of 
examples are also found. For example, in its 2005 Parmalat Report, IOSCO cast a doubt 
on the level of implementation of its standards.23 The report said that’ it is not now 
known whether implementation of these principles and standards is universal among 
securities regulators…a lack of implementation may lead to potential regulatory 
“gaps”’. 24 Although the report did not explain the reasons for the possible lack of 
implementation, the common explanations are lack of resources, expertise or the 
willingness to carry out the agreed reforms. Given the financial scandals took place in 
the most developed financial market, expertise was not the key issue. It was therefore 
more likely that lack of implementation was due to competing international and national 
agenda. Indeed, the problem of conflict between national agenda and international 
initiatives on cooperation was expressed acknowledged by the EU Commission in its 
2007 review of the Lamfalussy process. It was said that ‘[i]f supervisors’ obligations 
under their national law conflict with non-binding measures pursuant to Level 3, 
supervisors will let national obligations prevail’.25 
 If the contention of the Realists were proved absolutely unassailable, it would 
lead to an inference that any hope of a positive outcome from the current cooperation to 
address systemic risks in the financial markets would be in vain. Opponents of 
neorealism have been using the variety of institutional innovations since the Second 
 
behaviour.) See also, Valerio Novembre, ‘The bargaining process as a variable to explain 
implementation choices of international soft-law agreements: The Basel case study’ (2009)10 Journal 
of Banking Regulation 128. (Supporting the realists contention with empirical evidence, with however 
one exception – the presence of ‘hegemony’.) 
21
 Hale and Held, n 7 above, 7. 
22
 Novembre, n 20 above. 
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 See Chapter 4, Section2.3.1c.  
24
 Parmalat report, Executive summary. 
25
 EU Commission, ‘Review of the Lamfalussy process Strengthening supervisory convergence’ 
COM(2007) 727 final, para. 4.2.1. (The Commission’s comment was made in relation to 
implementation of ECSR’s Level 3 recommendations and guidance for fostering consistent 
interpretation and application of the FSAP directives. 
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World War to reveal anomalies in the theory. In particular, transgovernmentalists have 
attacked the unitary actor assumption of the realist claims, while proponents of 
neoliberal institutionalism have been trying to show how international institutions could 
facilitate cooperation, even with the central assumptions of neorealism maintained. 
Discussions on these alternative theories are shortly to follow. Before proceeding, I will 
first shed some light on weakness of the second assumption used by the realists. 
 It has been mentioned that in addition to the unitary actor assumption, the 
realists contention that international cooperation is unlikely to succeed due to states 
acting in self-interests requires the presence of divergent interests among states. 
However, in a globalizing world, resulting in interdependence among states, one may 
argue that communal interests have at times replaced divergence of interest and become 
a separate cause of action for international cooperation. It is submitted that one example 
of international cooperation based on communal interest is IOSCO’s MMoU. 
 A community interest is present when a benefit of international cooperation 
could only be attained through individual states act in aggregate and when a non-
cooperating act would lead to penalties due to the risk of loss of such benefit for all. In 
the case of IOSCO’s MMoU, ensuring better cross-border cooperation for regulatory 
enforcement is a communal interest sought by IOSCO’s members.26 When one country 
does not sign up to the MMoU thereby affording fraudsters the opportunity to hide 
behind its territorial borders, this will produce spill-over effect into other jurisdictions, 
although the exact impact of the spill-over will depend on the exact nature of the 
transactions. In its attempt to avoid holes in the global supervisory network, the PC’s 
2005 resolution required all members to become MMoU signatories with a watch-list of 
non-participating members published on the IOSCO website.27 
 It may be argued that the signing and termination of the MMoU are actions of 
self-interest, as regulators enjoy reciprocal undertakings from other regulators to 
provide assistance. However, it is submitted that some features of IOSCO’s MMoU 
may only be explained in terms of the presence of a communal interest. First, under the 
MMoU, a regulatory authority may not cherry-pick with whom it cooperates. If it were 
 
26
The MMoU is the key tool in cross-border enforcement according to IOSCO, ‘Strengthening capital 
market against financial fraud’, Executive summary, February 2005. (IOSCOPD192).  
27
 See Chapter 4, Section 2.3.1c. 
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left to the members themselves, they probably would not have chosen to enter into 
arrangements with all the other IOSCO members, or at least not on the exact same terms 
vis-à-vis every member. Moreover, signing the MMoU and undergoing a centralized 
vetting procedure are the prerequisites to become an IOSCO member. Since a 
prospective member may want to join IOSCO for reasons other than the benefits of the 
MMoU, making the MMoU a condition of membership demonstrates that ensuring 
better cross-border cooperation is not merely to achieve individual state’s benefit, but is, 
crucially, a communal interest. 
 The above analysis shows that when states have developed interdependence 
from the interconnectedness of their markets, individual and collective survival may 
become inseparable. As a result, communal interests may be found to replace self-
interest in some areas. Therefore, in recent years, governments who are the traditional 
actors in global governance have cooperated more closely and intensively than before. 
The G-20 is one example, another being the Eurozone members’ efforts to bailout 
Greece. Hegemony cannot explain either of these cases. They are like IOSCO’s MMoU 
demonstrative of the notion of communal interests. 
 It is submitted that if interdependence and communal interests were properly 
understood and appreciated by policy makers, it could provide an opportunity for 
successful outcomes in international cooperation. 
2.1.2 Neoliberal institutionalism 
The second theory of global governance above mentioned is neoliberal institutionalism. 
In the post-war period, the landscape of international relations was dominated by 
international organizations constituted by legally binding treaties.28 This form of global 
governance was observed to have continued to thrive despite the perceived decline of 
the hegemony of the US after the 1980s.29 Neoliberal institutionalism, also known as 
regime theory,30 developed during the last two decades of the twentieth century seeks to 
explain the raison d'être of international organizations in terms of their efficacy as 
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mechanism of cooperation. The neoliberal institutionalism is both a challenge to realists’ 
position that international cooperation is a doomed venture, and also a modification, 
resulting in fortifying the state-centred assumption which underlies realists’ 
contention.31 
 Neoliberal institutionalism conceives international cooperation to be in the form 
of regimes, which are defined as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations’. 32  Other than treaty organizations, bilateral treaties, 
conventions and informal reciprocal arrangements are instances of regimes. The most 
significant in international finance is the IMF whose adaptability to global events was 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
 Robert Keohane in After Hegemony33 explains the attractiveness of regimes in 
terms of the benefit of reducing the transactional costs for the states participating in 
mutually beneficial cooperation.34 Arrangements in international organizations, such as 
conditions for orderly multilateral negotiations and mechanisms for the enforcement of 
agreements, are example of how costs and uncertainties of international cooperation are 
reduced.35 
 The most important regime theorists have upheld the central role of state in 
global governance. 36  Keohane defines regimes as ‘institutions with explicit rules, 
negotiated by states.37 Ruggie’s definitions refer to ‘a set of mutual expectations, rules, 
and regulations…which have been accepted by a group of states’.38 Moreover, Shell is 
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of the view that "[r]egime theory assumes that states are the primary actors in the 
international system and that states are motivated to achieve a set of...self-interested 
goals’.39 In other words, international cooperation is to be understood as the actions of 
those who are controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief 
executives of national governments.40 
 Neo-liberal institutionalism may therefore be criticized for reinforcing the 
realists’ assumption of international cooperation being dominated by self-centred states, 
as this overlooks the influence of other actors. The shortcomings of the realists’ 
monolithic vision of international relations are addressed by transgovernmentalism. 
2.1.3 Transgovernmentalism 
A little more than a decade ago, it was opined that ‘[m]ost political scientists are also 
likely to ignore IFROs [an acronym for ‘international financial regulatory organizations’] 
as significant players on the international scene.’41 However, transgovernmentalism has 
become a prevalent form of global governance, with ‘networks like the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision…or the International Association of Insurance 
Supervision, develop technical standards that profoundly shape the global economy’.42 
a. Transgovernmentalism defined 
One of earliest attempts to identify and describe the phenomenon of transgovernmental 
governance was made by Keohane and Nye. They expounded transgovernmentalism to 
be international cooperation based on ‘sets of direct interactions among sub-units of 
different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the 
cabinets or chief executives of those governments’43 (emphasis added). This definition 
in fact attacks the realists’ assumptions of state-centred global governance and unitary 
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model of sovereignty. According to Keohane and Nye, as well as state governments, 
‘sub-units’ that are not under strict governmental control could also engage in 
international cooperation.44 
 Keohane and Nye’s definition has served to inform the recently re-emerged 
scholarship on ‘transgovernmental networks’. Raustiala uses the term 
‘transgovernmental networks’ (TRNs) to explain global governance:  
‘“transgovernmental” because they involve specialized domestic officials directly 
interacting with each other, often with minimal supervision by foreign ministries… 
"networks" because this cooperation is based on loosely-structured, peer-to-peer ties 
developed through frequent interaction rather than formal negotiation’.45 
 TRNs have two main features. First, actors in the networks are technocrats 
belonging to government agencies who may have different policy goals from diplomats 
in traditional international negotiations.46 Second, the networks’ cooperative structures 
are not based on formal treaty, and networks operate primarily by consensus, rather than 
through a voting system. The international standard-setters in financial regulation, 
BCBS, IOSCO and IAIS fall within this description. Moreover, bilateral cooperation 
between regulatory agencies could also be included. 
 It is interesting to note the proponents of transgovernmentalism do not advocate 
a weakening of sovereignty instead they view transgovernmentalism as ‘disaggregating 
the state into its functional components’ making it more pliable to engage in the 
increasingly interdependent and complex global affairs.47 TRNs may be considered as a 
means for tackling the trilemma explained in Chapter 2, as they could potentially 
resolve the tug-of-wall between sovereignty and global market regulation. 
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b. Benefits of transgovernmental networks 
 International cooperation via TRNs has been said to offer numerous benefits. 
Unlike international organizations which have often been bogged down by politics and 
procedural rules, TRNs general enjoy deference from politicians due to the mostly 
technical issues networks address.48 Thus from an operational perspective, networks are 
flexible and adaptable rendering them capable of fostering experimentation and 
innovation. From a functional perspective, networks, it has been argued, are valuable in 
the following ways. 49  Through information exchange mechanisms and technical 
working committees, networks have come to function as ‘distillers and disseminators of 
credible information’.50 As a result, the codes of best practices produced by network are 
internationally recognised,51 and, according to analysis of some academics, the codes 
have attained ‘soft law’ status.52 Another beneficial function of networks is the capacity 
building for regulators from developing countries ‘where the spirit is willing but the 
infrastructure is weak’.53 
 A more controversial advantage of TRNs identified in Raustiala’s research is the 
exporting of US securities laws by the SEC through IOSCO.54 Raustiala contends that 
the means by which SEC achieves its aims is not through coercion, but by utilising its 
soft powers of attraction. In particular SEC’s successful regulatory workshops for 
foreign regulators are both a statement and reinforcement of US laws’ attraction.55 From 
‘weaker’ states’ perspective, the importing of standards made by IOSCO can be thought 
of as an appropriate ‘price of admission to the fullest range of benefits provided by the 
network’. Particularly, if there are no existing national laws, off-the-shelf regulation is 
in fact cost-saving. Moreover, from a global regulatory perspective, when a national 
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regulator is committed to investor protection and financial stability, the soft power 
would in principle lead to permeation of better regulatory rules and result in greater 
chances of stability being established.56 It is my contention that SEC is not always 
exporting, consider for example the recent recognition of IFRSs, and amendments to 
converge with the EU CRA Regulation.57 Thus what was once a one-way street is 
presently under reconstruction in the evolving, interdependent regulatory landscape. 
 Indeed, one prominent transgovernmental scholar has claimed that TRNs have 
the capable to create ‘a genuinely new world order in which networked institutions 
perform the functions of a world government – legislation, administration, and 
adjudication – without the form’.58 As shown by my discussions in Chapter 4, in the 
case of IOSCO at least, there are some fundamental structural weaknesses which will 
hinder developments in the direction suggested by Slaughter. The GFC may be seen as a 
set-back for transgovernmentalism. Zaring, one the earliest writers on 
transgovernmental networks, has admitted that ‘[t]he failure of Basel, IOSCO, and their 
ilk to do anything to respond to the crisis…is sobering’.59 It was found the containment 
of the GFC was not contributable to either the international standard setters, or the IMF, 
or the WTO, but had been the endeavours of the G20, a political organization and 
antithesis of technocratic governance, which was leading the crisis talks and setting the 
reform agenda. 
c. Realist critique of transgovernmental governance and a rejoinder 
Verdier has a highlighted some fundamental limitations pertaining to networks which he 
argues threaten their capability of fulfilling their objectives of investor protection and 
reducing systemic risk.60 The first limitation according to Verdier is that TRNs were 
constantly subject to political and legal restraints at home and as a result they have the 
tendency to favour national interests. Evidence from negotiations of the Basle Accords 
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has shown direct political interference.61 The second limitation relates to the presence of 
distributive problems. As networks formed and operating on informal basis, there is a 
general lack of institutional capacity to resolve conflict between members’ preferences. 
Three results would arise: non-cooperation (such as the failed IOSCO attempt to 
achieve harmonization of capital adequacy requirement for investment firms); diluting 
of international standards; and/or where weaker states are involved, coercing them into 
acceptance. In all these cases, financial stability would likely to suffer as a result. The 
third limitation is the enforcement problem. Informal networks do not provide adequate 
monitoring, dispute resolution or enforcement mechanisms, thus the likelihood of defect 
is arguably high. Verdier used Basle I Accord as a case in point. Due to domestic 
economic problems in the 1990s, Japanese regulators opted for accommodating their 
own banks, rather than adhering to the Accord.62 In sum, Verdier’s findings essentially 
reflected, in relation to networks, the realists’ doubts about the effectiveness of 
international cooperation. 
 While the results revealed by Verdier’s case studies are the general state of 
affairs, a number of further points need highlighting which may explain why securities 
regulatory authorities continuously use IOSCO as the forum for cooperation and what 
are the hopes of it making positive contributions to securities regulation.  
 Unlike the detailed Basle Accords, the IOSCO members often adopt high-level 
principles. Although it could be said that the principle-based approach is adopted to 
‘paper over’ the distributive problems, the approach is valuable in a number of 
respects. 63  Adopting principles is a valuable first step towards resolving complex 
questions solutions to which are elusive, due to differences and changes in market 
conditions. Where rule-based standardization becomes undesirable for complex issues 
(such as systemic risk) and time consuming to establish, principles provide for an 
alternative means of cooperation.  
 The enforcement problem raised by Verdier is the fundamental issues with 
international standard-setting. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, there is renewed 
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initiative in the re-established Financial Stability Board to oversee the implementation 
of key international financial standards.64A range of tools have been developed to ensure 
implementation. Moreover, IOSCO’s recent structural reforms are intended to generate 
greater interaction between emerging and developed markets regulators.65 The balance 
of power within IOSCO is changing rapidly from hegemony to shared influence with 
the EU, and now to greater representation by regulators from markets such as China, 
Brazil and India (to name just a few), where there is high demand for development and 
growth.66 Fairer representation of the IOSCO members in standard-setting is crucial for 
the ownership of standards and likelihood of their implementation. Furthermore, it is 
submitted that, with the view to continuously establish their markets’ and their own 
reputation, regulators from the emerging countries have the incentive to implement 
IOSCO’s Principles and Objectives in a manner reflective of the spirit of the principles. 
Where regulators in a number of important international markets implement the 
Principles, a firm step is taken towards financial stability.  
2.1.4 Summary 
The upshot of the above analysis is that a ‘theory of everything’ is seldom available; 
each theory shines a different refraction of light upon the facts, yet clearly does not 
explain the whole picture of global governance in securities markets. What has emerged 
from the discussions is that each of the three global governance theories provides 
justifications for why the actors who have been discussed so far, (the discussion of 
transnational market participants is yet to come,) should have a role in global 
governance. The G-20’s role is justified because state governments are the traditional 
players in international cooperation, and also the crucial steering function it had 
provided during the GFC. The IMF’s governance role is justified through efficiency 
theory of international organizations. Moreover, due to the many advantages IOSCO 
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brings as explained by transgovernmentalists, it should also be considers as part of 
global governance. 
 Thus global governance in securities market does not take one particular form, 
and, is in fact the sum of the relevant actions of states (through the G-20), TRNs 
(IOSCO & IASB), treaty institution (IMF) and the FSB. The FSB being an amalgam of 
all the other actors is a new form of global governance which joins up the technocrats 
with the bureaucrats and does not fall within the ambit of any of the above theories. 
 It has already been discussed that the mandate of FSB is to act as coordinator 
between the international standard setters and to ensure systemic stability in the 
financial markets. Very significantly, FSB works to complement the role of the other 
global actors, either where there are limitations in the actors’ mandates or gaps in their 
activities. The normative question of why FSB should have these roles is now 
considered.  
 On the one hand, FSB could be considered an executive arm of the G-20. From 
the perspective of neorealism, FSB is an agent of sovereign states. As a result of the 
political commitments by member jurisdictions in the FSB’s charter, FSB could 
undertake initiatives to compel compliance in international financial standards, which 
could not easily be done by IOSCO. It appears that with the political support it has, FSB 
can even use incentives against non-members jurisdiction to engender their compliance 
with international standards.67 Moreover, findings of macroeconomic risks by the FSB 
in collaboration with the IMF will now be translated into policy reports to the G-20.68 
This is a clarification of the situation prior to the crisis when the IMF had no way to 
ensure that its risk assessments were heeded by policymakers. On the other hand 
however, transgovernmentalism could also be invoked to explain normatively the 
intended global impact of FSB’s work. FSB’s flexible structure and operations are very 
similar to transgovernmental networks. With its membership comprising politicians, 
regulatory authorities and staff from international institutions, FSB is well placed to 
produce the benefits of information exchange and implementation as envisaged by 
transgovernmentalists.  
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2.2 A multi-level governance approach 
With plurality of actors present, the next step is to discuss how they are organized 
within the global-level governance structure.  
 I have used ‘multilevel governance’ (MLG) literature to assist with this part of 
my analysis.69 The rationale for this approach could be explained by this quote from 
Peters and Armigeon: ‘Multilevel governance is not a theory; rather, it is a label for the 
joint and interconnected governance of subnational, national, regional, and global 
political actors’, and, in addition, the authors noted ‘explaining interaction effects of the 
various layers is one of the most important research fields’.70 MLG is therefore used as a 
conceptual devise for exploring how the global actors, e.g. IOSCO, FSB and IMF, 
should be interlinked and how they should relate to national regulatory authorities and 
transnational market participants. To this end, the tenets of MLG are first explained and 
then activities of the actors are examined against the MLG concept. 
2.2.1 The development of multi-level governance 
The scholarship on MLG is part of a constellation of literature revolving the 
phenomenon of dispersion of centralized state authority both within and without 
territorial boundaries. 71  The unifying theme in the literature is the basic tenet that 
dispersion of decision-making authority yields greater benefit than a centralized model 
and the common question of how non-unitary governance is to be organized.  
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 MLG emerged in the early 1990s, sprouting from the seminal article by Gary 
Marks 72  which advanced a new approach for analysing the European integration 
process. MLG brought to light the role of non-state actors in decision-making along 
with state and substate actors in European integration, in particular, MLG highlights the 
interconnections between different levels of governance in which the actors reside.73 
Marks was joined by Hooghe, together they developed the general conceptual 
framework for MLG.74 
 In the global arena, scholars have also found a need to analyse how state and 
non-state actors pool resources in order to solve shared-interest problems. Marks and 
Hooghe’s conceptual framework of MLG has been instructive in the global economic 
governance discourse. 75  My own research has also shown the need to address the 
organization and interaction numerous actors surrounding common problems in the 
absence of centralized authority. 
2.2.2 Definitions of multi-level governance 
What appears a versatile concept, MLG suffers from the need for a clear definition.76 In 
their paper, Hooghe and Marks did not seek to define MLG, they identified and 
distinguishes between two types of MLG structures. Type I MLG describes a ‘general-
purpose governance arrangement’ with a limited number of non-overlapping 
jurisdictional levels (or decision-making spheres) functioning within a stable ‘system 
wide architecture’. In contrast, Type II MLG describes a structurally flexible 
governance arrangement under which decision-making is assigned to ‘task-specific’ 
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jurisdictions comprising actors from many levels. Thus the concept of hierarchy breaks 
down in Type II MLG. 77 Whereas Type I MLG coincides with national federalism 
systems,78 global governance as shown below is more reflective of Type II MLG.  
 A definition of MLG was suggested by Zürn et al. They defined MLG as: 
‘a set of general-purpose or functional jurisdictions that enjoy some degree of 
autonomy with a common governance arrangement and whose actors claim to engage 
in an enduring interaction in pursuit of a common good.’79 
This definition explains both the ‘governance’ and ‘multi-level’ aspects of MLG.  
 The term ‘governance’ entails collective course of action taken with a view to 
address public problems. Zürn further explains that regulation – conceived as the norms, 
rules and policies adopted to address public problems – ‘points to the core…of 
governance’. 80  Thus governance in MLG denotes the sum of all regulation, the 
processes by which norms etc. are monitored and enforced, as well as the structures in 
which the regulation and processes are found.81 
 In order to establish governance as ‘multi-level’, there must be a finding of the 
existence of two or more levels each carries out governance functions autonomously.82 
Autonomy may be considered in both positive and negative terms. Positively, a level in 
MLG must be legitimate and capable of governing in one or more policy areas. 
Negatively, autonomy requires that a legitimate decision at one level must not to be 
reversible by other levels (or at least without incurring dire political and social 
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consequences).83 When applied to collective actions at a global-level, i.e. one which is 
distinct from governance at the national level, the notion of autonomy entails a 
capability to compel compliance from state or non-state constituents by the global-level 
collective, and, no one state with a right to veto decision of the collective, or at least 
most states do not.84 Zürn further adds that there needs to be a delegation of power from 
the state, and consequently consensus organizations in which the state has discretion in 
whether or not to comply with a collective decision by members of the organization are 
excluded from the concept of an autonomous level.85 Moreover, according to Zürn, the 
global-level needs to be part of a system, i.e. there must be interplay between the global 
and regional, national or local levels showing that they are linked and not functioning in 
isolation.86 
2.2.3 Is there multi-level governance in regulation of securities markets? 
If one goes on to apply Zürn et al.’s definition to actors identified under Section 2.1, 
one will see that IOSCO, FSB, G-20 and IMF only tenuously satisfy the requirements of 
MLG discussed above. However it is argued that it is not meaningful to speak of global 
governance in financial markets, in particular in the securities sector, as actions and 
processes of any one actor individually.87 Indeed, it is submitted that global governance 
in the financial markets is the sum of the relevant actions of all the global actors, which 
when viewed together appear to constitute the distinctive role of global-level standard-
setting in financial regulation. Standard-setting is the core of global governance in the 
financial markets, which also comprises the activities of market monitoring, 
implementation, enforcement and revision of existing standards. Compared with 
national regulation, global-level standard-setting is not territorially bound. 
 I will now discuss the results of applying Zürn et al.’s definition to each of the 
actors in global-level securities markets governance.  
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a. G-20 
The G-20 has played an important steering role during the GFC. This grouping however 
does not satisfy the definition of MLG. The MLG definition provided by Zürn et al. 
requires ‘an enduring interaction in pursuit of a common good’.88 The G-20 leaders have 
met annually since 2008. However, before its revival during the GFC, the G-20 had 
been dormant since its creation in 1999.89 Therefore the G-20 cannot by itself be said to 
have enjoyed a degree of durability in the area of economic and financial market 
governance. The G-level process which first began in 1975 has led to regular 
intergovernmental meetings, but the issues addressed in the meetings have varied from 
time-to-time.90 This indicates that the G-level process does not seek to create continual 
governance mandate in a certain issue area, but to provide ad hoc coordinated responses 
for member states. Following from this, the G-level process appears to be what Zürn et 
al. called ‘mere issue networks emerging across governance levels’, which, according to 
the authors, are distinguishable and distinguished from a level of the MLG.91 However, 
it is argued that the fact that the G-20 has only recently been revived should not by itself 
constitute contravention of the MLG definition. Since Hooghe and Marks themselves 
used evidence of the great numbers of organizations coming into existence and then 
relapsing after a short period of time to demonstrate ‘flexibility’ as a key characteristic 
of Type II MLG. Therefore it is submitted that the G-20 does not fulfill the MLG 
definition because the G-level process is not autonomous, independent from the 
participating states.  
 It is however submitted that the G-20 serves a particular role in global 
governance. The grouping acts as communication channel, or nodal point, between state 
governments inter se, and also between the national and the global-level. Moreover its 
Communiqués may be thought as a program containing instructions for global-level 
governance, of which the G-20, the instructor, does not itself form part. 
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b. IOSCO and FSB 
I have juxtaposed IOSCO and FSB in this part of the discussion because of their nature 
as consensus organizations. 92  They may be said to be individually engaged in the 
governance function of pursing common good. Through information exchange, 
standard-setting and mutual assistance, IOSCO aims to ensure investor protection, 
efficient and fair markets and reduction of systemic risk, particularly in cross-border 
situations where risks to attaining each of these goals increase. The mandate of FSB 
from the G-20 provides inter alia for the monitoring of market developments and 
assessment of vulnerabilities so as to devise actions and policies, the coordination and 
information exchange among authorities responsible for financial stability and the 
coordination of the activities of SSBs.93 
 The common issue faced by IOSCO and FSB is whether they are ‘autonomous’ 
in taking collective actions. It will be recalled that Zürn holds the view that consensus 
organizations do not count as autonomous where participating states have discretion on 
whether to comply with a collective decision. The point to highlight is that being a 
consensus organization per se is not conclusive as to whether it is within the MLG 
definition, the emphasis is on whether its members are subject to complying with the 
collective decisions. Since neither of their decisions and standards have legal force, the 
answer to the question whether IOSCO and FSB’s members are subject to compliance is 
not immediately clear. Moreover, the second feature of autonomy, which is that no one 
member could veto, must also be investigated further for the two consensus bodies. 
 IOSCO has a limited role in compelling compliance of the PC resolutions which 
are passed by majority voting, in which the ordinary members have one vote each.94 The 
Organization’s power of compulsion is found in under the Sanctions, which only 
provides that the PC is to impose sanctions upon members through a resolution ‘for 
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repeated failure to pay contributions’.95 In respect to the other resolutions IOSCO passes, 
e.g. for adoption of its P&O and endorsing the MMoU, there is no explicit requirement 
on members to implement these, while they encouraged to do so. In addition, the 
Secretary General is given the function to monitor implementation of PC’s resolutions,96 
but s/he has no powers to address any non-implementation. My research shows that the 
Secretary General has exercised this function only once, which is a reflection of the 
Secretariat’s very limited resources.97 
 The resolution on IOSCO’s MMoU was however an exception to the rule. The 
former Executive Committee was in charge of monitoring its implementation and has 
created a ‘watch-list’ for non-compliant members.98 It was through concerted effort of 
the Executive Committee members (under the chairmanship of Jane Diplock of New 
Zealand Securities Commission) that almost all the IOSCO members have become 
MMoU signatories.  
 The MMoU experience indicates that IOSCO has the potential to compel 
implementation of its decisions. However, in the absence of explicit commitments by 
members to implement President Committee resolutions, and a formal oversight 
process, the IOSCO members in fact have a large degree of discretion on whether to 
comply with IOSCO’s standards. These issues should be addressed were IOSCO 
seeking to enhance the effectiveness of its governance role.99 
 The FSB enjoys a greater degree of autonomy compared with IOSCO. My 
argument is two folds. First, the G-20 when re-establishing FSB has expressly delegated 
it with certain tasks with a reporting requirement.100 Second, under the FSB charter, 
member jurisdictions of the FSB have made a number of commitments, most notably, to 
implement international standards and subject to peer review, and to maintain financial 
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stability, financial sector openness and transparency.101 The FSB’s Standing Committee 
on Standards Implementation is now exercising oversight of the peer review process.102 
 However the autonomy of the SFB may still be questions on a number of 
grounds. Firstly, a member of the Plenary could have de facto veto powers. Secondly, 
there is uncertainty as to the effect of the decisions taken by the Plenary, since the FSB 
charter ‘is not intended to create any legal rights or obligations’.103 It is submitted that as 
a result of member jurisdictions’ commitment under Article 5, national regulatory 
authorities of members are under a moral obligation to implement a decision endorsing 
international standards or otherwise necessary for maintaining financial stability, as 
long as the decision is taken by the Plenary in accordance with the scope of FSB’s 
Objectives and Mandate. The answer to the first question is less certain. The Plenary 
makes decisions by way of consensus.104 One finds an explanation of consensus in the 
FSB peer review handbook. For the purpose of adopting peer review reports by the 
Plenary, ‘[c]onsensus is not synonymous with unanimity. Rather…consensus is 
understood to mean that the views of all members are considered and compromises are 
sought, but that no single jurisdiction can block a decision supported by a clear 
majority’.105 In spite of this explanation, it is conceivable that were representatives from 
a jurisdiction with great market power to say ‘no’ on an issue, their view could 
influence representatives from other member jurisdictions. However, an outsider to the 
negotiations would not know how consensus is reached within the Plenary, and thus be 
unable to determine whether the decision-making of the FSB is affected by de facto 
veto. Greater transparency of the Plenary’s decision-making process is therefore 
desirable, as any power imbalance might be revealed. One suggestion for enhancing the 
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decision-making process would be publication of minutes of the Plenary meetings.106 An 
alternative would be to invoke majority rule through voting.107 
c. IMF 
The IMF as an international organization has a solid institutional underpinning and 
universal membership. As discussed above, the Fund’s role in securities market 
governance mainly relates to its assessment of members’ implementation of FSB’s 
Compendium of Standards through ROSCs. 108  The IMF is, at the present, not 
autonomous in undertaking the ROSCs or deciding their publication, as the FSAP is 
voluntary, and, IMF members may require the findings not to become public. 109 
However, the decision-making power in relation to these two aspects of the FSAP may 
in the future tilt towards the IMF, with the G-20 member countries committed to 
undergoing the FSAP every five years and the internal reforms in the IMF itself. 
 Moreover, although before the GFC, the IMF had no means to ensure that its 
economic warnings were taken into account by policies makers, the FSB members must 
now disclose whether and how they implemented the Early Warnings issued jointly by 
FSB and IMF.110 Thus G-20 countries now have a moral obligation to take into account 
the warnings and it is for the FSB to determine whether to compel non-compliant 
members. 
2.2.4 Summary 
From the above analysis on how the actors satisfy the definition of MLG, one can see 
that the concept of global-level governance remains in weak form. Political impetus 
appears to be the life blood of global governance in the financial markets. The actions 
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taken by global actors are not free from interference by actors at the state and substate 
level.111 
 What is also clear from the analysis is that great strides are being taken towards 
completing the global governance framework. The strongest evidence are increasing 
coverage of the international standards and commitments by national regulatory 
authorities to implementing international standards together with greater willingness by 
the global actors to use special measures to ensure that words would be translated into 
actions. In the political sciences scholarship, Rosenau has expounded that the patterns 
of a global order can be seen from three aspects.112 Firstly, at the ‘ideational level’, there 
is a coming together of opinions that collective actions are the best way forward. 
Secondly, at the ‘behavioural level’, problems are routinely being propounded and 
addressed on an international or transgovernmental basis. Thirdly, at the ‘political level’, 
institutions and organizations are developed to facilitate collective activism. Therefore, 
in relation to the first of the two normative questions raised in the beginning of this 
Section, it is submitted that the functionalities of macro-prudential supervision and 
international standard-setting for issues regarding systemic stability and market integrity, 
constitute governance of the financial markets at a global-level, which is distinguishable 
from national governance. 
 A pertinent question would be whether functions of the global-level governance 
in the financial markets should be further expanded. For example, Avgouleas has 
provided a robust argument for the FSB (in a reconstituted form) to take on the role of a 
global micro-prudential authority for systemically important financial institutions (G-
SIFIs), and, for the IMF to participate in a global resolution regime. 113  These are 
important and stand-alone issue areas, which are outside of my focus on securities 
regulation. Avgouleas has also suggested that a global micro-prudential authority could 
also be extended to systemically important exchanges and derivatives markets.114 In this 
respect, it is submitted that national regulators should first be given time to improve 
 
111
 This is unlike the situation under national regulation frameworks where governments usually do not 
intervene in the work of regulatory authority whose independence is protected under the law. 
112
 Rosenau, n 10 above, 14-15. 
113
 Emilios Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Market (Cambridge: CUP) (2012), Chapter 8. 
This recommendation belongs to the strand of scholarship on centralization of financial regulation 
discussed in Literature Review in Chapter 2. 
114
 Ibid. 444. 
Towards a Global Regulatory Framework for Transnational Securities Markets 
189 
supervision of transnational exchanges and OTC trading markets through cooperation,115 
in order to better equip the toolbox for market systemic risk monitoring and 
management, which, as discussed in Chapter 3, is currently largely empty. A global 
supervisor therefore cannot presently provide more advanced know-how than national 
regulators. 
 In relation to the second normative question, it is contended there are two 
mechanisms through which the global actors in securities markets regulation are 
interlinked, namely, membership in the FSB and coordination function exercised by the 
FSB. The FSB is significant for bringing together not only actors dwelling in different 
compartments of the global regulatory framework, but also different sections of the 
political spectrum. As investigations on the EU’s regulatory structure has shown,116 the 
congruence of governmental ministers, central banker and financial sector regulators is 
indispensible for dealing with the global-level regulatory problems which could involve 
distributive issues.  
 Moreover, for national regulatory authorities who are not members of the FSB, 
they may take direct action at global-level through voting in the PC by virtue of their 
membership in IOSCO. Through the Secretary General, who is subject to review by the 
Chairman IOSCO Board, interests of IOSCO’s members may also be represented in the 
FSB.  
2.3 Benefits and Limitations of MLG 
The benefit of flexibility is the main reason of conducting international cooperation 
through informal networks and self-governing arrangements outside national and 
international laws.117 The so-called Type II MLG enables governance to be established 
whenever needed, and discontinued when no longer required, so as to address every 
change of circumstance when the will to do so is present. Flexibility is perhaps pivotal 
to explaining why the FSB was chosen over the IMF as the future guardian of financial 
system stability, despite the latter’s broad membership and established links with many 
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countries. It would require an amendment of the IMF’s Articles – last time amended in 
1978 – to bestow the capacity of financial market oversight and coordination of SSBs. 
However, flexibility presents many risks to international cooperation, which are briefly 
listed below. 
 The first type of risk pertains to the efficacy of the informal international 
decision-making process. According to Hooghe and Marks, the transactional costs of 
coordinating actors from multiples levels – state, substate and transnational – are high. 
As the number of actors rises, it becomes harder to punish defectors. In the absence of 
‘countervailing norm[s] that can induce actors to monitor and punish defection’, the free 
riding problem can therefore become prohibitive to making a collective decision.118 In 
global governance of the financial markets, what one has witnessed is not a total 
absence of collective actions, but what has been called ‘pork-barrel agreements’,119 that 
reflect the need to give everyone something and the end result often do not necessarily 
achieve the fundamental goal.120 The science of decision-making through international 
cooperation is intriguing.121 However, with the emphasis of this thesis on governance 
framework the decision-making problem shall not be discussed any further. 
 A second risk of MLG arises from the numerous actors present. Rosenau is of 
the view that plurality of actors means ‘the less can any one of them, or any coalition of 
them, dominate the course of events and the more will all of them have to be sensitive 
to how sheer numbers limit their influence’.122 Although safety in numbers appears to be 
the strategy employed to constrain influence from the most powerful state members 
within the FSB, the presence of international financial institutions and SSBs in global 
governance means a need for a central place for coordination. It has already been 
discussed that the FSB is now playing the coordinational role in financial market 
governance. 
 The third of risk relates to issues of legitimacy of decision-making. The 
legitimacy concern has two aspects. The legitimacy of MLG is said to be contingent on 
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everyone's interest, including those of weaker parties, being catered for.123 In informal 
decision-making, where institutional restrictions for safeguarding equality are removed, 
the powerful parties will dominate.124 Therefore, governance at the global-level seems to 
fundamentally suffer from the lack of legitimacy. The second aspect the issues of 
legitimacy relates the problem of substate, and also state actors, ‘using MLG 
governance process, and the arenas created by it, as a means of evading control’ from 
national democratic process.125 More specifically, MLG is accused of harbouring of the 
practice of confidentiality among global actors. 126  The issue of legitimacy is an 
important one both in the areas of regulation and governance. It is to be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 6. 
2.4 Role of transnational markets participants in global governance 
The above discussed theories of global governance are premised on the primacy of the 
state (or its subunits) in international cooperation. However, as already noted, the 
financial markets participants’ role in regulation is increasingly being recognized both 
at national and global-levels.127 Furthermore, theorists of globalization have argued that 
the nation-state has lost its dominant role in global governance to non-state actors.128 
Within the current discussion on governance structure, it is then necessary to consider 
the place of transnational markets participants in global governance. The two normative 
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questions raised at the beginning of Section 2 are to be considered in relation to market 
participants. 
 The first normative question asks what role should the transnational markets 
participants have in governance of the securities markets. My analysis proceeds from 
two perspectives, namely, functional and theoretical. From the functional perspective, I 
examine the advantages and corresponding shortcomings of markets participants’ role 
in securities markets regulation. I then consider the challenges posed by regulatory 
theories, which, if not surmounted, would fundamentally undermine the role of 
transnational markets participants in global governance.  
 The second normative question concerning the issue of potential co-existence of 
state and non-state actors asks how the actors should be organized under a global 
governance structure. For this question, I will consider the relationship between 
transnational markets participants and the other global actors. 
2.4.1 Transnational market participants and securities regulation 
The advantages and corresponding shortcomings of markets participants’ roles in 
securities markets regulation are examined from two aspects: first, private rule-making 
by market participants; second, their impact on public rule-making of the regulatory 
authorities. 
a. Private rule-making by market participants 
‘Contracts are the core mechanism whereby the market regulates itself’.129 Contracts 
may be viewed as private ordering in a number of ways. Firstly, legally binding 
contracts governed by the laws of a national legal system are used by market 
participants to provide for certainty in the regulation of risks pertaining to transactional 
decisions made in the financial markets.130 Secondly, industry standard documents and 
well-known legal opinions have become the handbook of accepted behaviour in the 
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markets, so that it would be difficult to negotiate on different terms to the ones set out in 
the standard forms.131 Thirdly, financial contracts do not only deal with the issue of 
default of the contracting parties, they can also address matters of regulatory concern. 
The often-cited example is the International Swaps and Agreements Association’s 
(ISDA’s) Master Agreement and credit support supplement which are used in bilateral 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives dealers. The ISDA Master Agreement provides 
extensive provisions on counterparty risk management, such as collateral taking, netting 
of open positions and evaluation of credit risk. 132  Collateral taking clauses aim to 
address counterparty credit risk through conferring property rights in cash and other 
quality financial assets to the non-defaulting party. The netting and risk evaluation 
clauses on the other hand, have as their objective the reductions of systemic risks 
pertaining to the potential liquidity problems flowing from the criss-crossing of many 
multilateral transactions, by enabling a single debt to be calculated between the parties 
in default and each of its counterparties. The fourth aspect of contract as regulation 
concerns the metamorphosis of standard documents from ‘soft law’ into ‘hard law’, 
either through courts’ judgements or statutory enactment.133 Moreover, under the EC 
Directive on financial collateral arrangements, MS must give effect to close-out netting 
provisions and title transfer financial collateral arrangements in accordance with the 
terms in the contracts.134 Since contracts operate across jurisdictional boundaries under 
the framework of often harmonized conflict of law rules, private regulation through 
contract is potentially more effective than territorially-based public law regulations. 
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 It was the opinion of some that the development of the ISDA Master Agreement, 
along with credit ratings and internal risk management by financial institutions, has 
resulted in the mitigation of risk in OTC derivatives transactions.135 However, what the 
GFC has shown is that private contracts, such as the ISDA Master Agreement, cannot 
ensure the taking of ownership in systemic risks which could result from such 
transactions. In the pre-crisis period, market participants in OTC derivatives built up 
concentration of exposures in the US subprime mortgage market, without such systemic 
risk being reflected in the provision of collateral or the price of the derivative 
instrument.136 One of the key post crisis reforms has therefore been to regulate the OTC 
derivatives market.137 
 Outside the domain of contracts, private regulation by financial markets is 
conducted primarily through self-regulatory organisations (SROs) or trade association 
standards and codes of good conduct. 
 SROs may operate under a statutory framework. National legislation confers on 
SROs the authority to create, amend, implement and enforce rules of conduct in relation 
to the entities subject to the SRO’s jurisdiction and to resolve disputes through 
arbitration or other means.138 Self-regulation by stock exchanges is paradigm case of 
regulation by a private entity under statutory oversight.139 Some SROs on the other hand 
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may function without statutory oversight, as their activities relate to areas, including 
Eurobonds and repos, which are uncovered by regulation.140 
 As a result of the development in electronic trading and cross-border exchange 
mergers, securities trading on exchanges is no longer thought as transactions entered 
into at a particular physical location.141 Thus exchanges’ rules are governing members 
who are located in jurisdictions beyond the reach of the national laws authorizing the 
exchanges. For example, under the Rule of the London Stock Exchange, the Exchange 
can consider the authorization of ‘overseas persons’ who do not require authorization 
under the FSMA on the basis of ‘evidence of satisfactory regulation of the applicant's 
financial integrity and fitness and probity’ by foreign regulatory bodies.142 
 The question to be considered is how effective are exchanges in regulation? 
Rules of exchanges have laid down enforcement powers and detailed compliance 
procedures. Upon the finding of a rule breach, Exchange may issue a warning notice 
and/or subject the recalcitrant firm to discipline by a Disciplinary Committee, as well as 
impose sanction, which include censure (private or public), fines, suspension of 
activities, and expulsion from membership.143 According to empirical literature, market-
based enforcement carried out by exchanges is generally overly lenient.144 The literature 
explains that this is due to the presence of exogenous competitive forces compelling 
stock exchanges to protect self-interests, such as profit maximization, instead of public 
interest, and, the absence of endogenous demand for strict enforcement by investors and 
end-users. 
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 For example, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) is a pan‐European self-regulatory 
organization and its market conventions and standards have been the pillars of the international debt 
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 The Rule of the London Stock Exchange G 1010 (and accompanying guidance). 
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 Many trade associations enjoy global membership.145 As a result, the reach of 
their standards and codes, like standard contracts, transcends nationalities and territorial 
borders of states. For reputational purposes, trade associations impose sanctions on 
members upon their breaching of codes the trade association standards and code. 
Therefore, it is thought that membership in trade associations, as in professional bodies, 
is a symbol quality assurance.146 There is however conflicting empirical evidence in 
respect of the effectiveness of trade associations as a type of market-based governance. 
While some evidence suggests that trade association membership has been subject to 
abuse, providing cover for sub-optimal behaviour, some other evidence points to racing 
to the top because of competition between different trade associations.147 
 During the GFC, trade associations have also been actively establishing 
standards of good practice in order to preserve their industry reputation and promote 
market confidence. One such initiative was undertaking by the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF), which set up a Committee on Market Best Practices in October 2007, 
with the view to developing practical ways to address market weaknesses.148 The IIF 
report was the result of a private and public sector dialogue.149 It addressed six areas of 
financial regulation: risk management; compensation policies; liquidity risk, conduit, 
and securitization issues; valuation issues; credit underwriting, ratings, and investor due 
diligence in securitization markets; transparency and disclosure issues. In addition, the 
IIF report laid down plans for a Market Monitoring Group. This is to be a forum for 
member firms to monitor global financial markets for early detection of systemic 
vulnerabilities and market strains and to discuss ways to address such risks. The work of 
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 The newly established global alliance under the umbrella of the Global Financial Markets Association 
(GFMA) comprises the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), the Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association in the US (Sifma), and the Asian Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association. Aimed to promote fair, orderly, and efficient wholesale capital markets in each 
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other financial market participants. 
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the Market Turmoil of 2007– 2008’ (July 2008) (IIF report). 
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the IIF will be further discussed below as a possible bridge-the-gap model between the 
state and non-state actors in international cooperation.150 The IIF report is mentioned 
here however, as an illustration of the limitation of the markets as an instrument of 
crisis management. Despite IIF’s initiative to create a code of conduct, it could not 
remedy loss of confidence in a market that was becoming dysfunctional. This was no 
surprise as the IIF report did not address the then crucial issues of locating ‘toxic’ assets 
and recapitalizing financial institutions, which could only be performed by state 
governments.  
b. Impact on public rule-making 
The financial markets also play an important role in public rule-making and 
enforcement of these rules. Firstly, trade associations, as well as setting standards for 
their members inter se, often play a prominent role in the consultation processes 
established by national authorities or international SSBs.151 The negative aspect of this is 
the power of lobbying by the markets which was clearly visible at national, regional and 
international levels during the negotiation and drafting of reform proposals post the 
GFC. For example, the markets’ concern that implementing Basle III too soon would 
forestall their role in the economic recovery process led to the deadline of 
implementation being delayed.152  
 Secondly, once a regulation is adopted, market participants consequently 
become subject to the rules and supervisory process. Contracts may become an 
enforcement tool. Parties to standard contracts such as the ISDA Master Agreement 
usually make the representation that performance under the contract will ‘not violate or 
conflict with any law applicable’. Even more crucially, contracting parties also 
undertake to ‘comply in all material respects with all applicable laws and orders’.153 
Since a failure to comply with these obligations could constitute an ‘event of default’,154 
thereby conferring a ‘right to terminate’155 on the non-defaulting party, the contract 
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 See Chapter 6, Section 2.3. 
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 Brooke Masters and Tom Braithwaite, ‘Banks versus Basle’, Financial Times, 11 (3 October 2011). 
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creates an incentive for parties to ensure their regulatory compliance. Private regulation 
through financial contracts, rather than challenge the sovereignty of the state, could be 
seen as reinforcing the rule emanating from state. 156  However, private enforcement 
actions under contract must not displace supervisory functions of the regulatory 
authorities, since litigation is sporadic and brought solely on the basis of self-interest of 
one of the parties. 
2.4.2 Challenges to market participants’ role 
From the above analysis, it may be concluded that market participants have the 
incentive and expertise to regulate their securities market activities. Markets also have a 
propensity to operate across territorial boundaries, thus rendering them naturally 
suitable for addressing cross-border issues. However, it has been seen that financial 
markets may not be effective in regulation of systemic risk, addressing crisis 
management and self-enforcement of public regulatory rules. Therefore, subject to these 
three limitations, should market participants have a role to play in the globalization 
standard-setting process? More specifically, should FSB and IOSCO extend the current 
consultative role of trade associations and other market participants to fully engaging 
them in all the stages of the standard-setting process? This approach has many practical 
difficulties. But first setting aside practical considerations, I shall examine from a 
theoretical perspective, whether there is any normative basis for full (or fuller) 
engagement with market participants in global-level standard-setting. 
 The starting point of this debate is that neither states individually, nor the above 
described global actors have prerogative in the international regulatory space. Secondly, 
regulation by state actors can fail. A third point in the market participants’ favour is that, 
even when there is no regulatory failure, public sector, cannot match the skills of 
financial industry’s own managers in micro-management.157 However, it is argued that 
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 A similar argument was put forth in respect to the effect of TRNs in bolstering international treaty 
compliance. Since TRNs are outside the traditional concept of sovereignty, like markets, they have 
been thought to challenge state sovereignty. Raustiala, n 48 above, 76-83. 
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problems of legitimacy and accountability are the hurdles which must be overcome if 
market participants were to be given a more direct role in global governance.  
 By accepting that non-state actors have a role in global governance, one 
embraces the positive theory of ‘polycentric’ regulation. Polycentric regulation 
recognizes the presence of multiple sites in which regulation occurs, at both a sub-
national, national and transnational level.158 It has been said that four challenges are 
posed by polycentric regulation. They are functional, normative, democratic and 
systemic. The first three are related to the issue of legitimacy. 159 Legitimacy issues 
relating to the state actors role in global governance are considered in detail in Chapter 
6. The discussion here on the legitimacy of market participants adopts the definition of 
legitimacy explained in the next Chapter.160 
 The question whether transnational markets’ role in global governance may be 
considered legitimate is addressed by examining the six possible models of the markets 
role. The models are simply labelled numerically to facilitate discussions.  
 In model 1, market participants initiate their own standards in an area where 
there is no national regulation. This situation is akin to trade associations’ standard 
documents being used in professional contracts. Since these agreements are voluntarily 
entered into by parties to govern their behaviour vis-à-vis each other, this type of 
arrangement does not suffer from legitimacy problems. When trade associations intend 
their industry codes to have wider impact, they may seek to engage the SSBs in the 
process of establishing their codes. For example, the IIF’s communication with the FSB 
on its codes of practice published during the GFC, in order to bolster the legitimacy of 
the codes. 
 In model 2, FSB or IOSCO produce preliminary standards for public 
consultation to which market participants can join. This is present situation. The main 
purpose of consultation is to address questions pertaining to the standard setters’ 
legitimacy and so the issue of market participants’ legitimacy is less relevant. 
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 Polycentric regulation is a variation on the term ‘decentred’ regulation. Whereas the latter ‘draws 
attention away from the state – denying a necessary central role for the state in regulation; the former 
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 In model 3, FSB or IOSCO invites market participants to put forward their own 
standards as the basis for drafting an industry-wide code in the absence of national 
regulation. This situation could be said to be similar to the IOSCO’s CRA code, which 
was developed through close dialogues with the CRAs and were intended to be 
implemented by CRAs themselves without involving regulatory changes.161 Legitimacy 
in this situation would arguably depend on how many market participants were involved 
in the drafting of the industry code and the degree of reliance by the IOSCO Task Force 
on market participants’ own standards. If the level of influence from the existing market 
standards were high, but only a small number of market participants’ standards were 
used, then other market participants might refuse to change their practices on the basis 
of others CRA’s standards.  
 Models 4 concerns the situation where standard-setting is intended by FSB and 
IOSCO to result in regulatory changes, and market participants are invited to put 
forward their own standards as templates for the changes. The risk of a lack of 
legitimacy can be found. Market participants such as the trade associations may not be 
subject to account to the public and they act exclusively to serve the interests of their 
members. Therefore, when standards are wholly based on the proposals or existing 
practices from a homogenous group of market participants, they will very likely 
prejudice interests of market participants outside this group. But, if the standard setter 
were able to involve a wide range of market entities to participate in the process, it 
would find reconciling differences of views very difficult, and the end result may not be 
satisfactory even for the participating market entities. 
 Model 5 contemplates a number of trade associations and SROs being invited by 
FSB or IOSCO to contribute to the discussions in standard-setting meetings.162 The 
invitation may be based on affiliate membership and/or otherwise in accordance with 
the constitutional documents.163 To alleviate the issue of lack of accountability, market 
participants could be required, in exchange for their participation, to disclose to the 
standard setters their internal governance. Trade associations could also be required to 
disclose the level of compliance with their own codes by their own members. However, 
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one issue with these transparency-based approaches is the problem that the management 
of private trade associations may not have the authority to share internal information in 
the public domain. Another issue is that in practice, only a limited number of trade 
associations and SROs could be invited to meeting. Therefore, the problem of capture 
by self-interest organization would arise, with impact on the legitimacy of the standard-
setting process.164 
 Model 6 is based on the structure and governance of the IASB. 165  Market 
participants from one particular sector could form an independent standard-setting body, 
which is subject to account to a monitoring board of public regulators. The issue of 
legitimacy under this model is addressed through internal governance and oversight. 
However, this model has not been repeated outside the area of accounting standards, 
which may be evidence of the unwillingness of market participants to surrender their 
freedom. 
 The above models for the potential role of transnational market participants in 
global governance have illustrated the problem of legitimacy. As a result, the role of the 
markets will likely to remain in the form of informal consultations and self-regulation 
where public intervention is absent. 
3 Pillar II: Mechanisms of Cross-border Cooperation 
Following from the discussion on the collective action roles of the global actors in 
securities markets regulation, and approaches to their organization under Pillar I of 
GRF, I will now turn to analysing the mechanisms the actors may use to address the 
global-level regulatory problems theorized in Chapter 2. ‘Mechanisms’ is an umbrella 
term being used here to encompass the variety of approaches, models, procedures, 
concepts and strategies in cross-border cooperation which constitute Pillar II of GRF. 
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 Lawrence Baxter, ‘“Capture” in financial regulation: can we channel it towards common good?’ 2011 
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 My study of EU securities regulation and cross-border initiatives in Chapters 3 
and 4 has been beneficial in identifying the possible mechanisms which may be used by 
national regulatory authorities to engage in bilateral, multilateral or global-level 
cooperation.166 Like regulation at the national level, all acts of cooperation can incur 
costs, such as negotiation, implementation and error costs.167 It is reasonable to expect a 
rational regulatory authority only to enter into cooperation after a comparison of all the 
available alternatives. To assist with their decision-making, I will set out the benefits 
and costs for each of the main tools and mechanisms of cross-border cooperation. It is 
submitted that by using an analytical and comparative approach explained here to 
determine appropriate mechanisms for addressing a specific cross-border issue, 
authorities may find it easier to address tendencies such as following the herd, or, 
succumbing to pressure from counterparts, which could result in sub-optimal results. 
My discussions of the benefits and costs are restricted to qualitative rather than 
quantitative analyses.  
 The mechanisms of cross-border cooperation may be grouped into three 
categories.168 The first category comprises the approaches and models for regulatory 
cooperation, which address the substantive differences between national securities 
regulations. The second category comprises the procedures for removing regulatory 
barriers which do not per se impact on substantive laws. The third category is made up 
of mechanisms of supervisory cooperation to assist regulatory authorities in their day-
to-day work in monitoring and enforcement of obligations of securities market 
participants.  
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3.1 Approaches and models for regulatory cooperation 
Divergence of laws lies at the root of the global-level problems. While divergence is 
found in all aspects of securities regulation, whether substantive169 or procedural,170 this 
part focuses on the approaches for addressing divergence in the substantive rules.  
 Governments, regulatory authorities and academics have over the years been 
devising and experimenting with numerous models for addressing divergence. The 
concepts of harmonization and standardization provide a useful theoretical framework 
for analysing a tangled array of solutions and suggestions. Harmonization may be 
conceptualized as a top-down approach in regulatory cooperation and standardization on 
the other hand connotes bottom-up. I will first explain each approach in more detail, 
before examining their benefits and costs. 
3.1.1 Harmonization 
a. Definition of harmonization 
In the Short Oxford English Dictionary, harmonization is defined to mean ‘action or 
process of bringing into harmony or agreement, reconciliation, standardisation’.171 This 
is an overly broad definition which describes a variety of perceivable outcomes, without 
however differentiating between the input ‘action or process’ that generates them. For 
my discussion on means of cooperation for addressing regulatory divergence, the nature 
of and differences between the various input ‘action or process’ would need to be 
understood. An all-encompassing definition is thus not very useful and ‘harmonization’ 
would need to be defined more narrowly for my purposes here. Nevertheless, the 
Dictionary definition is mentioned so as to highlight the two types of outcomes 
produced by harmonization, which are resolution of conflict and attainment of a 
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common standard.172 In the context of securities regulation, harmonization is similarly 
used to refer to two types of legal orders, namely reciprocity and commonality.173 
 Reciprocity refers to the deference to the standards of another jurisdiction. 
Under a reciprocal agreement, each country agrees to accept the compliance with the 
rules of the other jurisdictions as compliance with its own law.174 Commonality on the 
other hand, envisages the development of substantially uniform international norms and 
rules through concerted regulatory efforts, aimed to modify or replace national rules. 
The two outcomes are not mutually exclusive. One way of explaining their interplay is 
as follows. Where there is an initial harmonization of rules, i.e. commonality, aimed at 
creating a level-playing field for market participants and fostering mutual trust between 
national regulators, the way is paved for reciprocal agreements to be entered into, which, 
in turn, generates greater degrees of regulatory convergence.175 
 The present discussion of harmonization concerns commonality. Since a 
reciprocity agreement is procedural, it forms the subject matter under the second 
mechanisms of cooperation category. 
 Harmonization in this discussion is defined as a process whereby concerted 
regulatory efforts are used for developing substantially uniform international rules, and 
other binding norms to modify or replace national rules. Harmonization in this sense is 
therefore a top-down approach to regulatory cooperation. It is normally found within a 
formal structure which exhibits two basic elements: the existence of a body that has 
legitimate rule-making powers and undertakings by national regulatory authorities to 
apply the rules the body promulgates to regulating their national markets. 
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b. Models of harmonization 
In the EU, the model of harmonization of securities regulation has shifted from detailed 
harmonization to minimum and then to maximum harmonization. An in-depth 
discussion has been provided in Chapter 3, it will be suffice to recall a number of 
points. In the pre-Internal Market era, the Admissions Directive 176  and Listing 
Particulars Directive 177  attempted to set out comprehensively the contents of issuer 
disclosure. It was hope that through detailed harmonization alone regulatory barriers 
could be removed. In contrast, the 1992 Investment Services Directive established high 
level conduct of business principles intended to create minimum level of protection to 
users of investment services in the (former) EC, while leaving Member State with the 
freedom to formulate detail rules in their capacity as Host Member States.178 Under the 
Lamfalussy process, high-level policy principles were supplemented by technical rules, 
which would provide the maximum level of protection for creating a level-playing field, 
so as to facilitate the home country control. In the aftermath of the GFC, financial 
regulation in the EU is moving toward full harmonization. This will be based on making 
use of regulations rather than directives and establishing a single rulebook for the 
application of EU legislations.179 
 At the global-level, there is no supranational financial authority with rule-
making powers comparable with the legislative mechanisms established under the EU 
treaty. A number of proposals have however been made for a top-down model.180 
c. Benefits of harmonization 
The benefit of harmonization is that within a formal rule-making structure, there will be 
a high level of certainty in the decision making process. The balancing between 
efficiency and accountability in the rule-making process is more likely to be provided 
within a formal structure. The harmonization framework in EU securities regulations 
also contains mechanisms to ensure consistent implementation of regulations and 
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directives.181 These features of formal rule-making are important for ensuring that a 
common set of rules may be established to solve the global-level regulatory problems. 
 Harmonization of rules facilitates the removal of regulatory barriers. From the 
investor’s perspective, the benefit of harmonization is likely to be a consistent increase 
of regulatory standards in different countries, resulting in better quality of information 
on issuers and financial soundness of service providers. 182  Investor confidence may 
increase, which may contribute to diminishing ‘home bias’ and international portfolio 
diversification. Moreover, since harmonization would result in comparability of market 
information, the cost of collecting information would fall.  
 If a level-playing field could results from harmonization, there could be an 
incentive for regulatory authorities to establish arrangements for mutual recognition.183 
As a result, issuers and services providers will enjoy greater mobility, leading to what 
some call ‘superior’ equilibrium in the global market.184 There is some market data in 
support of this contention. For example, in relation to financial market in the US and 
EU, some research estimate that integration of the two markets would lower 
transactional costs by 60%, raise the volume of securities trading by almost 50% and cut 
the cost of equity for listed companies by 9%.185 
 From regulatory authorities’ perspective, harmonization will generate trust and 
confidence, which will be the important foundations for the mechanisms of supervisory 
cooperation discussed below. 
 Harmonization provides a means for addressing systemic risk. Through a 
collective rule-making mechanism, cross-border externalities may be addressed through 
the negotiation between states. Since states will undertake to implement the harmonized 
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rules, regulatory arbitrage is prevented and ‘race to the bottom’ avoided. Moreover, in 
respect to the cost of harmonization, it is submitted that despite the various costs, 
harmonization would be less costly than the social cost arising from another failure of 
the global financial system.186 
d. Costs of harmonization 
As a mechanism of regulation, harmonization incurs the usual costs pertaining to 
governmental intervention in a free market economy. 187  In addition, harmonization 
incurs transitional cost for both markets and regulatory authorities and there may be a 
higher risk of regulatory failures due to possible irreconcilable cultural and structural 
differences among states.188 I now use the EU experience analyzed in Chapter 3 to 
explain in practical terms the costs of harmonization. 
 In the pre-FSAP period, uniform rules were hard to attain. Members of the 
European Parliament and Council of Ministers, being accountable to their own national 
electorates, had their different goals. Therefore, the directives were often the products of 
political compromises which may not provide optimum rules for investor protection.189 
A closely related point is that the Admission Directive and List Particulars Directive 
were viewed as inflexible and failed to accommodate differences and changes in market 
conditions. This led countries to use derogation clauses. As a result, market issuers and 
financial services providers still found themselves having to comply with conflicting 
rule under various regulatory regimes. Moreover, the legislative and implementation 
progress was too slow to respond to market developments. 
 Under the Lamfalussy process, rule-making had, on the one hand, been 
substantially improved, but as MS were left with a free rein to implement the EU, 
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divergence and inconsistencies had, on the other hand, remained. 190  Moreover the 
transitional costs of harmonization were mounting. However, because market 
integration had been viewed as the prized possession before the GFC, harmonization 
was pursued by the EU law-makers with an underestimation of the risks arising from 
integration for both investor protection and systemic risk. There were initial signs of 
towards integration.191 However, the GFC brought to the fore stark evidence of the cost 
of harmonization when the balance of integration, investor protection and systemic risk 
could not be achieved.  
3.1.2 Standardization 
a. Definition and examples of standardization 
Standardization may be distinguished from harmonization on the grounds of informal 
processes of regulatory cooperation and the non-binding nature of standards. 192 
Standards are the accepted or approved human conduct or outcomes from human 
conduct in a specific area. Standards in the financial markets may be in the form of 
principles, practices, guidelines or codes of conduct.193 
 Standardization is a bottom-up process. SSBs are private organizations 
comprised of national regulatory authorities and market professionals (in the case of the 
IASB). Standards are developed by task/issue specific working groups which reach their 
decision through consensus. Standards only apply to the rest of an SSB after their 
endorsement.194 Regulatory convergence is achieved not through a central enforcement 
mechanism, but via national rules adopted by regulatory authorities to reflect the 
contents the standards. Since implementation methods can vary widely for standards, in 
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order to foster convergence authorities regularly consult with each other and share 
experience. Moreover, standards are formulated very close to market’s needs, and any 
regulatory convergence resulting from standard-setting would likely to be driven by 
market demand. 
 Notable examples of international standards in securities markets which have 
been discussed in Chapter 4. IOSCO’s most influential standards are its ‘Principles and 
Objectives of Securities Regulation’ (O&P), 195  ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for 
Credit Rating Agencies’, 196  and ‘International Disclosure Standards for Cross-border 
Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers’197 (I.D.S.).  
b. Benefits and difficulties of standardization 
The main benefits of standardization may be summarized in terms of adaptability. 
Without the need to follow formal rule-making procedures, issue-specific working 
groups serve as fora for regulatory authorities and market participants with the most 
expertise and interests in a particular area to gather together under ad hoc and time-
saving arrangements. As a result, the contents of standards are likely to be able to reflect 
new market issues. Moreover with no limitation on the particular form which standards 
can take, they are designed to best fit each context, whether as high-level principles or 
detailed practices, industry guidance or recommendation to regulatory authorities.198 
 From a practical perspective, the technical standards on accounting and issuer 
disclosure have reduced the costs and inconvenience of cross-border capital raising and 
investment, as a result of implementation and mutual recognition arrangements under 
national laws. 199  Financial stability is now anchored on FSB’s Compendium of 
Standards,200 many of which, e.g., IOSCO’s O&P, are principle-based. Unlike detailed 
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rules often found in the EU directives,201 broad principles have the potential to transcend 
cultural and structural differences, withstand changes in market practices,202 and address 
the force of sectoral convergence.203 
 The costs related to standardization are arguably less in comparison with 
harmonization. Transitional costs are likely to be low when standards are principle-
based since national regulatory authorities would be free to choose the methods of 
implementation that are most cost-efficient for their own markets.204 Within IOSCO, the 
standards promulgated by the former Technical Committee had usually represented 
consensual regulatory practices which were already in place in the jurisdictions of the 
participating members in standard-setting. 205  For these members, transitional costs 
would likely be negligible. Moreover, for emerging markets which had previously 
lacked a particular regulatory system, the cost of transition would be zero.206 
 Where standards are detailed, there will be the risk of regulatory failures similar 
to that for harmonization. Emerging evidence from the crisis has shown that Basle I 
Capital Accord which had standardized capital requirements for international banks had 
in fact provided an unintended incentive for banks to continue taking on risk by 
transferring debt and risk to off-balance-sheet vehicles. The consequence of increased 
opacity and greater financial risk then led to the GFC. 207  In the area of financial 
reporting standards, the IFRS have been criticized for its rule-based approach and for 
those rules which encouraged pro-cyclicality. 208  With standards being developed in 
close proximity to the market, the problem of capture may result.209 
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 Since many standards in financial regulation are at a high level, the chief 
concern is less about their costs of implementation, but rather about the difficulties of 
how to implement them. 210  The problems of transparency and implementation are 
demonstrated here an examining of the International Disclosure Standards promulgated 
by IOSCO as a case study. 
 It will be recalled that the implicit purpose of promulgating the I.D.S. was to 
encourage mutual recognition of prospectuses that fulfilled the standards. 211  It was 
envisaged that an issuer seeking a cross-border share offering will only have to prepare 
a single prospectus, an ‘international passport’, which, after being reviewed by one 
national regulator to be reflecting the I.D.S., will thereafter be recognized by all other 
securities regimes in which the shares are subsequently sold. 
 The standards have been criticized on number grounds. 212 Firstly, during the 
standard-setting process, only sixteen out of more than one hundred IOSCO member 
authorities were involved.213 As a result, it was likely that the particularities of emerging 
markets had been overlooked, causing the I.D.S. potentially inapplicable in these 
markets. Secondly, the institutional structure of IOSCO does not comprise an arbiter for 
resolving disputes on interpretation and enforcement. As a result, there may be diverse 
interpretation of key disclosure concepts such as ‘materiality’. Thirdly, modification of 
the I.D.S. by national regulatory authorities was explicitly permitted. Therefore, it 
would in practice be difficult to attain uniformity of the level of disclosure in cross-
border offering prospectuses. Fourthly, the I.D.S. are only to be used in multinational 
offerings and not domestic situations. Therefore, differences will remain between 
disclosure requirements on foreign and domestic issuers, resulting in difficulties of 
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comparing information for investors, and, duplicated compliance cost for issuers. 214 
Moreover, the existence of the I.D.S. may result in increased legal uncertainty. For 
example, the I.D.S. document has not expressly provided for private law duties and 
liabilities of issuers and underwriting banks. In conclusion, the I.D.S. have not reduced 
regulatory duplication and conflict of rules. 
3.1.3 Comparing standardization and harmonization 
Although conceptually diametrically opposed, it is argued that the distinction between 
standardization and harmonization may become blurred in practice. 
 In terms of the tools for standardization and harmonization, high-level principles 
and detailed rules have featured in both approaches. Detailed rules however have been 
used more frequently in harmonization due to the need for certainty in implementation. 
High-level principles conversely have been the more preferred approach in international 
standard-setting, due to the need to accommodate wide ranging interests and the fact 
that implementation is not subject to a centralized enforcement mechanism. In terms of 
the impact of standardization and harmonization, the latter is most like to result in 
regulatory convergence. Regulatory competition will likely be found where there is 
standardization, and, also in the absence of full harmonization, provided free movement 
of capital, trade and services is ensured. Although harmonization is more desirable for 
preventing regulatory arbitrage, FSB’s new initiatives on implementation is an 
alternative means for safeguarding against arbitrage risks. 
 Moreover, functions of the FSB appear to exhibit the characteristics of 
harmonization outlined in Section 3.1.1a. It will be recalled, the two basic elements of 
harmonization are the existence of a body that has legitimate rule making powers and 
undertakings by national regulatory authorities to apply the rules the body promulgates 
in regulating their national markets. 215  The FSB members have committed to 
implementing international standards and undergoing peer review. This provided FSB 
the impetus for adopting a framework to coordinate the peer review process and steering 
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regulatory changes using incentives. 216  To achieve the latter objective, FSB has 
conducted and published the results of its own assessments on how countries have 
implemented international cooperation and information exchange standards.217 Although 
the FSB has no express mandate in standard-setting, the G-20 has constantly called on 
FSB to take a lead in regulatory development.218 From a functional perspective, the new 
roles undertaken by FSB point to increasing concentration of standard-setting and 
implementation oversight within one forum. In other words, what Eatwell and Taylor 
have envisaged – a World Financial Authority – is coming into view.219 
 However, from an organizational perspective, FSB remains a bottom-up 
organization, whose primary role – coordination of activities and decisions of its 
members – is one of facilitation rather than initiation. The real changes are being 
brought by the will of individual to utilize FSB as a forum for discussions and decision-
making, and, the influences member countries exert on each other through interaction. 
3.2 Procedures for removing regulatory barriers 
Harmonization and standardization are means of engendering regulatory convergence, 
which is regarded as key to regulatory barrier removal. However, as the lessons from 
the EU tells us, the degrees to which harmonization may give rise to convergence can be 
difficult to ascertain. 220  Therefore, in addition to harmonization and standardization, 
procedure mechanisms have been devised to facilitate transnational securities 
transactions. From discussions in Chapter 3, the procedures for removing regulatory 
barriers (also called ‘market opening strategies’) are: exemptions, equivalence and 
mutual recognition.221 
 
216
 FSB, ‘Framework for Strengthening Adherence to International Standards’, 1 (9 January 2010). 
217
 FSB, ‘Global adherence to regulatory and supervisory standards on international cooperation and 
information exchange’, 2 November 2011. 
218
 For example, at the Seoul Summit, G-20 leaders called FSB, in collaboration with SSBs, to develop 
recommendations to strengthen the regulation and oversight of the shadow banking system. See FSB, 
‘Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening 
Financial Stability - Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Leaders’, 11 (4 November 2011). 
219
 See Section 3.1.1b. 
220
 In particular, see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1. 
221
 See also Eilís Ferran, ‘Capital Market Openness After Financial Turmoil’, (Working Paper 15 July 
2009) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series can be found at 
www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
Towards a Global Regulatory Framework for Transnational Securities Markets 
214 
3.2.1 Exemptions 
Two types of exemptions under the US federal law were mentioned in Chapter 3. The 
first type is Regulation S, which allows foreign public offering to be exempted from 
Securities Act 1933. The aim of this rule was less about barrier-removal than about 
clarifying the scope of the Securities Act. The second type of exemption is Rule 144A 
which excludes private placement from the application of the Securities Act. The 
approach of demarcating between sophisticated and retail investors is also used in the 
Prospectus Directive in the EU.222 
 In relation to private placement under Rule 144A, the main benefits for issuers is 
that they are not subject to filing registration documents. Moreover, as their securities 
are no exchange-traded in the US, issuers are also not required to meet on-going 
disclosure and corporate governance rules.223 Some costs saving consequences are as 
follows. First, the issuance of securities may be completed in under half of the time 
needed for IPOs, resulting in less management fee being incurred. 224  Second, 
transnational issuers would be able to tap into the largest capital market in the world 
while their internal management would escape one of the most burdensome regulatory 
regimes.225 
 The actual costs of private placements under Rule 144A are however still 
present. One study has found similar fees charged by underwriting banks for both Rule 
144A and public offerings.226 Unlike cross-border public offering, private placement 
would not enable the issuer to establish a reputation and thereby further expand business 
activities in the host market. 
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 The operation of Regulation S contributes to global market fragmentation. Yet 
its benefit for the US issuers is limited, since they are still able to invest in foreign 
securities by employing a broker, but at a higher transactional cost.227  
3.2.2 Mutual recognition & the ‘equivalence’ approach 
Mutual recognition has been defined as ‘an understanding among two or more states 
under which each recognizes the other’s regulation or supervision in respect of an 
activity or institution as an adequate substitute for its own’.228 As discussed in Chapter 3, 
reciprocity and a framework of supervisory cooperation are the key features in mutual 
recognition.  
 The basic principle of the ‘equivalence’ approach is that a foreign issuer or 
services provider becomes exempt from the regulation and, sometimes, supervision in a 
host country, by a unilateral decision of the host country authority.229 
 Mutual recognition and the ‘equivalence’ approach are similar in their key 
benefits, which are market access and the potential of raising regulatory standards to the 
level in the home country.230 In contrast with harmonization, these two approaches are 
less costly and time consuming, but may be capable of fostering greater level of 
regulatory competition.  
 Moreover, the equivalence approach is more flexible than mutual recognition, as 
it usually requires the initiative of the host regulatory authorities alone. Therefore, the 
equivalence approach it has been used to provide smaller and medium-sized stock 
markets to gain a competitive edge in the trading of securities. For example, Belgium 
and Israel stock exchange rules have permitted trading of securities listed on foreign 
exchanges whose rules have been considered to be equivalent. 231  From an issuer’s 
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perspective, dual listing on a foreign stock exchange becomes less burdensome as there 
is no longer the need to comply with different countries’ regulations.  
 For both these mechanisms, the host regulator needs to carefully balance 
between the needs of market opening with investor protection, as well as whether 
national market participants could be put at a competitive disadvantage.  
3.3 Mechanisms of supervisory cooperation 
Supervisory cooperation has three aspects, namely, sharing of information for 
monitoring and enforcement, allocation of supervisory responsibility between 
supervisory authorities and coordination of supervisory actions. Four mechanisms of 
supervisory cooperation have been identified in a report by the former technical 
Committee of IOSCO.232 They are ad hoc cooperation, memoranda of understanding, 
supervisory colleges, and networks of regulators. I will also argue that a set of 
principles for coordinating functions between home/host authorities are needed to 
supervise cross-border transactions. 
3.3.1 Ad hoc cooperation 
The need for ad hoc cooperation could arise in many ways, whether from a gap in the 
oversight of a specific regulated entity, or from an unexpected developments giving rise 
to an urgent need for authorities to cooperate. The contents of ad hoc cooperation vary 
in each situation. Authorities may just wish to exchange information in confidence, or 
may use ad hoc cooperation as path towards coordinating supervisory activities. 
 Ad hoc cooperation has the benefit of providing authorities the flexibility of 
coming together to address an issue when and how as required. Since no prior 
arrangements are in theory required, there is no cost in making arrangements that turn 
out to be unnecessary or inappropriate. 
 However, it has been said that regulatory authorities ‘may be reluctant to engage 
in meaningful supervisory cooperation without established confidentiality safeguards in 
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place’.233 Inadequate information sharing is one of the main risks when authorities rely 
on ad hoc cooperation alone. Or, worse still, request for cooperation may be rejected or 
negotiations to cooperate stalled or prolonged, thereby resulting in losses to investors. 
Regulatory authorities are most likely to be faced with no cooperation when they seek 
to obtain control in assets located in the territory of other states. 234  Therefore, in 
situations such as cross-border insolvency, regulators cannot rely on ad hoc 
cooperation.235 
3.3.2 Memoranda of understanding (MoUs) 
MoUs form the bedrock of supervisory cooperation and are prevalent at the national 
level and in cross-border situations. They are negotiated and entered into in advance 
where regulatory authorities foresee a need for information exchange at some point in 
the future. As discussed in Chapter 4, IOSCO members committed themselves in May 
2002 to become signatories to a multilateral MoU for exchanging information and 
providing mutual assistance for regulatory enforcement purposes. Exchange of 
information for supervisory purposes on the other hand, is currently facilitated through 
using bilateral MoUs. According to the ISOCO supervisory report, the MoUs used for 
supervision are usually firm-specific, relating to the sharing of routine information. 
Their purpose is to assist authorities in carrying out their day-to-day oversight activities, 
rather than to enable them to monitor market trends and assess emerging risks.236 
 The benefit of the MOU is that subject to a one-off cost of making the agreement, 
a predictable mechanism can be established for long-term cooperation and for 
exchanging non-public information, in a manner that satisfies national law requirements 
on confidentiality and information usage.237 MoUs may also produce intangible benefits, 
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the most important being promoting mutual trust and confidence. Based on a stable 
working relationship, authorities may further advance their cooperation into new and 
evolving regulatory issue areas. 
 In the current supervisory landscape, the use of bilateral MoUs exhibits two main 
weaknesses, namely, lack of clarity in drafting and no legal binding force. The 
uncertainties pertaining to the interpretation and implementation of MoUs are 
compounded by a lack of standardized framework and proliferation of MoUs in cross-
border cooperation. This had resulted in ‘confused and confusing’ criss-crossing 
arrangements which have been criticized upon the eruption of the GFC for being 
‘difficult to operate effectively and rapidly in the case of an investigation’.238 This leads 
to the question of whether the costs and time consumed by the MoUs negotiations can 
be justified. Moreover, as indicate earlier, MoUs are usually not designed for regulators 
to assess market trends and emerging issues since they do not generally allow for the 
sharing of less intangible information about a group of firms or securities markets. With 
the current emphasis on macro-prudential supervision, the existing bilateral MoUs will 
not be capable of meeting the supervisory requirements of regulatory authorities in the 
post-GFC age.  
 The above analysis points to a need to streamline the various bilateral regimes 
and broaden their scope. With the IOSCO MMoU near to achieving universal 
acceptance and the wide acclaim from regulators for its contributions to the efficiency 
of information exchange in cross-border enforcement,239 the question arises on whether 
a similar multilateral information-sharing framework is also desirable and attainable for 
monitoring and supervision. 
 In considering this question, I examined the sample supervisory MoU in the 
Annex of the IOSCO supervisory report.240 The conclusion drawn from my study is that 
the nature and purposes of information exchange are very different for enforcement and 
supervisory purposes. Therefore, whereas a multilateral arrangement may be suitable for 
enforcement, it may not be so for day-to-day supervision. 
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 In the case of enforcement, the provision of information would usually be made 
upon request. Since securities market participants may operate in a large number of 
jurisdictions, to obtain information related to possible breaches of securities regulations 
may involve large number of countries.241 In this case, a multilateral information sharing 
arrangement for investigation and enforcement would likely be a more efficient method. 
 The purpose of supervisory MoU, on the other hand is to put in place 
mechanisms for the routine exchange of information between the authorities who are 
supervising the same cross-border markets and entities. Thus the sample MoU 
envisages both routine exchanges of specified information without the need for a prior 
request and sharing of information upon a request.242 Confidential information about an 
entity or market, such as, material event with adverse impact, financial conditions and 
early warning notices, will only likely to be shared when an authority can expect to 
receive reciprocal sharing of such information from its counterparts, in order that both 
authorities will be able to build a fuller regulatory profile of the entity/market and to 
discuss common regulatory issues. 
 If a supervisory multilateral MoU like the existing IOSCO MMoU were adopted, 
an authority would need to respond to information sharing requests even when the 
requesting authorities have not got supervisory responsibilities for the entities/markets 
relating to which the requests are made. Arguably, authorities always have the 
discretion to refuse a request. However, a refusal may have adverse impact on relations 
and MMoU’s effectiveness. To prevent such problems, a multilateral MoU for 
supervisory purposes could contain a caveat that member signatories’ commitment to 
sharing information is premised on the establishment by the requesting authority of an 
existing and real regulatory relationship with the entity/market in question. The 
foreseeable problems with such additional requirement would be increasing costs, 
lingering distrusts between authorities and slowing down of information exchange 
process. Since it has taken over a decade for IOSCO to first formulate the MMoU and 
then negotiate access of every member, there is likely to be little appetite for another 
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MMoU on supervision. Therefore, one reaches the conclusion that a MMoU for 
supervisory purposes should not be used.  
 The issue of how to streamline the existing labyrinth of MoU arrangements still 
remains to be addressed. Two suggestions are made. First, some guidance, building on 
the sample MoU, need to be established for improving the drafting clarity of bilateral 
MoUs. Second, IOSCO could potentially establish a public database for all the bilateral 
MoUs entered into by its members. The database is to contain information on the names 
of parties, purposes and scope of each of the MoUs, as well as analyses of the 
information to show how systemically important entities are being supervised. It is 
submitted that a database would engender transparency on the use of the MoU, enable 
the identification of supervisory gaps and also bring to light any need for establishing 
supervisory colleges. 
3.3.3 Supervisory colleges 
Supervisory colleges have increasingly been used as a tool in cross-border regulation of 
securities markets and intermediaries.243 In the post GFC age, the need to develop the 
use of supervisory colleges, particularly in respect of the large financial institution, was 
underscored by the G-20 and it falls within FSB’s mandate.244 
 Supervisory colleges are viewed as a more efficient information sharing 
mechanism than bilateral MoUs. They are established to provide on-going dialogues 
(ranging from authorization to crisis management) among all authorities that have direct 
regulatory interest in an entity/market, so that a complete risk picture may be built.245 In 
addition to information exchange, supervisors can more easily distribute tasks and 
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this forum. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Press Release, A Global Framework for 
Regulatory Cooperation on OTC Derivative CCPs and Trade Repositories (September 24, 2009). 
http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/ma090924.html. Accessed on 01/09/2012. See 
discussion in IOSCO supervisory report, 35. 
244
 FSB, ‘Report on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience’.(7 April 2008) 
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0804.pdf. Accessed on 01/09/2012. 
245
 IOSCO supervisory report, 36. 
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coordinate decisions. It has also been argued that the flexibility of supervisory colleges 
is particularly beneficial for joining securities market authorities together to oversee 
markets that have sprawling linkages with remote members.246 
 The difficulties with operating supervisory colleges are in at least three folds. 
Firstly, an effective agreement is needed to supplement the existing bilateral MoUs used 
by authorities. The supplemental agreement needs to unify information exchange 
practices, address differences in national confidentiality laws, establish means for 
coordinated decision making and create mediation mechanisms in case of conflict. It is 
suggested that IOSCO should formulate a sample agreement for supervisory colleges, 
perhaps using the Template devised by the former Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors as an example.247 In Chapter 3, it was discussed in relation to regional 
cooperation that the European Securities and Market Authority can participate in the 
activities of colleges of supervisors248 and has mediation power.249 However, there is 
currently no mediation forum for the global-level. Therefore it is likely that a lack of 
mediation result in authorities to limit the functions of global-level supervisory colleges. 
 The second difficulty pertaining to supervisory colleges concerns the issue of 
optimal design. The important questions are: (1) which jurisdictions should comprise a 
college; and what is the scope of regulatory issues the college should consider?250 While 
a larger membership has the advantage of comprehensiveness, hence easier to wield 
authority, it also has the disadvantage of possible operational inefficiency; a smaller 
group on the other hand can offer flexibility, but there is the risk of excluding regulatory 
authorities with potential legitimate interests. Moreover, setting the scope of a college’s 
remit too narrowly, the benefit yielded may not justify the cost. However, a wider remit 
 
246
 Ibid. 
247
 Comm. of European Banking Supervisors, Template for a Multilateral Cooperation and Coordination 
Agreement on the Supervision of XY Group (Dec. 27, 2007), available at 
www.cebs.org/getdoc/0cb8e434-764d-4530-9b09-a23b5bd25f99/CEBS-2007-177-rev-2-template-for-
written-agre-(1).aspx. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. The Template document was a formal agreement, to 
be signed among supervisors, regarding the organization of the colleges in supervising a particular 
bank. See discussions in Duncan Alford, ‘Supervisory colleges: the global GFC and improving 
international supervisory coordination’, Emory International Law Review 24 (2010) 57, 61-63. 
248
 Art. 21, 23.Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority, See Chapter 3. 
249
 Art. 19, ibid. 
250
 IOSCO supervisory report, 36. Also Report on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience (7 April 
2008), V.5 www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0804.pdf. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012. 
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will exert a greater demand on regulatory authorities’ limited resources.251 Therefore, 
authorities must always endeavour to strike a balance between these considerations 
every time establishing a supervisory college.252 
 The third difficulty is more fundamental. It is to this difficulty that the UK’s 
Financial Services Authority has expressed concerns in the Turner Review.253 In sum, 
the difficult is that ‘national governments look to national supervisors to protect 
national interests’ 254  which are most likely to diverge, thereby causing problem for 
coordination within a college. The collapse of BCCI mentioned in Chapter 3 is a case in 
point. It demonstrates that when unwise strategies are adopted by supervisors in a 
college, it can lead to dire results for a regulated entity.255 
3.3.4 Networks of regulators 
As an additional mechanism in cross-border supervisory cooperation, the IOSCO 
supervisory report has put forward the Technique Committee (now taken over by seven 
Policy Committees). In the past, IOSCO’s Technical Committee has been the primary – 
to borrow an above noted expression from Slaughter – ‘distiller and disseminator of 
credible information’256 the securities markets. The IOSCO supervisory report makes the 
suggestion that Technique Committee could take on the roles of assessing risk and 
developing strategies for their mitigation. In other words, in addition to information 
exchange and standard-setting at a microeconomic level, which relates to the health of 
individual entities and efficiency in particular markets, IOSCO is looking to gather 
information about macro-economic risk arising in the securities markets. As already 
mentioned, IOSCO formed an independent research unit in 2010 to monitor market risk. 
 
251
 For example Lannoo has expressed doubts about whether the newly established European Banking 
Authority has the resource to meet its mandate of overseeing supervisory colleges in banking. Karel 
Lannoo, ‘The road ahead after de Larosière’ CEPS Policy Brief No. 195/7, Brussels, August 2009, p. 
4. (www.ceps.eu) 
252
 In respect to establishing supervisory colleges for CRAs, IOSCO has listed a numbers of criteria for 
membership. See IOSCO, ‘International cooperation in oversight of credit agencies – notes’, March 
2009. (IOSCOPD287) 
253
 FSA ‘The Turner Review: a regulatory response to the global banking crisis’, 99 (2009). 
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. Accessed on 01/09/ 2012.  
254
 Ibid. 
255
 There was a lack of incentive among the supervisory college to supervise BCCI properly and 
cooperate adequately. See discussions in Alford, n 247 above, 60. 
256
 See Slaughter, n 18 above, 297. 
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While IOSCO is in a good position to obtain information, the question is whether it has 
the expertise to assess them. Another question to be addressed is how IOSCO’s role in 
risk assessment is to complement the roles of the FSB and IMF. These developments 
are at an embryonic stage and should be a focal point for future research. 
3.3.5 Gaps in supervisory cooperation 
The four mechanisms contained in the IOSCO supervisory report provide for the means 
by which regulatory authorities can exchange information, and, where a college is 
established, coordinate supervisory activities. It will be recalled that there is another 
aspect to supervisory cooperation, namely, allocation of supervisory responsibilities 
between authorities. There is currently no authority in the area of securities regulation 
on how supervision of a transnational market/entity should be allocated between its 
home-country supervisor and host-countries authorities.257 National authorities within a 
supervisory college could in theory make decisions about allocation as they see fit. 
However, where a college has not been formed, which is the case for the majority of 
market participants, how home and host supervisors will coordinate their activities is 
not immediately clear. This issue is usually outside of MoUs, which focus on 
information exchange.258 I would like to argue for the need to establish a coherent set of 
principles for coordinating supervisory functions between home and host authorities 
regulating a transnational market/entity. 
 In the area of banking regulation, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) promulgated in 1975 the First Concordat which set out basic principles for the 
supervisory cooperation between ‘host’ and ‘parent’ authorities of international banks.259 
 
257
 IOSCO has however, under different contexts, discussed the various roles of the home and host 
supervisors. But without much reference on how and for what purpose they should interact. For 
example see IOSCO, ‘Recognizing a firm’s internal risk model for the purposes of calculating 
required regulatory risk capital: guide to supervisors’, 14-17, May 1999. IOSCOPD89. 
258
 See Mann and Barry, n above, and ‘International Agreements and Understandings for the Production 
of Information and Other Mutual Assistance (1995) 29 Int'l L. 780. (Discussing MoUs entered into by 
the US SEC in the years between 1982-2002.) 
259
 Guidelines for cooperation between supervisors were, in fact, one of the first major issues considered 
the BCBS. The first set of recommendations of the First Concordat was sent to the G 10 Governors in 
September 1975 and subsequently endorsed in December the same year. For a detailed discussion of 
the Concordats see George Walker, International banking regulation – law, policy and practice, 
(Kluwer Law International) 2001, 86 et seq. 
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Consequently revised, the current Concordat contains principles addressing the follow 
issues:260 
 Report between host authority and parent authority where problems arise 
affecting operations in the host country; 
 Mutual review by home and host authorities of each other’s supervision 
and extension of supervision where necessary; 
 Consolidated supervision; 
 Co-operation between home and host authorities on supervision of 
solvency and liquidity and foreign exchange exposures. 
The rules in the Concordat are based on the principle of cooperation between authorities 
to establish adequate supervision and ensure no gaps in the oversight of foreign 
operations.261 The Concordat does not provide for rules on allocation of supervisory 
responsibilities between home and host country authorities. This is an appropriate 
approach since discussions in Chapter 3 on the EU’s passport rules for financial services 
have shown that rules-based approach for allocating supervisory responsibilities can be 
difficult to operate because the rules are inflexible and can give rise to legal 
uncertainty.262 However, high-level principles to give guidance on best practices for 
efficient sharing of supervisory responsibilities between home and host country 
authorities can still be useful. Moreover, another aspect not considered under the 
Concordat is cooperation in relation to macro-prudential supervision, which has been 
highlighted by the GFC as a crucial issue. 
 It is my contention that a new Concordat in the area securities could be 
established through reconstructing the Basle model. A preliminary list of issues to be 
addressed in the new Concordat is as follows. (1) High-level principles on best practices 
for efficient sharing of supervisory responsibilities between home and host country 
authorities. (2) Standards of supervision to be attained by home/host authorities and 
mutual review by the authorities against the standards. (3) Rules on when certain 
information needs to be shared between home/host authorities. (4) Principles of 
 
260
 The 1983 revision was triggered by the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano, then Italy’s largest bank. 
Walker, n 260 above, 100. 
261
 Revised Concordat, Section III. 
262
 See Chapter 3, Section 3.1.  
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cooperation for prudential and conduct supervision. (5) Principles for coordinating 
when a macro-prudential risk affecting a market/entity is to be identified. 
 There are no easy answers for these issues.263 In the securities sector, there is an 
absence of the relative homogeneity in the banking industry. Thus the supervisory needs 
of the OTC clearing and settlement system differ greatly from the investment arm of 
Barclays plc. Therefore a new Concordat would need to contain separate provisions for 
addressing the supervision of transnational markets, settlement systems, services 
providers and investment funds. The difficulty of such project should not however erase 
the need to establish global principles for coordinating supervisory functions between 
home and host authorities.  
 There are three reasons for the need of a Concordat in securities to supplement 
the one in banking. First, the merging of the financial sectors means that any gaps in 
cross-border supervision in one sector of the financial market may have spill-over effect 
into other sectors. Second, effective cross-border crisis management is premised on 
adequate supervisory cooperation arrangements between home and host authorities.264 
Third, the growing numbers of transnational market participants coming from the 
emerging markets points to the need for a set of global principles since regulatory 
authorities in those countries may have little experience in home-host cooperation. It is 
further suggested that this could be a suitable project for the FSB to undertake. 
 Moreover, in light of the collapses of multinational financial institutions during 
the GFC, the notion of supervisory cooperation needs to be extended to consolidated 
cross-border resolution.
265
 In the absence of harmonized laws in the area of resolution, a 
Concordat was proposed to facilitate consolidated resolutions.266 
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 Mr Huib Muller, the third Chairman of BCBS, recorded the First Concordat process in terms of ‘much 
blood, sweat and tears of simple supervisors’. Quote found in Walker, n 260 above, 87. 
264
 Eva Hüpkes, ‘Rivalry in Resolution How to reconcile local responsibilities and global interests?’, 
(2010) 2 ECFR 216.  
265
 Rosa Lastra and Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘From Consolidated Supervision to Consolidated 
Resolution’, Chapter 17 in John Raymond LaBrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Dalvinder Singh 
(eds), Managing Risk in the Financial System, (Elgar 2011), 308. Generally see, Rosa Lastra (ed), 
Cross Border Bank Insolvency, (Oxford: OUP 2010). 
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4 Summary of Findings 
This Chapter has propounded the concept of a Global Regulatory Framework to address 
the global-level regulatory problems in securities regulation.  
 Pillar I of the GRF contains the governance structure which is shown in Figure 1 
on page 228. The actors authorized by law are represented as squares, and the soft law 
actors as circles. The diagram illustrates the organization of the actors in the governance 
of securities markets as two distinct and yet related systems. The national legal system 
is shown on the left. It is a representation of polycentric governance. The state has 
delegated regulatory authority (as shown by arrows) to agencies which are functionally 
independent, yet to remain democratically accountable. Agencies, in turn, have 
delegated regulatory functions to SROs. Both agencies and SROs are subject to legal 
and political restraints coming from the state. Outside the areas of governmental 
regulation is the domain of the transnational markets which function through contracts 
and trade associations.  
 The system of global-level governance is set out in Figure 1 on the right. As 
explained above, national regulators are linked together through their membership in 
FSB, IMF and the other SSBs. It is primarily the FSB and IMF’s role to monitor market 
trends and assess risks, this role is also supplemented by the risk monitoring functions 
within the SSBs and trade associations. International standards are established by the 
FSB and SSBs, in consultation with the transnational markets and national 
governments. These standards address important issues including systemic risk and 
supervisory cooperation and could also foster the removal of regulatory barriers due to 
convergence-effect on national laws. Moreover, supervisory cooperation is further 
facilitated through the interactions between regulatory authorities within the soft law 
bodies. FSB also plays a coordination role in the financial regulation of FSB member 
countries. To improve the operation of the governance structure, it is suggested that the 
FSB should publish principles on how it allocates tasks on standard-setting and 
implementation oversight between the standard setters and itself. 
 Soft law is the primary form of governance. Although IMF is a treaty 
organization, the FSAP and Early Warnings do not give rise to legal obligations on IMF 
members. At the interface of national regulation and global-level governance, hierarchy 
(which is clearly visible at the national level) breaks down within the flexible structures 
of the GRF. It is argued in Chapter 6 that the fluidity between the left and right-hand-
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side compoenents in Figure 1 is opportunity for the almost appropriate solutions to be 
found. 
 It is recommended that regulatory authorities should carefully weigh the benefits 
and costs of the relevant mechanisms of cooperation within the Pillar II of GRF so as to 
make a determination on the appropriate mechanism(s) to adopt for a specific cross-
border issue. To assist authorities with their determination, a three-stage test is 
suggested. Its underlying goal is to establish the most suitable means for solving a 
particular global-level problem.267 The test for determining the most suitable means is 
stated as follows. Firstly, the mechanism must be a suitable means for generating 
benefits such as lowering transactional costs and reducing systemic risk. Secondly, the 
costs of adopting the mechanism must not exceed the benefits. Thirdly, there must not 
be a better available alternative. 
 The final reflection in the Chapter is on the trilemma in the global-level 
problems. It is argued that the opposing forces of state sovereignty and market 
regulation become resolved through the informal and flexible processes and 
arrangements under the GRF (diagrammatically represented in Figure 2). It is through 
collection action of the global actors within the GRF that the globalizing markets may 
be fostered while the global-level regulatory problems are addressed. 
  
 
267
 This a variation of the criteria for harmonization formulated in the context of EC corporate law by 
Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, ‘The Uneasy Case for Top-down Corporate Law Harmonisation in the 
European Union.’ (2006) 27 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 939. (The criteria stated on page 953 are: first, 
presence of market failures to correct; second, countries acting individually are unable or unwilling to 
correct them; and third, the result of harmonization would be the increasing of societal welfare, after 
the costs of the new rules are taken into account.) 
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Fig. 1 – Governance structure in transnational securities market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 – Resolving the trilemma 
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Chapter 6:  Quasi-legal Issues in the GRF 
 
The global actors in the Global Regulatory Framework (GRF) identified in the last 
Chapter are the IMF, FSB and the relevant international standard setters. The roles of 
FSB and IOSCO in securities market governance have not been provided in national 
law or by international treaties. Therefore, there are uncertainties as to the legitimacy of 
these actors and legal nature of the international standards and other collective actions.1 
When there are doubts about the legitimacy of a standard, regulatory authorities are 
likely to ignore it, particularly if it is vague.2 Therefore, the issues of legitimacy and 
implementation are closely connected. Inconsistency in the implementation of 
international financial standards is a logical consequence flowing from uncertainties 
concerning legitimacy. Moreover, when there is a lack of proper implementation of a 
standard, this could affect views on its legitimacy. 
 In this Chapter, the issue of legitimacy is examined in relation to the FSB and 
IOSCO, with a view finding how their legitimacy could be enhanced and 
implementation of international standards improved. I will argue that at the global-level, 
legitimacy is best achieved through ex ante processes of representation and transparency 
and principles of fairness. My contention is that there needs to be re-connection between 
governance at the global-level and national legal systems. One means of achieving this 
would be to utilized domestic review processes as a safeguard mechanism to engender 
accountability and implementation. 
 The chapter is set out as follows. Section 1 explains the concepts of legitimacy 
and accountability, and examines the accountability framework at global-level. Section 
2 examines the present implementation framework for ‘soft law’ and suggests ways to 
foster greater level of implementation. 
 
1
 For example, Mario Giovanoli, ‘The international financial architecture and its reform after the global 
crisis’, in Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (ed.) International Monetary and Financial Law, the 
Global Crisis, (Oxford: OUP) 2011, 19. 
2
 As standards may be ‘too vague to mean much.…Even the most specific standards can be evaded’. See 
‘A stitch in time’, The Economist (28 January 1999). 
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1 Legitimacy 
1.1 The concept of legitimacy 
Under a national regulatory framework for the financial markets, the issue of legitimacy 
arises from the establishment of independent regulatory authorities formally by an Act 
of Parliament.3 For an operationally independent authority to be legitimate within a 
democracy, 4  it needs to be created and to function according to the constitutional 
principles and mechanisms within a national legal system, and in particular, to be 
subject to some accountability process.5 
 In global-level governance of the financial markets, legitimacy is not an issue 
relating just to legal validity.6 Due to an absence of an international treaty to confer 
powers on the actors of governance and the weak link between the global-level and the 
national democratic process,7 if one were to apply the concept of democratic legitimacy 
at the global-level, it would lead to a finding of perpetual lack of legitimacy in the 
actors. Yet despite the innate democratic legitimacy deficit, many of the actors in global 
 
3
 It was explained by the European Commission that ‘[t]here are four main dimensions to operational 
independence: institutional, regulatory, supervisory and budgetary. First, supervisors should be 
independent from both political authorities and commercial interference in the exercise of their 
powers and functions. Second, supervisors should have sufficient autonomy in setting technical 
prudential rules. Third, supervisors should be able to exercise their judgments and powers 
independently, and in a non-discriminatory manner, with respect to licensing, inspections, sanctioning, 
and enforcement actions. Finally, supervisors should have sufficient flexibility to determine their 
budgetary needs.’ See ‘Review of the Lamfalussy process Strengthening supervisory convergence’ 
COM(2007) 727 final. For example, the regulatory independence model has had a long tradition in the 
US. See Fabian Amtenbrink and Rosa Lastra, ‘Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial 
Regulatory Agencies – A Theoretical Framework’ in R. V. De Mulder, Mitigating Risk in the Context 
of safety and security. How Relevant is a Rational Approach? (Rotterdam: Erasmus School of Law & 
Research School for Safety and Security (OMV) 2008), 117-119 (ISBN 987-90-5677-068-6). Also, 
the second principle in IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ requires that 
‘[t]he regulator should be operationally independent and accountable in the exercise of its functions 
and powers’ (June 2010, IOSCOPD323).  
4
 The concept of democracy has many facets. A simple explanation is offered by Hachez and Wouters: 
democracy is the ‘“government by the people”, meaning inclusive and egalitarian participation of all 
in public decision-making’. Nicolas Hachez and Jan Wouters, ‘A glimpse at the democratic legitimacy 
of private standards: assessing the public accountability of GLOBALGAP’, J.I.E.L. 677, 685 (and 
literature mentioned).  
5
 Amtenbrink and Lastra, n 3 above, 119-124. (Establishing ‘the case for financial regulatory agencies 
which are insulated from political influence while at the same time being democratically accountable’.) 
6
 Julia Black 'Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes' 
(2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 137, 144. 
7
 On the point of weak link with national democratic processes see Nico Krisch, ‘Global Administrative 
Law and the Constitutional Ambition’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (ed.) The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism (Oxford: OUP) 2010, 262. 
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governance in the financial markets (and indeed in many other areas of global concern) 
are still regarded as legitimate, for example, through the objective fact that their 
standards are being implemented at national and regional levels. 8  It is therefore 
insightful also to consider legitimacy from a social scientist’s perspective.9  
 Social scientists study legitimacy by asking whether and why an organization is 
accorded credibility and enjoys acceptance by those whom it seeks to govern. 10 An 
institution/organization is said to be legitimate when ‘it is widely believed to have the 
right to rule’.11 Alternatively speaking, a legitimate institution may be said to exhibit a 
property of ‘pull towards compliance’ on the addressees of a rule.12 Thus accepted or 
believed as having the right to rule are ulterior qualities, capable of being exteriorly 
established. 
 Democratic legitimacy is a ground for social acceptance, due to the 
establishment of procedures and processes, which causes a social group ‘as holder of the 
pouvoir constituant’13 to form a perception that their preferences are reflected by the 
policies and decisions taken on their behalf.14 According to Black, there are three further 
grounds for social acceptance. Legitimacy of an institution may be pragmatically based, 
because a social group perceives the institution as pursuing their interests. Legitimacy 
can be morally based, where a social group perceives the goals and/or procedures of an 
institution to fit their morally values. Moreover, legitimacy can be cognitively based, 
where an institution is accepted as necessary or inevitable.15 
 Thus in the global arena, legitimacy rests on the ability of global actors to align 
the outcomes of their activities with various stakeholder interests and/or their moral 
values. In order that such alignment of interests and/or moral values may be 
 
8
 The capital requirements in Basle I is a case in point.  
9
 Social scientists’ view of legitimacy is rooted in Weber’s work. Max Weber, ‘Economy and Society: An 
Outline of Interpretive Sociology’ (1922) 1 Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (ed.), Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978) vol. 1, 215 
10
 Black, n 6 above, 144. 
11
 Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, ‘The legitimacy of global governance institutions’, in Rudiger 
Wolfrum and Volker Roben (eds.) Legitimacy in International Law, (Berlin: Springer) 2008, 25. 
12
 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations,(Oxford: OUP) 1990, 24.  
13
 ‘Pouvoir constituant’, literally means the power to constitute, refers to constitution making as the 
fundamental action of self-determination. Philipp Dann and Zaid Al-Ali, ‘The institutionalized 
pouvoir constituent – constitution-making under external influence in Iraq, Sudan, and East Timor’, in 
Armin von Bogdandy and Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.) (2006) 10 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law, 423, 426. 
14
 Amtenbrink and Lastra, n 3 above 121. 
15
 Black, n 6 above, 144. 
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demonstrated and assessed, accountability becomes the ‘route through which pragmatic 
and moral/normative legitimacy claims…are validated’.16 
 However, some writers have viewed this form of ‘output legitimacy’ in less 
favourable terms. In their view, some governing entities would try to foster their 
legitimacy in global governance without necessarily referring to democracy, but through 
their problem-solving potential, i.e. ‘getting the job done’.17 Therefore, it is submitted 
that while the social sciences approach provides some plausible explanations to the 
global governance – governing without government - phenomenon, democratic 
legitimacy should always remain as the basis of social acceptance of international 
standards. Two points serve to illustrate the relevance of democratic legitimacy in 
global-level governance. Firstly, national financial regulators as creatures of national 
laws must be acting within their authority when engaging in international cooperation.18 
Secondly, the consensus decision-making approach in the FSB (comprising national 
government officials) reflects a decision not to further cede national autonomy and to 
maintain the control by individual states. Thus to construct democratic legitimacy in 
global governance is also to strengthen global governance.19  
1.2 Accountability 
As noted above, a process of accountability is required both for national regulatory 
authorities and actors of global governance to establish legitimacy. However, the 
rationale and nature of accountability differ at the national and global-levels. Under a 
national regulatory regime, accountability being a pre-requisite for the independence of 
regulatory authorities is generally prescribed by law. The function of accountability in 
global governance is primarily to engender social acceptance of soft law standards, as 
result, the construction of accountability is mostly by global actors themselves. In the 
 
16
 Black, n 6 above, 149. 
17
 ‘Focusing on output legitimacy and effectiveness would in practice surrender agenda-setting and rule-
making to the actors most able to deliver outputs, rather than to the community actually affected by 
such agenda and rules’ (emphasis added).Therefore the authors restating the centrality of the 
democracy ideal in legitimacy judgments about global governance. Hachez and Wouters, n 4 above, 
684. 
18
 For example, EU Transparency Directive Art. 25(4), and MiFID 63. For discussions see chapter 3.  
19
 It is also the view of Krisch that, ‘Democracy may not be the only source of legitimacy for public 
power, but other sources are likely to serve as complements, not substitutes for it’. Krisch, n 7 above, 
250. 
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following discussion, by using the mechanisms of accountability under national laws as 
the starting point, the meaning of accountability at the global-level is examined, and the 
accountability framework of the global actors assessed. 
1.2.1 Mechanisms of accountability in national law 
Accountability for national regulatory authorities entails ‘an obligation owed by one 
person (the accountable [authority]) to another (the accountee) according to which the 
former must give account of, explain and justify his actions or decisions against criteria 
of some kind, and take responsibility for any fault or damage’.20 From this definition, 
the elements of an accountability regime – who, to whom, how, for what, in accordance 
with what standards, and with what effects – are abstracted.21 On a basic level, these 
elements may be thought as an application of principal-agency theory. However, 
Hüpkes et al. have argued that the ‘command and control’ relationship between the 
principal and agent contradicts with operational independence of national regulatory 
authorities.22 Therefore, unlike in a ‘command and control’ relationship where control is 
usually only exercised (e.g., through sanctions) after an agent has acted,23 both ex ante 
and ex post accountability mechanisms are used for independent regulatory authorities. 
The assessments of regulatory and supervisory actions may be based on procedures 
requirements, regulatory objectives or a set of performance indicators.24 Furthermore, 
the functions of accountability mechanisms are four folds: (1) provide public oversight; 
(2) enhance legitimacy; (3) enhance governance; and (4) improve performance.25 
 In general, an independent financial regulatory authority is accountable to a 
national parliament through annual reports and appearing in front of parliamentary 
members. Parliament holds the ultimate power to change the charter of constitution, as 
 
20
 Dawn Oliver, ‘Law, Politics and Public Accountability: The Search for a New Equilibrium’ (1994) 
Public Law, 248. This reference is found in Amtenbrink and Lastra, n 3 above, 120. See also Anne-
Marie Slaughter, ‘Agencies on the loose? Holding government networks accountable’ in George 
Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, and Peter Lindseth (ed.) Transatlantic regulatory co-operation : legal 
problems and political prospects (Oxford : OUP, 2000), 525. 
21
 For a more detailed discussion on the elements, see Maria Lastra, Legal foundations of international 
monetary stability, (Oxford: OUP) 2006, 67. 
22
 Eva Hüpkes, Marc Quintyn and Michael Taylor, ‘The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors – 
Principles and Practice’ [2005] EBLR 1575, 1577. 
23
 Hachez and Wouters, n 4 above, 690. 
24
 Hüpkes et al. n 22 above, 1591 et seq. 
25
 Hüpkes et al. n 22 above, 1578. 
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well as appoint and remove officials of the authority. Thus ‘the rationale for 
accountability mechanisms…finds its roots in (representative) democracy itself’.26 The 
political dimensions of accountability also includes judicial review and, in some 
circumstances, the obligation to cooperate with the executive.27 This latter obligation 
however needs to be carefully designed so as not to frustrate the operational 
independence of the authority. 28  Moreover, from an economics perspective, the 
designing of an accountability regime further requires establishing clear standards and 
specific outcomes against which the authority’s conduct and performance are to the 
assessed.29  
1.2.2 Extending accountability to global governance 
As above mentioned, accountability regimes under national law addresses issues such as, 
who accounts to whom, how to account, in accordance with what standards, and with 
what effects? However, these accountability questions are not easily answerable at the 
global-level. Therefore, it is argued that a different analytical path is required for 
assessing accountability in global governance.  
a. Uncertainty as to ‘who accounts to whom’ 
In the absence of an international legal framework, it is difficult to determine with 
whom FSB and IOSCO should have an accountability relationship. It will be shown that 
a principal-agent model also does not fit global-level governance. 
 The situation of FSB is considered first. There is an express mandate from the 
G-20 to FSB which prima facie results in the latter accountable to the former. 30 
However, the difficulty with FSB being accountable to the G-20 is that the Plenary 
Meeting, the decision-making body of the FSB, is also comprised of the IMF and 
international standard setters. Since the G-20 is not able (in theory at least) to determine 
the personnel representing these bodies, and the independence of the standard setters is 
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expressly provided in the FSB charter,31 the G-20 could only be said to have partial 
control over the Plenary. Therefore, in terms of accountability, the Plenary meeting may 
not be viewed as unitary. This fact makes a direct application of the principal-agent 
model difficult. This explains why the FSB charter itself does not mention 
accountability, or any requirement that the Plenary is to report its work to the G-20. 
Where in its various communiqués and declarations, the G-20 requires FSB to make 
reports, these mostly relate to information on how the member jurisdictions have 
implemented their commitments and the policies FSB has developed in response to the 
G-20 leaders’ requests.32 In short, the issue of accountability is evaded because the non-
homogenous membership. 
 In respective of IOSCO, an analysis to determine ‘who accounts to whom’ has 
two aspects. The first aspect concerns IOSCO Board’s accountability which arises from 
delegation of responsibility and requirement to report from the Presidents Committee 
(PC) to the IOSCO Board.33 Since it is the Board that oversees the Policy Committees in 
their formulation of standards and appoints the IOSCO’s Secretary General who 
represents the Organization in FSB, accountability of the Board is a critical connection 
point in global governance, which needs further explanation. Firstly, it may be said that 
the Board is accountable to all the IOSCO members, like the board of directors to 
shareholders of a company. Secondly, it could also be argued that the Board is 
accountable to market participants. As discussed above, to attain pragmatic and 
moral/normative legitimacy, the global actors must align the outcomes of their activities 
with various stakeholder interests and/or their moral values. Consequently, the global 
actors are accountable to the various stakeholders for the outcomes of collective actions. 
In broad terms, the three groups of stakeholders in securities markets are regulatory 
authorities, consumer investors and professional market participants. The IOSCO’s by-
laws have already provided some mechanisms for the Board to account to the assembly 
of regulatory authorities in the PC. This leaves the two categories of market participants, 
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whose interests, it is submitted, the Board also should also take into account.34 Due to 
the presence of numerous stakeholders whose interests may not coincide, there are 
‘multiple legitimacy claims’.35 The Board must determine for a particular incidence to 
whose interests it should respond first.  
 Moreover, it will be recalled that it is the PC which has the powers to make the 
decisions that applies to all the IOSCO members. The second aspect of the 
accountability question concerns to whom are the IOSCO members accountable in 
making the PC resolutions? In the recently amended by-laws, IOSCO’s members have 
expressly committed to implementing international standards endorsed by the PC. Since 
the PC resolutions have no legal effect, IOSCO’s members are therefore individually 
accountable under their own national constitutional laws for their own decisions to 
implement the standards. Moreover, IOSCO’s members may also be accountable to 
their counterparts in the PC. 
 In sum, the question ‘who accounts to whom’ is complex at the global-level. 
Accountability mechanisms for the FSB have not been clearly set out due to the 
difficulty with membership comprising International Financial Institutions and 
international standard setters. For IOSCO, the primary accountability relationship is that 
between the Board and the Presidents Committee, but it is also suggested that the 
former needs to take into account market participants’ interest. 
b. Absence of yardsticks 
It will be recalled that under national laws, accountability mechanisms and standards 
have been established which are based on administrative law processes and micro-
economics theories on measuring the performance of an authority. However for the FSB 
and IOSCO, there is no direct link with national electorate, nor is there judicial review 
process for examine decision-making in the organizations. Moreover, it is submitted 
that the objectives of the FSB and IOSCO are too broad to render any attempts to 
account meaningful. Moreover, no yardsticks have been developed for either of the 
bodies.  
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 The objectives of the FSB are set out in Article 1 of the FSB Charter, which 
provides: 
‘[FSB] to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial authorities 
and international standard-setting bodies (SSBs) in order to develop and promote the 
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector 
policies…the FSB will address vulnerabilities affecting financial systems in the interest 
of global financial stability’. 
According to this Article, the FSB, in carrying out its mandate, must seek to ensure that 
effective regulations and policies are in place, in particular for the purposes of 
identifying and addressing vulnerabilities affecting financial stability. The terms such as 
‘effective’ and ‘vulnerabilities’ are broad concepts which have not been further defined. 
 The IOSCO’s by-laws (recently amended) provide that the objective of the 
Organization is to –  
‘exchange information with a view of: (a) developing securities markets and improving 
their efficiency; (b) coordinating the enforcement of securities regulation; and (c) 
implementing common standards’.36 
This is a statement of intent of the IOSCO membership to be used as bases for 
collective action. In the almost thirty years of IOSCO’s existence, there have been many 
reports and standards produced – in particular the ‘Principles and Objectives of 
Securities Regulation’ and the MMoU – under these three objectives, but there has yet 
to be an investigation by members into how effectively IOSCO has delivered on each of 
the objectives. Indeed, it would be difficult to design a measure to determining whether 
securities markets have become more developed or efficient.  
1.2.3 The ‘responsiveness’ of accountability 
The above analysis has shown the accountability questions used for independent 
national regulatory authorities are difficult to apply to the FSB and IOSCO. Writing in 
the context of developing a model of legitimacy applicable to governing the global food 
industry, Hachez and Wouters have defined accountability as  
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‘the relationship of a governing entity to its public according to which the former must 
allow inclusive and egalitarian participation of the latter in its governing activities, in 
order to take account of the public's preferences in making governance decisions, as 
well as the relationship according to which the public is entitled to control…the 
governing entity for the way it has conducted’.37 
In Hachez and Wouters’ view, where a set of norms is issued by a ‘governing entity’ 
after participation of the ‘public’, this should satisfy the democratic process and the 
norms have good chances of being viewed as legitimate.  
 According to the ‘responsiveness’ concept of accountability propounded by the 
two authors, to attain legitimacy, it entails the global actors to first consult with the 
various stakeholders, and then to take all the relevant interests into account. Following 
from my analysis on the accountability relationships of IOSCO, the stakeholder with 
whom the Organization should consult are professional market participants, as well as 
retail investors and national authorities. This ex ante participatory accountability 
mechanism is also in line with the ownership notion in international economic 
relations.38 
 In order to facilitate participation of stakeholders and responsiveness of the 
global actors, Hachez and Wouters suggest that there should be transparency concerning 
the actors and statement of their reasons for making regulatory decisions. 
1.2.4 Transparency 
Transparency may be defined as the degree of access enjoyed by the relevant public to 
information.39 Freedom to information has been labelled as a fundamental constitutional 
right and key for efficient free markets. 40  This part further explains the role of 
transparency in financial market governance. 
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 National regulatory authorities are under legal obligations to disclose certain 
information. It is submitted that transparency of regulatory authorities possess three 
distinctive functions, namely, constitutional, market discipline and instrumental. First, 
as already indicated, accountability can only take place in the environment where a 
financial authority has been providing, on a continuously basis, adequate information to 
the parliament and executive which explains its actions.41 The transparency obligations 
of regulatory authorities, as the pre-condition for invoking check and balances are also 
the bulwark for the protection of constitutional rights, often articulated as freedom of 
information. However, this right like many other ‘human rights’ is not absolute, since 
some confidential information, particularly those related to the solvency of financial 
institutions, cannot be published for reasons of financial market stability. 42  Thus a 
balance always needs to be struck between transparency and market confidence. 
 The second role of transparency on the part of regulatory authorities is the 
promotion of transparency in the market, thereby fostering market efficiency. Outside of 
its obligations to account to the parliament and executive, a regulatory authority also 
needs to keep the markets and general public informed about its actions.43 This is carried 
out through a regulatory authority’s consultation process, its publications of proposals 
and decisions, as well as its public conferences and seminars. These communicative 
processes, firstly, facilitate accountability. A regulatory authority when brought ‘face-
to-face’ with the regulated firms, as well as consumers and investors, is subject to direct 
questioning, sometimes on matters of individual concern. Where there is public airing 
of complaints and discontents,44 reputation risk will likely to move the authority to 
amend its ways even in the absence of breach of law. Secondly, transparency on the part 
of the regulatory authority provides information to the markets about future regulatory 
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changes, thereby assisting in commercial decision-making. Thirdly, regulatory 
transparency will facilitate regulatory competition.45 
 I have termed the third function served by transparency of regulatory authorities 
as instrumental, with a view to indicate that transparency may also be used by the 
authority for its own purposes, in particular to evoke certain behavioural reactions. It 
has been argued that accountability relationships are innately ‘dialectical’.46 This means 
that a degree of interdependence exists between the accountable and the accountee. By 
being transparent, a regulatory authority could prevent interference from the 
governmental executive.47 Moreover, when the regulated firms are better informed about 
a piece of regulation, greater compliance is like to result.48 Thus a rational regulatory 
could able to use transparency for its own advantage.  
 Having established the crucial functions of transparency in giving effect to 
constitutional rights, enhancing market mechanisms and promoting the regulators’ goals, 
the question arises as to whether transparency of the global actors is adequate. When 
considering this question, one should bear in mind a lesson from the GFC, which is that 
in order that transparency may serve as an effective market mechanism, information 
disclosure needs to be of good quality and kept simple.49 
1.3 Assessing accountability of global actors 
Having identified the key elements of accountability in global governance as 
participation and transparency, a critical analysis on the accountability frameworks of 
the FSB and IOSCO is now provided. The analysis examines the rules on participation 
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and transparency governing each of the actors and discusses accountability from the 
perspectives of state members, market and other relevant stakeholders. 
1.3.1 Accountability of FSB 
As discussed above, FSB’s mandate comes from the G-20. Accountability and formal 
reporting to the G-20 are not expressly provided in the FSB’s charter. Participation by 
G-20 financial ministers or other governmental officials is therefore the most important 
element for ensuring that the FSB is acting within its mandate to achieve its objectives. 
All except five of the G-20 countries’ financial ministers are FSB members.50 Hong 
Kong and Singapore are the only non-G20 countries in the FSB without a ministerial 
representation. The other non-G20 countries – Spain, Switzerland and the Netherlands – 
have ministerial representatives in the FSB. Ministerial presence is also important 
because the FSB’s work on financial stability involves distributive problems. 
 The impact of the FSB’s work reaches beyond its membership. In recognition of 
this the FSB is required to consult with private sector and non-member authorities.51 The 
FSB has not issued any documentation on how the consultation progress is conducted. 
Therefore it has been uncertain as to which area the FSB will be consulting. For 
example, there has been no evidence of consultation from FSB’s public documents in 
respect to its decision to assess adherence to standards on supervision and cooperation, 
which also included non-members. The FSB did however explain in detail its 
methodology for choosing which countries’ laws to assess.52 
1.3.2 Accountability of IOSCO 
The accountability framework in the ISOCO is more sophisticated. Accountability 
processes have been established in relation to the IOSCO members, market participants 
and the wider global community. 
 Participation of members in decision-making in ISOCO is ensured through the 
voting mechanism in the Presidents Committee, as well as through procedural 
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safeguards, including requirements on quorum and circulation of resolutions. 53 
Moreover, the ISOCO Board is required to report to the PC at the Annual Meeting.54 
The latter selects the Board members at every Biennial Meeting.55 What is unclear to an 
outsider is how the Board chooses members of the seven Policy Committees whose 
members are responsible for formulating international standards. Fair participation in 
the Policy Committees is important for accountability.  
 IOSCO conducts public consultation for the reports it produces on securities 
regulation. All comments received on a Consultation Report are made public and 
responses to these comments included in the Final Reports.56 From my own survey of 
150 reports produced by the IOSCO between 2000~2010, it has shown that the numbers 
of commentators are small and they are mostly trade associations and stock exchanges 
from developed markets.57 After having abolished the separate Technical and Emerging 
Market Committees, IOSCO members need to find ways to reach out to wider range of 
stakeholders during consultation. Therefore, it is suggested IOSCO should learn from 
the experience of the former Committee of European Securities Regulators, which had 
successfully promoted participation from consumer associations. 58  For this, the 
Organization would need more resources so as to conduct roundtables and seminars to 
engage the participation of both professionals and consumer investor groups. Moreover, 
there needs to be better coordination between consultations at the national, regional and 
global-levels when the same issues are being addressed.  
 Lastly, the transparency of IOSCO has recently been enhanced through the 
requirement of reporting to the FSB on its work and participation by supranational 
organizations in IOSCO’s meetings as affiliate members.59 These improvements have 
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brought IOSCO’s work under greater scrutiny of the international organizations and 
national governments.  
 From the forgoing, accountability framework within the FSB and IOSCO is 
starting to be developed, primarily through the use of wider membership and reporting. 
This development is still limited, as there is small scale participation by transnational 
market players and lack of direct accountability to governments outside the G-20. The 
question is how accountability could be further strengthened to enhance the legitimacy 
of global-level governance? In an attempt to address this question, I will draw on two 
strands of developing scholarly debate. 
1.4 Strengthening global-level accountability 
Studies into Global Administrative Law (GAL) and constitutionalism have been carried 
out to tackle, from two different angles, the problem of ‘legitimacy deficit’ of global-
level governance.60 After a brief summary of the tenets of each of the debates, the 
discussion will then focus on how they each could enhance the Global-level Regulatory 
Framework in securities markets.  
1.4.1 Global Administrative Law (GAL) 
The GAL scholars centre their debate on the question of whether there is, or ought to be, 
a ‘global administrative law’. GAL is defined as ‘the mechanisms, principles, practices, 
and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability 
of global administrative bodies’.61 The main concern of GAL is the procedural aspect of 
accountability.62 Proceeding from the insight that much of global governance can be 
understood as ‘global administrative actions’, scholars use administrative law concepts 
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in national legal systems to address their question.63 ‘Global administrative action’ is 
defined as ‘rulemaking, adjudications, and other decisions that are neither treaty-making 
nor simple dispute settlements between parties’.64 
 The case for the emergence of a body of rules for administering global-level 
activities is set out through the mechanisms, principles, as well as normative bases of 
accountability for global actors. According to empirical analysis, Kingsbury et al. 
identify the key principles of accountability as: participation in decision-making by 
those whose interests are affected, decisional transparency and access to information, 
reasoned decisions and review of decisions.65 A number of models of accountability 
mechanisms have been suggested: domestic institutions reviewing participation by 
national authorities in global collective action, internal review mechanism by global 
actors and national authorities acting as agents of global actors.66 Moreover, it has been 
argued that GAL may perform three normative roles: internal administrative oversight 
of the appointed agents of global actors, protection of private rights or the rights of 
states, and, promotion of democracy.67 
 In the area of financial regulation, empirical research on the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) has shown that a number of the above-mentioned features 
are present in the Basel process.68 Most notably, the ‘notice and comment rule-making’ 
processes in the Second Basle Accord was an excellent example of the principles of 
participation and transparency in action. Between 1999 and 2004, the BCBS launched 
three public consultations on the Second Accord and received over 700 comment 
letters.69 There was evidence of accountability of the Basle process at the national level. 
For example, the US Congressional committee chairs were in contact with US 
regulators during the course of the Basel negotiations expressing their concerns over the 
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draft accords; and there were hearings in both the Congress and the Senate leading up to, 
and after agreements reached on the Second Accord.70 
 There are some important limitations to the present GAL research which need to 
be taken into account when considering its application in designing accountability in 
global governance. Firstly, the boundary of GAL research was never clearly defined, as 
GAL scholars have not succeeded in disentangling ‘administrative’ issues from 
‘constitutional’ ones.71 Therefore, a deliberate narrowing of focus on procedural matters, 
such as transparency and participation, was suggested.72 However, this approach gives 
rise to the second problem, which is that for weaker states, mere inclusion does not 
solve the problem of power. It has been argued by Slaughter73 that the stronger states are 
likely to muster ‘soft power’, such as through training, information and assistance, 
thereby steering towards convergence on the basis of their own laws and regulations, 
rendering the other states to be seen and not heard.74 This problem may be addressed 
through block participation by a group of weaker states. A third fundamental problem of 
the GAL project relates to the continuing uncertainties about the sources of global 
administrative law. As admitted by the founders of GAL themselves, there will unlikely 
be a definitive and detailed body of rules and principles governing global 
administration.75 
1.4.2 Global constitutionalism 
Global constitutionalism is a school of thought nested within public international law.76 
While its precise meaning remains a subject of debate,77 global constitutionalism may be 
broadly understood as a project associated with the various proposals for projecting 
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national constitutional principles onto the international plane. A summary exposition of 
global constitutionalism given by Peters and Armigeon is as follows: 
‘an academic and political agenda which identifies and advocates the application of 
constitutionalist principles, such as the rule of law, checks and balances, human rights 
protection, and possibly democracy, in the international legal sphere in order to 
improve the effectiveness and the fairness of the international legal order’.78 
 The difference between the two academic projects of global constitutionalism 
and GAL, it has been argued, lies within their respective approaches. Whereas the focus 
of GAL has been acuminated to exploring accountability processes, the scope of the 
global constitutionalism agenda is larger in scale encompassing all aspects related to 
constructing a comprehensive and coherent political order.79 However, it has been noted 
above that the authors of GAL have themselves conceded that the overlap in the 
contents of the two projects cannot be disentangled easily. This is echoed by Peters and 
Armigeon, who admit that matters such as due process, proportionality, legality, and 
transparency are administrative and as well as constitutional.80 
 The question is how global constitutionalism with its attempt to construct some 
form of international constitution could assist with solving the legitimacy problem in 
global governance in the securities market. There are two ways in which global 
constitutionalism may be relevant.  
 Firstly, through its foundational role, constitutionalism could create legitimacy 
for the global actors. By establishing some form of international constitution 81  that 
provides the legal frameworks for organizing the public powers in the international 
community, the global actors’ powers and restraints on their powers could be 
legitimised.82 In the view of the Peters by elevating the role of national constitutions to 
the international level, it would compensate for the loss legal uncertainty resulting from 
the global governance trade off.83 
 
78
 Anne Peters and Klaus Armigeon, ‘Introduction-Global Constitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary 
Perspective’, (2009)16 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud.385, 389. 
79
 Krisch, n 7 above, 253. 
80
 Peters and Armigeon, n 78 above, 388. 
81
 Anne van Aaken, ‘Defragmentation of public international law through interpretation: a methodological 
proposal’, (2009) 16 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 483,490. (Where Aaken gives the examples of the 
treaties establishing the WTO, WHO and the UN.)  
82
 Ibid. Also, Krisch, n 7 above, 252-3. 
83
 Anne Peters, ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’, (2009) 16 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud.397, 405. 
Quasi-legal Issues in the GRF 
247 
 Secondly, constitutionalists are seeking to identify shared common values held 
by all humanity, the protection for which gives rise to legitimacy of governance. Cottier 
argues that values such as, human rights and equal conditions of competition and 
property protection in international economic law, are recognized shared common 
values held at all levels of governance, national, regional and global. In accordance with 
my earlier discussions on the meaning of legitimacy, it is submitted that if a global actor 
were to be established to promote universally recognized common values, it could be 
accorded social acceptance on the basis of moral legitimacy.  
 Writing in the aftermath of the GFC, Weber purported to apply Cottier’s concept 
of ‘multilayered governance’, founded on shared common values, to the arena of 
international financial regulation and supervision. 84  According to Weber, ‘some 
principles – beyond that of non-discrimination – are widely acknowledged…and can 
serve as common grounds for establishing a system of multilayered governance [in 
international financial regulation]’.85 He suggested the principles to be financial stability, 
trust/confidence in systems and persons, market integrity.86  
 It is submitted that there are observable differences in the nature of the principles 
suggested by Weber and the values enunciated by Cottier and indeed Aaken in their 
writings on Constitutionalism. The values contained in human rights and equal 
conditions of competition and property protection are attributable to natural persons and 
are intended to confer legal rights on the individual. Principles suggested by Weber 
however may be regarded as common goods in economic terms. However, financial 
regulations to achieve financial stability and market confidence and integrity are not for 
bestowing rights on the individual, and, where the law confers private rights of 
enforcement in securities regulation, controversies remain.87 
 In order to attain legitimacy through protecting common values, the question 
which must be answered is what values are to be the foundations for building and 
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binding multilayered governance? Most importantly, there needs to be some agreement 
on the means for identifying such values.  
 Slaughter has proposed some potential global norms for governing 
transgovernmental networks, including, global deliberative equality, legitimate 
difference, positive comity, checks and balances and subsidiarity.88 These norms may be 
seen as applications of ‘equal conditions of competition’, and, generally speaking, the 
principle of fairness. Moreover, Aeken has suggested that environmental protection is to 
be a constitutional principle together with human rights and the economic law 
principles.89 Since the values set out by the two authors largely correspond with the ones 
enunciated by Cottier, no further light is shed on the overarching issue of how 
fundamental common values are determined.  
 From the above discussions, shared common values could be categorized into 
two types. The first category of values concerns how actors (states, SSBs and 
international organizations) act towards individual persons and each other. The second 
category of values relates to the subject matter of collective actions. The principles of 
human rights, fairness, equal conditions of competition belong to the first category of 
values, which are constitutional in nature. Therefore, they should be universally 
protected in all level and areas of governance for an institution to claim legitimacy. The 
financial regulation and environmental protection objectives belong to the second 
category, as they relate to the goals of different areas of collective actions.  
 One often finds that the objectives of financial regulation are articulated in 
various forms in the founding documents, e.g. the FSB charter and IOSCO’s by-laws. 
However, the constitutional values are not found in the documents. According to the 
constitutionalists’ view, legitimacy of global actors would be enhanced by adding 
constitutional values into the founding documents, and ensuring their observance. 
National review mechanisms, such as administrative and judicial review, could be a 
route for safeguarding observance of the constitutional values by national regulators. By 
applying national review mechanisms to examine global-level collective actions of 
national regulators, it could achieve a see-through effect in global governance. However, 
national review mechanisms at presently do not apply to reviewing whether the acts of 
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national regulators are in conformity with non-binding charters and by-laws,90 further 
research is required to assess whether and how national review mechanisms could be 
adjusted to give effect to the common constitutional values. 
1.4.3 Recommendations 
Drawing from the above discussed approaches, the following recommendations are set 
out for enhancing the accountability framework. 
 
Recommendations on participation: 
1) Membership in the working groups of the FSB and IOSCO is to be fair and 
transparent. The membership should not only be made up of members whose 
markets have strong international presence in a particular area, but should also 
comprise members who believe they are likely to develop market in that area.  
2) Decision making in the plenary meetings needs to be more open. This can be 
achieved by publishing the different points of view expressed and how they are 
resolved during meetings in which decisions are made through consensus.  
3) Market participants and independent body of experts to be invited to the 
meetings as observers. 
4) The founding document is to provide for the methods for determining the 
composition of working groups and transparency of discussions in meetings. 
The founding document should also contain the general principles of fairness 
and non-discrimination for the workings of the actors. 
 
Recommendations on transparency: 
1) Principles of consultation are to be published. There needs to be collective 
efforts made to ensure market participants other than multinational financial 
institutions can actively engage in consultation in international standard-setting.  
2) Standards are to clearly state at whom they are aimed and their implementation 
requirements, i.e. whether they need to be implemented by all members, or only 
those participating in their formulation, or they merely serve as 
recommendations and information.  
3) Regular gathering of information on the degree of implementation of various 
standards, with comments from states on the reasons for not implementing. 
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National accountability system as support for global governance: 
1) National regulators to consult with local market participants on international 
standards before adopting. 
2) Contents of founding documents can serve as grounds for national review, for 
the purpose of checking whether national authorities have acted in accordance 
with the principles which may be considered administrative norms. 
2 Implementation 
Implementation is the second, and perhaps the more frequently raised issue in global 
governance in the financial markets. 91  As discussed in Chapter 5 Section 3.1.2b, 
international financial standards formulated by IOSCO suffer from problems of 
implementation. The implementation problems are associated with the ‘soft law’ nature 
of these standards which are non-binding, often broadly drafted resulting in wide 
ranging interpretations and have no centralised enforcement mechanism.92  
 There are two schools of thought on implementation of soft law. According to 
the realists, national regulatory authorities, being ‘rational and self-interested agents’, 
have an incentive to renege on agreed arrangements when an opportunity to pursue 
short-term benefits arises, since there is no institutional mechanism to punish 
defection.93 However, scholars of soft law and transgovernmental networks argue that 
because international standards are formed on the basis of existing normative consensus 
on an issue area, deliberate defections are rare. Non-compliance is the result of 
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incapacity or failure to understand provisions in a standard.94 Therefore, both schools 
accept the existence of compliance problems in the existing governance structure. 
Whereas realists would seek to achieve compliance through replacing soft law 
mechanisms with a hard law structure, soft law advocates, on the other hand, would rely 
on processes such transparency and capacity-building to strengthen compliance-pull of 
international standards.  
 There is much empirical evidence to support the realists’ contention.95 However, 
my investigation into the internal operations of IOSCO reveals that standards 
established through consensus can indeed lead to compliance.96 In this Section, I will 
first critically examine the effectiveness of the soft law initiatives employed by global 
actors to promote implementation. These initiatives comprise assessments of adherence 
to international financial standards and incentive structures to foster compliance by 
countries which either cannot or will not comply. Then in the last part of this Section, I 
will consider various legal approaches which could be used to harden soft law. 
2.1 Assessment framework 
Assessing jurisdictions’ compliance with international financial standards is arguably a 
Herculean task, due to the broad manner in which these standards are written and the 
absence of a centralized authority responsible for their interpretation. Providing 
transparency on the degree of adherence to international financial standards is both the 
first step towards and the sine qua non for ensuring implementation. 
 Discussions in Chapters 4 have outlined the main initiatives in the IMF, FSB and 
IOSCO in relation to assessing implementation of the standards promulgated by BCBS, 
IOSCO and IAIS. Prior to assessing the initiative, a summary of the current assessment 
framework adherence to international financial standards is firstly provided.  
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 The main route for assessing adherence to the international financial standards 
still lies through the ROSCs conducted by the IMF. All members of the G-20 have 
committed to undergoing ROSCs and FSAP every five years.97 The crucial development 
in the aftermath of the GFC is the setting up of the FSB’s Standing Committee on 
Standards Implementation (SCSI).98 The SCSI is undertaking the following work which is 
complementary to IMF’s assessments. Firstly, the SCSI coordinates the periodic peer 
review of member countries.99 In particular, country reviews examine individual member 
countries’ responses to FSSA and ROSC recommendations published by the IMF and the 
World Bank. Second, the SCSI assesses countries’ adherence to the international 
cooperation and information exchange standards. 100  Third, FSB prepares procedures to 
encourage the adherence of all countries to international financial standards.101 Moreover, 
another element of the assessment framework is IOSCO’s peer review of its members to 
be based on its Methodology for self-assessment.102 
2.1.1 Assessment coverage 
The above-outlined assessment framework appears coherent and comprehensive in 
theory. However, practical limitations within the IMF will render FSB’s approach of 
relying on the FSSA for its ‘country reviews’ unattainable in the future years. 
 In a joint report of the IMF and World Bank, it was found that as a result of the 
increasing costs of conducting full standards assessments, the average number of 
ROSCs produced has decreased from about five in 2002 to around one in 2009.103 Many 
initial FSSAs are therefore produced without ROSCs, or, only with summarized 
Technical Notes which have been said to be less effective and transparent.104 With the 
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FSB’s member jurisdictions’ committing to undergoing FSSA every five years, one 
may conclude, using a simple numerical calculation (and bearing in mind that IMF’s 
membership far exceeds the G-20 (!)), that the ROSCs would not be supplied in time to 
support FSB’s country reviews and their follow-up process.105 
 The IMF and World Bank are currently looking to devise more risk-focused 
ROSCs and shorter modules in place of full FSAP updates. 106  The aim of these 
initiatives is to tailor the assessments more closely to the needs of the countries and the 
priorities and resources of the two institutions. However, it submitted that this selective 
form of assessment may not provide a full picture on countries continuing compliance 
with international financial standards, as the market environments change.107 Therefore, 
it is highlighted here that in addition to the information from the FSSA and ROCSs, 
FSB should look to the SSBs to provide it with information about compliance. IOSCO 
is only beginning of develop a role in peer review and assessment on compliance. In 
accordance with its mandate to ‘coordinate the alignment of the activities of the SSBs to 
address any overlaps or gaps’,108 FSB should oversee and assist IOSCO with developing 
an assessment procedure. 
2.1.2 Jurisdiction-led assessments 
It may be said that ‘transparency through dialogue’ is the central feature of both the 
ROSCs of the IMF and FSB’s peer reviews. 109  Information collection for these 
assessments is carried out primarily through questionnaires designed to gauge the level 
of compliance with international financial standards and/or FSB’s own policies. These 
questionnaires, directed at the relevant authorities of the countries being assessed, are 
intended to engender self-assessments by the authorities themselves. Reports are then 
drafted by a review team on the basis of the self-assessments and other relevant 
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information,110 as well as in consultation with the relevant national authorities. Finally, 
before the reports are formally adopted, the national authorities are again invited to give 
their comments. The reports containing assessments of a country’s level of compliance 
and recommendations for improvement are to reflect the whole dialogue between the 
assessment team and assessed country. 
 It can be seen that as the assessed countries are closely involved in the input 
process of the reports. They therefore have opportunities to exert influence over the 
final outcomes of the assessments.111 Moreover, since the FSB member countries are 
required to implement the recommendations in the assessments reports and failing to do 
so will subject them to ‘exceptional measures’ (see discussions below on ‘incentive 
structure’), it is submitted that the authorities of the assessed countries are likely to try to 
steer the assessment outcomes in a way to their best advantage. 
 It is interesting to note, that while the production processes of the ROSCs and 
FSB’s peer reviews have been designed to provide an amicable dialogue and a mutually 
assisting environment among national regulatory authorities, the goal of changing the 
behaviours of the authorities to foster a ‘race to the top’112 has become much more 
visible in the aftermath of the GFC. The role of global governance would be 
strengthened where peer review leads to behavioural changes. 
 However, the operation of the current jurisdiction-led assessment process is 
inherently vulnerable to the risk of conflicts of interests, and the conflicts could take a 
number of forms. For example, there might be a difference of interpretation on a 
particular standard between the authorities of the assessed country and the review team. 
One way of dealing with this could be to issue an explanation memorandum or an 
agreed assessment criteria.113 Another facet of conflict of interest, relating more closely 
to the issue of transparency, is that authorities may object to the publication of negative 
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assessment outcomes. 114  Regulatory authorities may have valid reasons to resist 
publication of assessments, such as, the assessment contains market-sensitive 
information, or, negative assessments may prejudice a country’s economic development 
prospects. The question is, therefore, how to balance between a particular country’s 
interests and need for transparency in relation to publication, and who determines this.  
 It is therefore submitted that the global actors need to devise ways to address the 
risks of conflicts of interest when conducting the assessment process.  
2.1.3 Transparency of assessment findings 
The issue of transparency has already been discussed in relation to legitimacy and 
accountability. This part analyses the effectiveness of transparency in the context 
dissemination of assessment findings on adherence to international standards. 
 The global actors have different policies on publication of assessment reports. 
For IMF, publication of the FSSA and the ROSCs is voluntary.115 Data have shown that 
there is higher numbers of publications for the developed markets.116 In the FSB, there is 
a strong commitment by its member countries to transparency.117 All peer review reports 
approved by the Plenary are published.118 The FSB has recently published the names of 
all the jurisdictions evaluated in its initiative to encourage the adherence to regulatory 
and supervisory standards on international cooperation and information exchange.119 
Two countries have been named by FSB as non-cooperative jurisdictions.120 
 Financial markets are likely to take into account information in the assessment 
reports into their decision-making process.121 An examination of the FSSAs, ROSCs and 
FSB’s peer reviews has shown that these reports contain summarized findings. General 
phrases such as ‘high degree of compliance’ are often used, without an explanation of 
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the areas of adherence or any existence of non-adherence. At times, the degree 
adherence has not been stated.122 Therefore, it is submitted that markets participants may 
find interpreting and utilizing the reports for decision-making difficult. In addition to 
posting assessment reports such as FSSA and ROSCs in the public domain, it is 
submitted that contents of the information should be improved to enhance accessibility 
for financial market participants. 
 To enhance transparency of the reports for markets participants, a scoring 
approach is suggested here. First, there needs to be clear grading of the degree of 
adherence for each of the provisions in the international financial standards. Secondly, it 
may be beneficial to establish a ranking system for making comparisons between the 
degrees of adherence by countries whose markets are in similar stages of development. 
In IOSCO’s Methodology for self-assessment, adherence to each of the principles in the 
‘Principles and Objectives of Securities Regulation’ can be graded as either ‘fully 
implemented’, ‘broadly implemented’, ‘partly implemented’, or ‘not implemented’.123 It 
is suggested that in order to facilitate comparison between countries, each grade may be 
represented by a number, thus, 3 for ‘fully implemented’, 2 for ‘broadly implemented’, 
1 for ‘partly implemented’, 0 for ‘not implemented’. After a country is given a score for 
each principle, the scores may be added up for each issue area in the IOSCO’s 
Principles and Objective, or to a grand total. This scoring method may supplement the 
existing descriptive analysis on specific risk areas, as it will allow investors and 
financial service providers to see clearly areas where there is compliance and where 
there is not.  
 Lastly, it has been noted above that there is a need to balance transparency with 
other legitimate interests such as confidentiality and national security. The final 
suggestion for this part is that all the global actors should collaborate together to issue a 
policy on transparency. It should address issues discussed in this part. This policy 
should also address how the various legitimate interests are to be weighed during the 
decision to publish the assessment reports, as a means of addressing the conflicts of 
interests discussed above.  
 
122
 FSSA and ROSCs are available on www.imf.org/external/NP/rosc/rosc.aspx. 
123
 See Methodology for self-assessment, n 102 above.  
Quasi-legal Issues in the GRF 
257 
2.1.4 Monitoring of supervisory cooperation 
In addition to complying with international standards, regulatory authorities also must 
fulfil their roles under MoUs, college of supervisors’ arrangements and mutual 
recognition agreements. Monitoring compliance with supervisory requirements is 
currently being carried out by authorities themselves. 124  However, there may be 
disagreement between authorities arising either from interpretation of a written 
document or from an alleged non-compliance. The question is how would the potential 
disagreements may be resolved? The issue of monitoring of supervisory cooperation has 
yet to be addressed by the global actors.  
 In Chapter 3, it was discussed that each of the European Supervisory Authorities 
now have powers to pass binding mediation decisions between Member State 
authorities in relation to their exercising of supervisory functions.125 It is suggested that 
a mediation committee could be set up within IOSCO both to monitor compliance with 
IOSCO’s MMoU and other bilateral MoU on supervision, 126  and to resolve any 
disagreements. A change to ISOCO’s by-laws is required to establish the committee and 
provide for the effect of mediation decisions between the authorities in dispute.  
2.2 Incentive structure 
Building on the efforts to ensure transparency on the degree of adherence to 
international financial standards, a range of incentive tools are formulated by global 
actors to steer individual jurisdictions towards implementation. The incentive structure 
comprises official and market incentives.127 
 Official incentives are tools applied by the official or public sector for promoting 
implementation. The IMF financial assistance programs operating through 
conditionality (or program-related conditions) is one form of public sector incentive. 
Countries are to make specific economic and regulatory adjustments as a condition for 
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receiving aid.128 When the implementation of international financial standards is part of 
conditionality, implementation may be facilitated due to the funding incentive together 
with the monitoring by the Fund’s staff. However, implementation could be frustrated 
when local stakeholders to be affected by the adjustments are excluded from 
international negotiations for the funding arrangements.129 
 The preferred tool of the FSB to foster implementation is international policy 
dialogues which are initiated during its implementation assessments.130 The dialogue is 
to be supplemented by letters to minister of finance highlighting areas of concern. 
Moreover, capacity building remains an important tool to helping regulators in the 
developing economies.131 
 Market incentives are measures to incentives market participants to take account 
of a jurisdiction’s adherence to standards in their decision-making. The first step is to 
make the markets aware of the purpose and relevance of the international financial 
standards, and, then to provide information about the degree of adherence to 
international standards by every jurisdiction.132 The effectiveness of market discipline is 
however doubtful. Markets often suffer from myopia, as proved by the GFC, and so 
market participants may not always regard the need to comply with international 
standards as an important commercial factor.133 
 Outside of official and market incentives, disincentive tools were found in the 
FSB toolbox. Some of these tools are truly harsh, as they bordering on violation of long-
standing international economic law principles. Perhaps the most benign disincentive is 
reputational cost to a country, which is increasingly being recognized as a weapon 
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against non-cooperation.134 Throughout the thesis, I have highlighted how the ‘naming 
and shaming’ tactic has been used in the past year used by both IOSCO and FSB. The 
former has listed the members who have not applied to become the IOSCO’s MMoU, 
and, the latter published the names of (non-member) countries which did not cooperate 
with its assessments on compliance with international cooperation standards. One needs 
to wait and see whether the tactic will engender behavioral changes. 
 The other disincentives mentioned in the FSB toolbox include suspension of 
membership privileges; higher capital requirements on firms operating in jurisdictions 
that are publicly listed as non-cooperative; increased supervisory examination on these 
firm; restrictions on firms to open new operations in jurisdictions that are publicly listed 
as non-cooperative; also, restrictions on any transaction conducted through 
intermediaries operating in non-cooperative jurisdictions. 
 The disincentives in this list will of course only be contemplated under 
exceptional circumstances, for example when the global financial system is being 
threatened with a non-cooperative action. Not only do many of them violate the non-
discrimination principle, but it would also be difficult to reach consensus on when they 
should be used. Therefore, FSB’s decision to create a list of the possible disincentives 
needs to be viewed as a statement of will and commitment to implementing 
international financial standards, rather than as a discriminatory gesture. 
 The effectiveness of the incentive structure may only be revealed with time and 
through empirical research. A question for further research would be how the global 
actors have made decisions on using incentives to foster implementation, and how 
successfully has the goal been achieved? 
2.3 Strengthening soft law – some legal approaches 
The above-analyzed initiatives for transparency accompanied by incentive schemes are 
still being reformed. The realists’ sceptism regarding the effectiveness of soft law 
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mechanism was mentioned at the beginning of this Section. I will briefly outline some 
possible approaches for strengthening soft law should it not proved to be effective. 
 It was discussed in Chapter 5 that codes of conduct of a trade association have 
binding force in the sense that violation may result in sanctioning by the association.135 
Moreover, if a violation of codes of conduct were to result in losses for a market 
counterparty, a court could potentially find that the violation was in breach of contract 
or general duty of care, thereby giving force to the codes.136 An interesting development 
during the GFC was that the International Institute of Finance (IIF) invited inter alia the 
FSB to develop a set of ‘Principles of Conduct and Best Practice Recommendations’ for 
the financial services industry. 137  This report was endorse by the IIF board which 
encouraged all its members to implement its contents and committed to monitoring 
implementation of its members. Moreover, the report made specific references to the 
standards established SSBs with which the IIF principles were said to conform.138 Were 
IIF member firms to implement the report, they would also be indirectly implementing 
international standards. Furthermore, it could be conceived that if a dispute were to arise 
in a national court relating to an alleged loss resulted from an IIF member firm’s non-
compliance with the IIF principles, the court would be indirectly giving effect to the 
principles if non-compliance would be a ground for finding a breach of contract or duty 
of care. 139  According to this analysis, international standard are not conferred legal 
status, thus no sovereignty is violated, courts’ decisions will be based on private rights 
of parties. 
 International lawyers have been analysing the ways in which soft law standards 
may be strengthened through hard law. 140  Giovanoli proposes that the informal 
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international financial standards should become part of a ‘master treaty’ to which 
countries could sign up and make commitments to implement in their jurisdictions.141 
He suggests that only fundamental principles could be in the treaty itself, with technical 
details contained in schedules that could be more easily amended. While Giovanoli 
addresses the structural aspects of reform, Avgouleas has recommended some 
functional issues to be addressed through an international treaty. As partly mentioned 
already, Avgouleas recommends using an international treaty for laying down 
international regulatory principles, IMF’s macro-prudential function, as well as a legal 
structure for the monitoring of risks, micro-prudential supervision and cross-border 
resolution.142  
 The benefits of an international treaty approach are potential to establish 
enforcement mechanisms like those the EU, or, dispute resolution arrangements like 
those in the WTO. 143  Since the world’s securities markets differ and will remain 
diversified in terms of their depth, structural, social function, international pull, two 
fundamental difficulties may arise if an international treaty were to be used in securities 
regulation. Firstly, it would be impossible to apply international standards such as 
IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles in a uniform manner. Secondly, as it would not be 
possible to harmonize every aspect of securities regulation, the difficulty of deciding 
which areas to harmonize is particularly acute due to the risk of regulatory arbitrage. It 
is suggested that a number of question must be addressed before a treaty approach is to 
be considered.  
1) With so many issues in securities regulation, which ones should be harmonized 
and at what level? 
2) How to enforce IOSCO’s ‘Objectives and Principles’ when these would 
necessarily need to be interpreted and applied differently depending on the level 
of development of a securities market?  
3) How will a treaty framework affect the standard-setting by IOSCO’s Policy 
Committees, which would need to be retained due to their flexibility to react 
quickly to market changes? 
 
141
 Giovanoli, n 91above, 46 et seq. 
142
 Avgouleas, n 86 above, Chapter 8. 
143
 For example, see Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, ‘GATS' prudential carve out in financial services and its 
relation with prudential regulation’ (2008) 57 I.C.L.Q. 613. 
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4) Securities market bubbles can grow,as well burst, quickly, therefore how is 
centralized supervision of systemically important markets capable of adapting to 
market developments? 
3 Summary of Findings 
This Chapter has examined two fundamental issues pertaining to global governance in 
securities markets. On the issue of legitimacy, it was established that accountability is 
key both for democratic legitimacy as well as for acceptance-based legitimacy. It has 
been found that the accountability frameworks for the FSB and IOSCO have limitations. 
Therefore ways for promoting greater levels of participation were suggested. In relation 
to the implementation of soft law, the key aspects for fostering implementation were 
examined, namely, assessing degree of adherence and incentive structures. Lastly, some 
legal approaches were considered in relation to implementation. 
 For these two global governance issues, scholars have attempted to seek for 
answers by using national legal framework as models. What has been suggested in this 
Chapter is that the checks and balances within national constitutions should be utilized 
for collective actions at the global-level. Thus standardization at global-level may be 
accompanied national law mechanisms providing oversight of collective actions and 
degree of implementation. 
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Chapter 7:  Conclusions 
 
Although the debates on an International Financial Architecture had begun in 1999, we 
had just got passed the starting line in the marathon to build a stable global financial 
system when countries in the Group of Twenty made commitments to regulatory 
reforms in the aftermath of the GFC.1 This thesis makes a contribution to this great 
building project through establishing the Global Regulatory Framework. My journey 
began with the three global-level regulatory problems, and my research efforts have 
culminated in a central theme: a framework approach anchored on the concept of 
governance.  
 In this final Chapter, I seek to further expound on why the GRF would be a 
suitable approach to addressing the problems in the regulation of transnational securities 
markets. My discussions proceed as follows. First, a brief outline is given of the key 
findings established in my thesis. Second, a case for the GRF is presented. Third, 
limitations and required further research are explained. 
 The evolving nature of securities markets regulation was analyzed in Part 1. 
Since national securities markets have become more complex, as well as interconnected 
on cross-sectoral and cross-border bases, regulation and supervision in the securities 
and wider financial markets had not kept up with changing market practices and 
evolving risks associated with the global macro-economic environment. Partly due to 
the fact that regulatory objectives – reduction of systemic risk, market integrity and 
efficiency and investor protection – had not been achieved, individual savers and the 
society as a whole suffered great economic losses during the GFC, and, as a result, we 
are still fighting to rebuild from the ashes of the global financial collapse. The GFC has 
however provided us with two guiding principles for the future of securities regulations. 
Firstly, systemic risks may be found in the securities markets. Highly leveraged hedge 
funds and investment banking institutions, complex and opaque instruments and trading 
 
1
 As mentioned numerous times before, G20 leaders’ statement, ‘Declaration on Strengthening the 
Financial System’ (London Declaration), London 2 April 2009. 
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infrastructures, abusive and volatility-prone trading practices, as well as counterparty 
settlement risks were all salient features of the pre-GFC securities markets which had 
resulted in aggravating the global impact of the crisis. Addressing these issues, as 
regulators already are doing, is one thing, but, designing a system to identify and 
manage future systemic risks is yet another. The GFC has therefore taught us that 
reforms are needed to equip regulators, as far as possible, with the capacity to address, 
on an on-going basis, systemic risks wherever they are located in the securities 
markets. 2  Secondly, the GFC has shown that securities regulation needs to be 
coordinated at a global-level. It is argued that unilateral, bilateral and regional 
initiatives, if uncoordinated, cannot properly tackle the problems of regulatory conflicts, 
supervisory gaps and systemic risks in the globalizing securities markets. 3 It is this 
insight that forms the basis of the global perspective of my thesis. 
 In Part 2, important lessons for global governance were drawn from the US and 
EU securities regulations, as well as from the existing initiatives of global-level 
cooperation. The analysis of EU securities regulation has revealed the risks of 
harmonization, particularly the difficulties of converging both the laws in books and 
laws in action within the twenty-seven MS. Therefore, it is argued that the costs and 
risks of harmonization indicate that it should not be an instrument of global-level 
regulation. The investigation into the work of IOSCO on the other hand has shown that 
standardization could potentially facilitate convergence at a high-level,4 and, network 
mechanisms could provide the exchange of information for capturing and addressing 
emerging issues.5 However, the impact of IOSCO’s standards is limited. An important 
reason is that the soft law body does not have a coherent implementation structure. 
Moreover, the supervisory framework in the EU is laid down by legislations, 6  and 
accompanied by a binding dispute resolution mechanism and progressively hard, soft 
law guidance structure. While the soft law US-Australia mutual recognition 
arrangement also provides for supervisory cooperation, the IOSCO members’ initiatives 
on supervision are hitherto limited to information exchange. Prima facie, this is 
 
2
 Chapter 1, Section 4. 
3
 Chapter 2, Section 1. 
4
 E.g., the establishment of international disclosure standards. 
5
 IOSCO’s CRAs codes were established before the problems with credit ratings arose during the crisis. 
6
 E.g., issues on allocation of supervisory functions and means of cooperation between home/host MS, 
and ESMA’s right to intervene in securities markets. 
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indicative of hard law, instead of soft law, as the more appropriate form for engendering 
collective supervisory actions. However, the success of the Basle Concordat is evidence 
that soft law may still be effective in fostering supervisory cooperation beyond 
information exchange. Therefore it is argued that a Concordat setting out principles of 
supervisory cooperation is required for securities markets.7 Lastly, it is interesting to 
note that soft law has been the chosen instrument for macro-prudential supervision and 
issuing early warnings both in the EU and at the global-level. Countries in the EU and 
the FSB do not have binding obligations to change their policies or adopt new ones to 
reflect these warnings, which demonstrates their unpreparedness to surrender control 
over national security related matters. 
 The GRF was expounded in Part 3. The two Pillars are the Governance Structure 
and Mechanisms of cross-border supervision. The Governance Structure addresses the 
issues of the functions and forms of global-level governance, as well as the organization 
of global actors within the national, regional and global levels. It was shown that the 
governance of transnational securities markets at the global-level consists of the 
functions of international standard-setting and macro-prudential supervision. 8 
Governance is primarily conducted by national regulators and government ministers 
through soft law arrangements, such as participation in the IOSCO and FSB. 
Furthermore, the IMF is recognized for its role in technical assistance. Although the 
IMF’s Articles of Agreement have not expressly provided for IMF’s role in financial 
regulation, through operational developments and flexible interpretation of the Articles, 
the FSAP and IMF’s multilateral surveillance powers are used to facilitate macro-
prudential supervision and implementation of international financial standards. The 
second Pillar of the Mechanisms of cross-border cooperation provides a framework of 
tools for addressing the three global-level regulatory problems.  
 It is argued that standardization coupled with an implementation framework will 
systematically foster convergence of national regulatory standards at a high-level. Since 
the standard-setting process involves regulators in frequent information exchange and 
mutual assistance, mutual understanding and trust would be fostered, which may be the 
basis for negotiating regulatory barrier-removal procedures and supervisory cooperation. 
 
7
 See Chapter 5, Section 3.3.5. 
8
 See Chapter 5, Section 2.2.4. 
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Moreover, standardization also permits regulatory innovation. It is argued that while 
standards ensure a basic level of protection for investors and against systemic risks, 
national regulators can also enact rules themselves according to the needs of their own 
markets, thus the potentially high impact of regulatory failure from harmonization is 
prevented. The risks of regulatory arbitrage may be addressed if the implementation of 
international financial standards could be ensured. 
 In relation to implementation, it is argued that IOSCO needs to establish a 
coherent structure which would engender clarity as to the status of its standards, and, 
transparency on countries’ adherence both to international financial standards and 
arrangements of supervisory cooperation.9 Incentives structures are also a key part in 
effective implementation. Furthermore, it is argued that the problem of a lack of 
legitimacy in soft law bodies, which often undermines effective standards-setting and 
implementation, may, to some extent, be addressed through ex ante participation and 
transparency on internal operations of the organizations. 10  Establishing general 
principles on common values, such as fairness and non-discrimination, in the founding 
documents of soft law bodies, and, subjecting national authorities to national reviews 
processes in accordance with these principles is recommended as a novel approach to 
accountability in global governance. 
 The GRF consists of flexible structures within which national regulators and 
policy makers interact with their counterparts either directly, or through regional and 
global bodies, to engage in regulatory and supervisory cooperation using a framework 
of soft law instruments. The benefits of a framework approach to governance, it is 
argued, are three-fold. Firstly, as there are many ways to solving a particular regulatory 
issue, a framework for the mechanisms of cross-border cooperation would enable 
regulators to analyze the pros and cons of every conceivable alternative, and, 
accordingly, determine the best solution under the specific conditions existing within a 
particular time frame. The framework approach could also facilitate comparisons 
between the effectiveness of the chosen solutions for different cross-border issues. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the framework approach could also create an incentive for 
regulators to evaluate and revise their solutions, thereby generating reformative effects.  
 
9
 See recommendations in Chapter 4, Section 2.4. 
10
 See recommendations in Chapter 6, Section1.4.3. 
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 Secondly, an essentially soft-law-based governance structure is crucial in 
providing trade-offs between national sovereignty and regulation of the globalizing 
markets. As a result, financial systemic stability is capable of being maintained whilst 
national sovereignty is duly upheld. In the body of my thesis, the argument for an 
international treaty in financial market regulation has been raised and its difficulties 
were discussed in the area of securities regulation. It is argued here that even if an 
international treaty were to be established, the GRF would still be relevant for two 
reasons. Since an international treaty could not cover all regulatory issues, soft law 
standards would have the function of filling the gaps and preventing risks of arbitrage. 
The second reason is that the GRF is flexible enough to encompass a treaty as one part 
of the governance structure – just as the IMF, an international law organization, is also a 
part through its role in macro-prudential supervision and implementation.  
 A third argument in support of the GRF is that not only does it provide 
flexibility for global-level activism, but it also provides opportunities for finding 
solutions at all levels of the governance structure. This point has already been made 
above in relation to using national review mechanisms to facilitate accountability of 
global-level activities. Thus, while the benefits from the flexible governance structure 
are gained, pragmatism at the global-level is kept in check by the rule of law. 
 Having establishing the concept of Global Regulatory Framework in my thesis 
and put forth some recommendations for the contents of the GRF, future research is 
required to further its development. The following list contains the most important 
questions require research in the years to come for building better governance in the 
global financial markets. 
 In terms of the functions of governance: 
1. Haw far has FSB’s implementation initiatives promoted proper 
implementation of international financial standards? How to harness the 
resources of the IOSCO (and SSBs), FSB and IMF to enhance the 
implementation structure for the international standards?  
2. What part may IOSCO play in macro-prudential supervision? How should 
the Early Warnings issues by IMF and FSB feed into the work of SSBs? 
3. How could systemic risks in securities markets be identified, monitored and 
managed? 
4. Is college of supervisors an efficient means of cooperation, or, are further 
structural arrangements needed for supervising cross-border markets and 
entities? 
5. How should consolidated cross-border resolution be designed? 
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In terms of governance structure and form: 
6. Which aspects of regulation should securities regulatory work together with 
other sectoral regulators? Is the current Joint Forum structure adequate to 
cope with cross-sectoral risks? 
7. In what situations should international treaties be used and for what 
purposes? 
 We are living in interesting times, and, if there ever was a time when ‘better 
regulation’ was needed, this is it. 
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Appendix 1:  Of Market Operations and Financial 
Institutions 
 
The processes of the issuance, trading and settlement in securities markets are described 
below in relation to UK and US markets. 
1 Primary Market Issuance 
1.1 Methods of issuance 
There are three identifiable ways in which equities and debt securities are created and 
sold in the primary markets. They are public offerings, private placements and 
auctions.1  
 Securities issuance made under public offerings are subjected to regulatory 
requirements. For example, in the UK, section 85 of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 (‘FSMA’) provides that when an offer of transferable securities2 is made to the 
public, a prospectus must published under the Prospectus Directive, 3  unless an 
exemption4 applies. The statutory definition of public offering is very broad, and it 
refers to any communication to any person which presents sufficient information on the 
securities and their terms to enable an investor to decide to buy or subscribe for the 
securities.5 Under the US federal securities laws, section 5 of Securities Act 1933 (the 
‘Securities Act’) provides that no offer to sell or to buy securities6 may be made, ‘unless 
a registration statement has been filed’. 
 The term ‘private placements’ generally refers the offering of securities to a 
specified group of investors, where such offerings are exempt from regulation. Under 
 
1
 Thomas McInish, Capital Markets – A Global Perspective (Blackwell) 2000. 
2
 As defined in s. 102A(3) FSMA 2000. 
3
 Directive 2003/71/EC. 
4
 Section 86 FSMA 2000. 
5
 Section 102B FSMA 2000. 
6
 As defined in s. 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act. 
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section 86 FSMA, a public offering is exempted from the prospectus requirement if the 
offer is made to qualified investors, or to fewer than 100 persons, or if the consideration 
paid by any person for the securities is at least 50,000 euros. Under the Securities Act, 
similar exemptions are contained in sections 4(2) and 3(b).7 The advantage of a private 
placement is that it can be arranged quickly and without the need to publicly disclose 
corporate information. Investor base in private placements often comprises wealthy 
individual and financial institutions, such as pension funds and insurance companies.  
 Auctions are often used to issue sovereign debts 8 . For example, in the UK 
treasury gilts are issued by the Debt Management Office (DMO) and auctioned to 
members of the DMO’s Approved Group of Investors.9 
1.2 Securities underwriting 
Underwriting may not be used for all public offers of corporate securities. For example, 
companies that are not well established may not be able to find an underwriter that will 
give a firm commitment and assume the risk of distribution. In this case, investment 
banks may be engaged to provide a service of distributing securities using their best 
efforts. Paradoxically, companies that are well established may on occasions be able to 
successfully place their securities on the markets without using underwriters. Selling 
agents may still be used to facilitate efficient merchandising of securities. 
 There is a new trend for issuers to sell their shares directly to the public through 
offering on the Internet. A number of sites have been developed on which these firms 
can advertise their offerings. William Hambrecht has formed a firm to offer shares and 
bonds over the Internet.10 The means by which the securities are offered is by means of 
auctioning.  
 Where underwriting is used, the following processes may be identified. In the 
UK, the managing bank is known as the ‘lead manager’, and as the ‘originating bank’ in 
the US. The process of issuance commences with the prospective issuer granting a 
mandate to an investment bank for the management of the marketing and distribution of 
 
7
 The Securities Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) has also promulgated Rule 505 and 506 to provide safe 
harbours in securities offerings. 
8
 McInish, n 1 above, Chapter 7. 
9
 www.dmo.gov.uk 
10
 www.wrhambrecht.com 
Appendix 1 
284 
its securities. The mandate is usually preceded by a period of negotiations between the 
manager and the issuer during which the important terms and condition relating to the 
issue is determined. To spread the underwriting risk, the manager forms a group of 
underwriters by first publicly announcing the issue and inviting interested parties to join 
the group. The group is then formed seven to fourteen days 11  after the public 
announcement upon the formal signing of legal documents. The documents provide the 
legal framework for the marketing and placing of the securities. Three types of 
documents generally constitute the formal signing. The first is the subscription 
agreement12 which is entered into between the issuer and the group of underwriters 
including the manager bank. It contains the underwriting obligation given to the issuer 
by members of the group. In a second document, the underwriters enter into an 
agreement inter se to allocate between themselves the proportion of securities that each 
would underwrite. In a third document, a separate selling group is formed to 
merchandise the securities. The selling group members undertake no underwriting 
obligations.  
 After the signing of documents, the manager formally allots securities on behalf 
of the issuer to prospective subscribers. Once the securities have been placed, the 
closing of the bond issue take place usually about a week after the signing. Two more 
important events take place at the closing. The first is the signing of a further number of 
documents for establishing a regime for administration of the securities. The documents 
may include paying agency agreement, fiscal agency agreement and trust deed. The 
second is the transfer of funds from subscribers to the issuer. This is again arranged 
through the manager, who, receives funds from the subscribers and transfers them to 
issuer’s account, and, on the same day, also delivers securities to the subscribers. 
Traditionally physical paper instruments were delivered. In the present day, only 
electronic records of the securities are issued.13  
 
11
 Ravi Tennekoon, The Law and Regulation of International Finance (London: Butterworths) 1991. 
12
 Known as ‘subscription agreement’ in the US. 
13
 Developed to facilitate settlement and deal with risks. See section 1.2.3 below on electronic settlement. 
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2 Secondary Markets Trading 
Secondary markets provide mechanisms for the trading of securities. They enable 
investors to sell and purchase securities in accordance with their needs. The existence of 
a liquid secondary market provides investors with an incentive for risk taking in 
securities investment, and it is the linchpin in a strong capital market. Therefore, it is in 
the interest of the issuer to ensure that a secondary market exists for its securities. 
Moreover, it is also crucial that the law facilitates the establishment of an efficient 
secondary market through appropriate regulatory regime and framework of legal rules 
protecting personal and proprietary rights of private parties.  
 To ensure the effective buying and selling of securities, procedures have been 
put in place in secondary markets to provide price disclosure, trading, clearing and 
settlement and also reporting of trades. These procedures are regulated either by rules of 
institutions or by official regulators. 
 In addition to buying and selling, securities dealings in the secondary market 
also consists of securities lending and collateral taking. Custodian banks whose core 
business is safekeeping and administration of securities also provide a variety of value 
added services such securities lending.14 Securities lending reduces settlement failure 
risks and enhances market liquidity. Moreover, securities are used as collateral in 
different transactions on money markets, capital markets and derivatives markets. 
A. Trading venues 
There are a number of different forums in which contracts can be entered into for the 
buying and selling of securities. 
i) Auction 
 
14
 Joanna Benjamin and Madeleine Yates The Law of Global custody 2nd edition 2003, Chapter 1. 
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An auction is an organised system to determine the price of an asset principally through 
open bidding 15 . An auction market needs to provide a forum, either physical or 
otherwise, in which price can be determined. 
ii) Exchange  
An exchange is an organised and officially recognised market on which securities are 
bought and sold16. In addition to its trading function, an exchange may also perform a 
regulatory role. Its listing rules stipulate the types of issuer whose securities can be 
listed and impose disclosure requirements, while its trading rules control exchange 
membership and regulate members’ behaviour. As a result, non-members can only buy 
and sell securities on an exchange through attaining the service of members. Thus if a 
non-member pension fund wishes to trade securities list on an exchange, it needs to 
employ a member to act as broker. The broker enters on the exchange to trade with 
other members as the fund’s agent. Exchange rules may restrict their members to act in 
a single capacity as either brokers (who execute buy and sell orders for others) or 
dealers (who are required to buy or sell securities for their own account for maintaining 
fair and orderly markets). However rules17 often allow members to act in dual capacities.  
 Traditionally, exchanges used to require a physical location for traders to gather 
together18. Exchange trading has increasingly become electronic with transactions being 
conducted on screen or internet or intranet terminals using passwords and security codes. 
Early electronic trading was developed in the 1960s by the main exchanges such as the 
Toronto Stock Exchange. Since the 1986, the LSE has adopted screen trading. 19 
However, trading on some main exchange, such the NYSE and Tokyo exchange, is still 
conducted on trading floors. 
 
15
 Michael Blair and George Walker (ed.), Financial Markets and Exchanges Law (Oxford: OUP 2006), 
Chapter 1.  
16
 See Ruben Lee, What is an Exchange? (Oxford: OUP) 1998. 
17
 For example rules governing the London Stock Exchange. 
18
 The London Stock Exchange grew from traders’ meeting place at Jonathan’s Coffee-house from the 
year 1680. The New York Stock Exchange found its humble root under a buttonwood tree outside 68 
Wall Street in Lower Manhattan. 
19
 The LSE now operates through a number of parallel system including SEAQ (Stock Exchange 
Automated Quotations System), SEAQ International, SETS (Stock Exchange Trading Services) and 
SEATS Plus (Stock Exchange Alternative Trading Services). www.londonstockexchange.com.  
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iii) OTC 
Securities trading which occurs otherwise than on stock exchange takes on the so-called 
‘over the counter’ or OTC market. OTC markets have no physical location or formal 
organisational structure. OTC trading involves buyers and sellers dealing directly with 
each other by telephone or electronically.  While OTC markets are generally self or 
even non-regulated, participants may adopt standard form documents devised by trade 
association and are subject to general securities regulation with regard to authorisation, 
conduct and client remedies. 20 
 NASDAQ was formed in the US to challenge the monopoly of the NYSE. Major 
OTC markets include the foreign exchange, Eurobond markets and part of the derivative 
markets. Price information is provided by information vendors such as Reuters and 
Bloomberg.  
iv) Order book 
Some large brokers increasingly carry out their client orders by conducting trade in-
house. This involves the firms first offsetting their own and client positions regarding a 
particular security on an internal order book, and then purchasing securities on a formal 
exchange before end-of-day trading to cover net exposures. Although this method 
reduces trading cost, problems regarding pricing, reporting and ensuring fair conduct 
raises regulatory concerns. 
B. Competition to exchanges 
As a consequence of changes in regulation and technological advancements, players in 
equity markets have developed trading platforms as alternatives to trading on the main 
exchanges.  
 In the US, growth in electronic communications networks (ECNs) have been 
spurred by the SEC’s decision to grant them complete access to the NASDAQ in 1997. 
ECNs operate through the process of posting price and size of limit orders received 
from clients and automatically matching these buy and sell orders. Transactions are 
 
20
 Blair and Walker, n. 15 above 
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completed when an internal match is found. When an internal match for an order is not 
found, the ECNs then post order an on NASDAQ. Compared with other main 
exchanges, such as the NYSE, the ECNs offers investors potentially lower transaction 
costs, faster execution, more information and greater anonymity. ECNs are regulated as 
brokers and are subject to rules of NASDAQ.21 However, some ECNs have applied to 
the SEC to become stock exchanges22. This entitles them to self-regulation, and, more 
importantly, access to the Intermarket Trading System in which they can commit to buy 
or sell the stock at another exchange. 
 In the UK, some new exchanges and alternative trading systems have emerged 
as competitors of the LSE. PLUS Markets plc23 (PLUS) and virt-x24 are Recognised 
Investment Exchanges (RIE) supervised by the LSE. Virt-x offers investors access to a 
variety of markets, namely, Swiss blue chip securities, lead European blue chip 
securities and electronics traded funds (ETFs). Chi-X offer investors a means of trading 
FTSE 100 stock outside the LSE.25 
3 Settlement Risks and Their Management 
Settlement is the delivery of securities and payment under a sales and purchase 
agreement or pursuant to a collateral arrangement. While deliveries are usually made 
against payment, some are made without a corresponding payment, for example, the 
delivery of securities made pursuant to a margin call.26 
 Before settlement takes place, the commercial party who is entitled to receive 
the securities is exposed to a variety of risks, which are collectively known as securities 
settlement risks in the markets.27 The principal risk is credit risk. This is the risk of loss 
resulting from counterparties defaulting on securities transactions, typically as a 
 
21
 List of NASDAQ members include: 
22
 McAndrews, James and Stefanadis. ‘The Emergence of Electronic Communications Networks in the 
US Equity Markets.’ Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 6, 
no. 12 (2000). 
23
 www.plusmarketsgroup.com  
24
 www.virt-x.com 
25
 Norma Cohen, ‘Buoyant trading at Chi-X Europe News Digest’. FT (07/08/07). 
26
 For more examples see Joanna Benjamin in ‘Overview of Post-trade Infrastructure, Part I’ [2003] 4 
JIBFL 127. 
27
 See Benjamin, Recommendations for securities settlement systems, available from ICSCO website 
www.icsco.org. 
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consequence of insolvency. Failure to deliver by one counterparty may cause liquidity 
risks, since it may result in other market counterparties not being able to make their own 
deliveries pursuant to other agreements. If liquidity risk is not addressed quickly enough, 
it may lead to systemic risk and cause further insolvencies and disruption to the whole 
market. There is also operational risk, which is the result of human error or securities 
settlement system deficiencies.  
 In traditional securities settlement systems, paper instruments and certificates are 
physically moved from one place to other. Under such settlement systems, there is a 
particularly high level of risk that loss will materialise. This is firstly because paper-
based settlement is slow resulting in a longer time interval between conclusion of trade 
and settlement. Generally speaking, the longer the time interval, the greater the credit 
risk. Secondly, since paper may easily be lost or stolen, the level of operational risk is 
also high. Moreover, paper-based settlement is inadequate to cope with the gigantic 
amount of paper arising from a sharp increase in trading volumes. This had led to the 
‘paper crunch’ crisis, 28  during which backlogs of unsettled trades threatened the 
integrity of the securities markets. 
 Market participants have developed a number of mechanisms29 for managing 
risks in securities settlement. Among these mechanisms, dematerialization of securities 
and electronic settlement through a central securities depository are the most 
fundamental. In an electronic settlement system, 30  instead of holding physical 
certificates or instruments, market participants 31  maintain securities accounts with 
custodians in which their security entitlements are recorded. To settle a sale of securities, 
a buyer and a seller of the transaction simply give matching instructions to the 
settlement system, which, in response to these instructions, debits the securities account 
of the seller and credits that of the buyer, and also credits the cash account of the seller 
and debits that of the buyer. Through the technique of entries in accounts, the electronic 
 
28
 ‘Paper crunch’ occurred in the US in the 1960s, and also the in UK in the 1980s. 
29
 For example see the 1989 report of ‘Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World’s Securities 
Markets’ (‘G30 Report’) of the Group of Thirty. Established in 1978 in New York, the Group of 
Thirty has as one of its aims the deepening of the understanding of international economic and 
financial issues. www.Group30.org. 
30
 CRESTCo. is an example of an electronic settlement system. www.euroclear.com/site/public/CRE. 
31
 As discussed above, market participants in the secondary market comprise traders, end-investors and 
brokers acting on their behalf. 
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settlement system may be able to achieve ‘delivery versus payment’ which is a means of 
eliminate credit risk by ensuring that delivery occurs if, and only if, payment occurs.  
 The process of clearing is another mechanism for managing settlement risks. 
Clearing takes place after trading and before settlements. Its core function is to interpose 
a well-capitalised institution (the central counterparty) between the original parties of a 
trade agreement. An additional function of clearing is the netting of obligations of 
market participants. Netting reduces of the credit exposure of each participant. 
 
Appendix 2 
291 
 
Appendix 2:  Questionnaire on IOSCO 
 
Mr David Cliffe at IOSCO’s Secretariat provided a telephone interview for the 
‘Questionnaire on IOSCO’ on February 27, 2012 at 15:00 GMT. Below is the transcript 
of the interview which lasted 59 minutes in total. I am very grateful for Mr Cliffe’s time 
and assistance, and, in particular, I very much appreciate his sharing of knowledge, 
experience and insight into the raison d'être and operations of the Organization.  
1 On IOSCO’s Role in the Global Financial Market 
1.1 Standard-setting 
1. Please describe the standard-setting process of the Technical Committee and the Emerging 
Market Committee. Please include information on what criteria or mechanisms are used by 
Committee members to identify issues for investigation, how the composition of the various 
Standing/Working committees is determined, and what processes are used for setting new 
standards, reviewing existing standards and carrying out stakeholder consultation. 
 
DC- On the composition question first, we have the TC and EMC, which both have a number of 
self-committees. So in the TC, there are 6 standing committees:  
• Multinational Disclosure and Accounting;  
• Regulation of Secondary Markets;  
• Regulation of Market Intermediaries;  
• Enforcement and the Exchange of Information;  
• Investment Management;  
• Credit Rating Agencies. 
There are also a number of task forces, one of which is the commodities Task Force, which will 
actually be shortly transformed into a standing committee. There are also other Task Forces. 
For instance, Task Force on Unregulated Entities, which focuses on hedge funds, Task Force on 
Unregulated Markets and Products, a joint Task Force with CPSS which looks at market 
infrastructure, also a Task Force on OTC derivatives. Also, the Task Force on Short-selling 
which is on ice at the moment, but may be reactivated sometime in the future. The membership of 
the above is made up of TC members. However, membership in the standing committees is not 
exclusive. In some instances, there will be members from outside that grouping. For instance, in 
the case of the Investment Management Standing Committee, Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore 
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and Jersey participate in that Committee, as a reflection of those jurisdictions’ involvement in 
this particular market segment. I also know, Norway participates in the Commodities Task Force, 
as do Saudi Arabia and the Dubai Financial Services Authority. In general, membership is 
reflective of the TC itself, but in some cases, depending on the particular topic, membership can 
be drawn from outside of the TC.   
The EMC, has five working groups, reflective of the five committees in the TC. The 
membership of these is more reflective of the interest of members in the Emerging Markets 
jurisdictions to partake in the relevant work. The work can be quite demanding of members’ 
resources, so everything depends on members’ commitment to do particular work or their ability 
to do the work.  
The SC/WG have around four meetings per year. At those meetings members will 
discuss events and market activities from their own jurisdictions. Members will discuss among 
themselves any emerging trends in particular areas that cause them concern, or they that think 
could become an issue for securities regulators. It is through this process of information 
exchange that they identify issues [to address]. At present, you see that a lot of the work we are 
undertaking is coming from the G20/FSB. 
  If you look back at previous IOSCO reports, you will see that many of the topics that 
are covered are as a result of the discussions within the SC and WG. When they see an emerging 
issue in a particular sector, members will take that away, and the Committee will develop a 
mandate which will be discussed among the members. A sub-committee or a sub-group will 
develop the mandate. The mandate is then to be presented by the Chair of the SC to the TC, or 
Chair of the WG to the EMC. Whereupon approved, the mandate will be the work going forward, 
and will include a timetable and description of the work, and what outcomes would be. On our 
website, you can find a copy of the mandate of the OTC derivatives Task Force that will give you 
an idea of what is produced by the Committees in terms of risks and issues identification for 
their work streams. 
The members will also invite some industry participants to attend some of their 
meetings to make presentation or to discuss issues. This can be another avenue and forum where 
work can be identified and generated. At the present, the TC holds twice a year meetings with 
financial market stakeholders, where we present IOSCO’s recent work or upcoming work 
streams for the future, on which they can comment or raise new issues. There is quite a free flow 
of information between IOSCO and financial market stakeholders. This is a relatively recent 
development –the first meeting of this kind held in Tokyo in 2007 (which I was at myself) was the 
first attempt to directly engage with the financial markets by the TC. 
[On reviewing of existing work]A paper published last week on a review of collective 
investment schemes’ valuation principles updates work published in 1999. There is an element 
within the Committee’s work to look back at previous work, as prompted by market development. 
In this case, during the GFC, we had an issue of redemptions of collective redemption schemes 
which caused the issue of the valuation of collective investment schemes to come to the fore. 
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Many of the reviews are prompted by market developments and call into question whether the 
existing guidelines and principles are fit for purpose. 
The principles are developed within the standing committees through discussion and 
consensus, although we have had some recent issues. If you look in early 2011, we published a 
paper on moving OTC derivatives to platform trading where there was a divide of opinion. We 
brought out seven standards on which everyone could agree, but there was an eighth standard 
where there was some difference of opinion. This was set out in the paper, a first for IOSCO. The 
final standard to a number of members was an issue [could not be agreed on]. Not all the 
principles are developed by consensus, although they are generally done by consensus. 
The results of the work [in standing committees] would be presented to the TC for 
consideration and presented to the public for consultation. The period of consultation is 90 days, 
but we can accelerate the period if the need arises. 
Asked whether the bylaws of the TC/EMC provide guidance for the process of standard-
setting, DC said ‘no’. 
 
2. What are the criteria for determining whether a report/issue should be a matter for a Presidents’ 
Committee resolution? And who determines this?  
 
That would generally be determined by the Executive Committee I think.  A very few reports 
actually go for PC resolutions. Such decision is taken when the Organisation wants to bind itself 
to a particular issue, such as, the objective and principles of securities regulation, which is of 
relevance to all members. Whereas many of the standards set in the committees are discrete to 
particular sectors that may not apply to all members. We do not submit those to the PC. 
[Further asked whether it is always the EC that selects issues for PC resolutions] The 
EC has devolved powers from the PC, which only meets once a year, so the EC by its very nature 
is the executive of the PC. 
 
3. How and to what extent does IOSCO monitor implementation by members of (1) Presidents’ 
Committee resolutions (especially the 1998 resolution adopting Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation), and (2) reports adopted by the Technical or Emerging Market 
Committees that have not been subject to Presidents’ Committee resolutions?  
 
I will take the second question first. [For] The reports (and standards and guidelines) that are 
generated in the TC and EMC, members will look to implement these themselves. Because the 
way the standards and guidelines are developed, members will already meet these requirements. 
The standards and guidelines and principles exist there as reference for members who may be 
looking at a particular market sector, either to develop that or to tighten up regulation. You will 
see, in many of our reports we make reference to the fact that the principles are drafted at a 
high-level in order to give members flexibility in implementing them into their own legislation, 
or adopting them to the facets and characteristics of their jurisdictions’ markets. So it is not 
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‘one-size-fits-all’ requirements that we come up with. The requirements are designed to be 
flexible, so that members can implement them if they are needed within their jurisdictions.  
We have in more recent times done a lot more on looking at how members have 
adopted various proposals and guidelines in particular areas. You will find on the website one 
or two reports on how members have adopted the CRAs model code of conduct in national 
legislations. We are moving forward looking at how member have applied the principles that are 
set out in the various final reports. 
On the PC, we are in the process of setting up an ‘assessment committee’, which will 
look at members’ adherence and implementation of the objectives and principles of securities 
regulation. The implementation of these falls within the remit of IMF’s FSAP process (and also 
the World Bank’s), which is the assessment of jurisdictions’ application of the principles. The 
‘assessment committee’ is to look at how members go about adopting our principles and 
standards. 
[Asked about the composition and remit of the ‘assessment committee’] This is an 
internal IOSCO committee, whether it will make external report cannot be said. This committee 
is being led by Australia and India, as the Chair and vice-Chair of that committee. 
[Further asked about whether the committee’s existence would be publicized] Cannot 
say at this time. 
 
4. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the present standard-setting and implementation 
mechanisms for attaining the three regulatory objectives in IOSCO’s ‘Objectives and Principles 
of Securities Regulation’? Please provide examples. And how might the mechanisms need to be 
enhanced with a view to preventing future crisis? 
 
I am afraid this is an opinion-based question which I cannot provide an answer. The one thing I 
would say, the regulatory objectives go to inform the work that we do, we don’t tick the box 
saying we have achieved this. The objectives are in a way the raison d'être of the Organisation, 
the ongoing timeless objectives, to be reflected and achieved through the day-to-day work of the 
Organisation. 
1.2 Cross-border market surveillance 
1. Since the publication of the report on ‘Principles Regarding Cross-Border Supervisory 
Cooperation’ in May 2010, has there been any follow-up action to monitor how the principles 
have been adopted by IOSCO members? Or have any follow-up actions been planned for the 
future? 
 
It has not been discussed in the most recent meeting in Tokyo two weeks ago. The reports would 
generally set out what the next steps may be. Many of the reports, this one in particular, are 
designed to help members in the sphere. The [Supervision] report says supervisory cooperation 
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is no substitute for effective regulation. The attitude is that the principles are there as a guide for 
members, it is not that they have to be inserted into their legislation.  
Some principles do not apply at all for some members, for instance, in some 
jurisdictions, CRAs are not regulated or approved. But if the regulator chooses to look into this 
area, IOSCO’s work in the CRA area would be a bespoke regulatory guide. For example the EU 
Regulation on CRAs makes a lot of positive references to IOSCO’s work which had served as the 
basis for the legislation. Anecdotally, the Chair of Brazilian CVM said in an interview that they 
are able to take ‘off-the-shelf’ policies and guidelines of IOSCO in developing the capital market 
in Brazil. 
 
2. Please describe the function and operation of the Standing Committees, in particular, how they 
fulfil the role as a supervisory cooperation mechanism according to Principle 11 of the above 
report on cross-border supervision. In what ways might the workings of the Standing 
Committees networks need to be further enhanced?  
 
Already partly covered above [in question1]. The standing committees meet more frequently 
than the TC, they have the opportunity to discuss developments in their own markets, developing 
issues that they may see. We have a standing committee on Research and Risk, also a useful 
forum for exchange of information. The Committee focuses on risk itself. It has representatives 
from TC members’ research departments. [Also,]The nature of IOSCO is to form continuous 
contacts between members in their day-to-day work and to enhance relationship building 
between regulators. 
 
3. Does IOSCO provide for its members a mechanism for routinely sharing of supervisory 
information on regulated entities and markets, and information relating to regulatory and market 
developments? If so, is there a central storage for such information?  
 
The information sharing mechanism is member contact. One of a concrete example is through 
the MMoU for enforcement purposes. This is one of the high achievements of IOSCO in the last 
ten years. It sets a high threshold for members when signing up, because it involves members 
having to change legislation to be able to meet the information sharing requirements. This 
information sharing mechanism can also be used for supervisory purposes if there is an issue 
developing within a particular market, it would enable members to share information. What 
IOSCO stands for is the bringing together of regulators from national markets. 
The Secretariat would not provide [centralised information storage]. I am not sure how 
national jurisdictions would feel about a third party holding information of that kind, with all 
sort confidential issues. [Unlike the EU] IOSCO is a private organisation that consists of public 
bodies. We are not a treaty organisation; we a coming together of members; and [unlike ESMA] 
we do not have supervisory or regulatory powers. 
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4. Do you consider there to be a need for an international informational repository for the gathering 
of information on systemically significant activities and entities and on outcomes of risk 
assessments? Which international body/bodies could undertake such role? How might IOSCO’s 
new research department contribute in this respect? 
 
That is an opinion question, I cannot answer. A question for the FSB. 
[On the new research department] They are currently working on a risk outlook, with 
the first report due in May 2012. IOSCO has dedicated some research towards this work. A 
number of staff in the Secretariat work in support of the standing committee on Research and 
Risk (formed in 2011) and of other standing committees. 
1.3 Mutual assistance and sharing regulatory experience 
Please provide some examples of mutual assistance and sharing regulatory experience under the 
auspices of IOSCO. 
 
MMoU is the best example we have of mutual assistance. One area we are looking to up our 
game is capacity building for members. This is generally aimed at members who have 
developing capital markets, or who are looking to develop capital markets, or whose regulators 
feel that they could benefit from the experience and knowledge of regulators from more 
developed markets. This is one of the work streams the Secretariat is supporting. You do find 
that members support the work of the Secretariat in this area by providing teams with a 
variation of experience. This area should be mentioned in some of the recent resolutions. As the 
work on the MMoU draws to a close in January 2013, the Organisation is putting up resources 
in capacity building. 
2 On Future Orientation of IOSCO’s Work  
1. Does mutual recognition form part of IOSCO’s future work plans? 
No plan for work in mutual recognition. This falls outside the remit of IOSCO.  
2. Does IOSCO intend to develop its work in cross-border crisis management either in relation to 
the collapsing of international securities firms or volatility in securities markets?  
In relation to crisis-management, through the standard committees, IOSCO facilitate this 
through its member contacts. 
3. What are the main work streams for the Organisation in the next five years? 
[See email on work stream]  
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3 On IOSCO’s Organisation  
1. Why was it considered necessary to change the Bylaws in respect to the Executive Committee? 
In what ways would a new IOSCO board constituted by means of PC election impact on the 
work of the Organisation?  
 
The creation of the IOSCO Board came about as a result of the review of the strategic Task 
Force. With IOSCO’s growing profile, there was a need for IOSCO to coalesce more. With a 
number of disparate committees, several chairs, there was a need for IOSCO to become more 
streamlined such that there would only be one decision-making body. The composition of the 
Board is to be announced in the Annual Conference in Beijing in May. There will be members 
transiting into the Board [from the Executive Committee], and elected members as well. 
 
2. What is the future role of the Technical committee as a result of the proposed Bylaws changes? 
 
The Technical Committee will cease to exist as a separate committee. The EMC would still exist 
with a role in capacity building. The working groups of the EMC and standing committees of the 
TC will merge to form the IOSCO committees. With a broader membership, they will undertake 
the policy work and be answerable to the Board. The Board will oversee the running and policy-
making of the Organisation, (rather than have that discrete split presently existing). There will 
be a Chairman/Chairwoman of the Board, who will be one of the two recognisable figureheads 
of IOSCO along with the Secretary General. 
 This will reduce possible confusion for outsiders, which arose in the past about who is 
responsible – due to the distinction between the chair of the executive committee (the head of the 
Organization) and chair of the TC (responsible for most policy work).    
The structure of the new working committees will be the same as the present seven work streams. 
 
3. How does IOSCO see itself in the post-2007 international regulatory landscape? How does its 
role relate to the other international groupings and Organisations, including the FSB, IMF, the 
EU and other standard setters? 
 
We are the forum for securities markets regulators. We are an active participant on the FSB, on 
which IOSCO has two seats. We actively cooperate with the World Bank and IMF, in particular 
by providing the objectives and principles for FSAP in the regulation of securities markets. Also, 
we contribute to the capacity building area of the IMF. The European Commission is a member 
of IOSCO; ESMA is looking to become a member. The European Commission participates in our 
committees as observers.  
The profile of IOSCO has risen in the time I have been here, partly due to the quality of 
its work. We worked on CRAs sometime before the problems in the structured finance market 
emerged. We have got deserved credit for the actual work. Every time there is a Communiqué 
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from G20, there is a request for work from IOSCO, which would either be a request to be 
reported to the FSB or directly to the G20. We are not subordinate to either of the Organisations. 
That is something which we value; we are independent. 
 
